



DISCOVERY OF MARX

HARSH NARAIN

DISCOVERY OF MARX

By the same author

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DISCOVERY OF MARX

HARSH NARAIN

M. A., Ph. D.

Department of Philosophy
North-Eastern Hill University,
Shillong.

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To my wife

My dear wife
I have just received
your letter of the 10th
and am glad to hear
from you. I am well
and hope this finds
you the same.

To my wife

I have just received
your letter of the 10th
and am glad to hear
from you. I am well
and hope this finds
you the same.

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Preface

I have the pleasure of presenting Dr. Harsh Narain's *Discovery of Marx* to the world of serious students of Marx. The work is the quintessence of the learned author's intensive study of Marxism and his occasional deliberations thereon at the seminars of the Lucknow Akademi. We have decided to bring to light other *discoveries* as well, from the pen of our learned author as well as others participating in the seminars of the Akademi.

The Akademi is a modest forum of thought, and we consider it obligatory upon us to preserve and publish its deliberations. We would welcome co-operation in our venture, in whatever form, from all those who feel interested in promoting constructive thinking in the country.

I conclude this prefatory statement with a note of gratitude to Dr. Harsh Narain on behalf of the Akademi as well as on behalf of his would-be readers and admirers.

Ashok Kumar Kalia

General Secretary

Lucknow Akademi



CHAPTER I

An Introductory Statement

Marxism is vibrantly alive today, as the one global ideology the impact of which is betrayed by all theoretical issues underlying or overlying contemporary social, economic, and political developments. In fact, Marxism is not only philosophy, speculative philosophy, pure and simple; it is more in the nature of a study of the actual world, of the human situation, with the avowed purpose of changing it. 'Philosophy and the study of the actual world', according to Marx and Engels, 'have the same relation to one another as onanism and sexual love.'¹ In fact, they had a distaste for mere philosophy. Compare what they have to say in another but related connexion: 'Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the *criticism of religion* into *criticism of right* and the *criticism of theology* into the *criticism of politics*.'² Marx also remarks: 'We do not turn secular questions into theological questions. We turn theological questions into secular ones.'³

1. *GI*, p. 259.

2. *CCHPR (OR)*, p. 42.

3. 'OJQ', p. 151.

In fact, Marxism is an ideology, in a rather un-Marxian sense, though; it is philosophy, passion, and plan rolled into one. It is undoubtedly the most dominant ideology of the twentieth century, and thereby deserves our foremost attention.

Here is an humble attempt to discover the fundamentals of the ideology, to the studious exclusion of matters of detail. Much of the writings of Marx and Engels is of a polemical character, and much of the polemics is dated. This and all other clearly dated matters have entirely been ignored in this inquiry. Here we are concerned more with substantive issues than with adjectival or expressional ones. This is the only way of rounding off the angularities of a system. Our chief concern is to discover the spirit of Marx rather than to highlight his pitfalls like the bulk of his critics. The Marxian dialectic and so-called materialism seem to us to be not only not organically or intimately related to each other but even mutually contradictory. Should this circumstance lead us to wind up the issue by dismissing dialectical materialism as self-contradictory out of hand? The bulk of the critics of Marx have done so; logical positivists would surely do so. Our finding, in Chapter III, on the contrary, is that the term 'dialectical materialism' is a misnomer and that Marxism is a kind of what we have chosen to term 'transmaterialism'. Materialism as emphasis on the ontologically given, on the ontologically immediate, is one thing and dialectical materialism is quite another. Higher, dynamic materialism, or materialism in its higher reaches, tends to transcend itself. Sample the positions of Samuel Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, J. C. Smuts, and the like, who begin with materialism of one sort or another but end with theism or immaterialism of one sort or another. Alexander and Lloyd Morgan have had to postulate a principle, *nisus*,⁴ as the propelling and directing force behind the process of evolution. The process, inseminated by *nisus*, ultimately gives birth to what Alexander calls the deity, a quality supervenient upon the world-process at the terminus of evolution. He conceives of 'the universe as Space-Time engendering within itself in the course of time the series of empirical qualities of which deity is the one next ahead of mind.'⁵ At that stage the entire world of space, time, and matter becomes God. 'God is the whole world as possessing the quality of deity. Of such a being the whole world is the 'body' and deity is the 'mind'. But this possessor of deity is not actual but ideal. As an actual existent, God is

4. Hume refers to '*nisus*' as 'strong endeavour'. See his *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1971), p. 56, f. n.

5. S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity* (3rd reprint, London, Melbourne, Toronto: Macmillan & Co., 1966), Vol. II, p. 353.

the infinite world with its *nisus* toward deity, or to adapt a phrase of Leibniz, as big or in travail with deity.⁶ For Lloye Morgan, however, *nisus* itself is God. 'I acknowledge God as the *nisus* through whose activity emergents emerge, and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed.'⁷ J. C. Smuts has his own counterpart of the *nisus*, which he calls the holistic principle. A. N. Whitehead is contented with postulating the Creative Advance of Nature. C. D. Broad, the great emergent materialist, had to propound the doctrine of survival, which takes him away from materialism proper. Indeed, the materialism of early Greek philosophers like Thales produces Heraclitus who ends up with the doctrine of the *Logos*, a non-materialistic doctrine; or with Parmenides, the philosopher of the non-materialistic doctrine of the One. And the case of the triad of Greek philosophers—Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—is crystal clear and goes without saying.

On the Indian side, the materialism of *Bṛhaspati*, the mythical father of Indian materialism, ends up with a kind of nihilism or downright scepticism at the hands of *Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa*. The Buddha was ontologically a materialist, but had to transcend it in his eschatology and soteriology. For he could not face the annihilationism (*uccheda-vāda*) implied in the materialistic outlook. But he could not reconcile himself with eternalism (*śaśata-vāda*) either. In this tug-of-war between two opposite tendencies emerged a confused doctrine of survival and an elusive doctrine of *Nibbāna*, as pale imitations of their counterparts in the Vedic tradition. And Mahāyāna Buddhism was, both in its nihilistic and in absolutistic formulations, at the farthest remove from materialism.

We take it that the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic can be juxtaposed to *Māyā* of the Vedānta and Mahāyāna in so far as the one is an infinitizing-absolutizing principle in contradistinction to the other which is in the nature of a finitizing-relativizing principle. Dialectic serves to turn the finite into the infinite, the relative into the absolute, whereas *Māyā* serves to turn the infinite into the finite, the absolute into the relative.

So far as Marx is concerned, he remained till death what he had been all along. We do not find reason to believe in a hiatus between the early Marx and the later Marx. And he had all along been a transmaterialist.

We fail to find any radical difference of opinion between Marx and Engels either. Some contend that Marx believed in only what may be called

6. *Loc. cit.*

7. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1923), p. 36.

dialectic of history and society to the exclusion of dialectic of nature, which was upheld only by Engels. This is far from true. Engels' *Anti-Dühring*, which sets out the dialectic of nature in great detail was duly glanced through and approved by Marx as representing his own standpoint. Besides, Marx has made it abundantly clear that history 'is a *real* part of *natural history*.'⁸ Hence, if dialectic rules history, it must have its germs in nature.

Our way in this work is to try to hold the mirror up to the spirit of Marxism rather than to make a mountain of the molehill of its letter. According to Engels, there are passing as well as enduring, reactionary as well as progressive, parts in philosophies in general, and here we are trying to judge Marxism by its enduring and progressive part, with only a side-glance at the passing and reactionary one. (Indeed, in a review of Marx's *Capital* in the Stuttgart *Observer* for December 27, 1867, Engels himself discovers in the work what he calls 'subjective conclusions' and 'subjective whims', which 'are refuted by his own objective expositions'.)

There are two radically different, mutually opposed, and apparently equally forceful attitudes to existence. According to one attitude, existence is rational, meaningful; according to the other, it is irrational, meaningless. Thereby, the whole of world-thought is divisible into the rationalistic, meaningful concept of existence on the one hand and the irrationalistic, meaningless concept of existence on the other. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Eduard von Hartmann may be taken to be irrationalistic in this sense, to some extent or other. Russell displays a kindred mood in his 'Free Man's Worship'. We daresay, Marx the dialectician is a rationalist, meliorist, and soteriologist, while Marx the materialist displays, along with the materialists in general, a marked but unacknowledged tendency towards irrationalism. In this respect, existentialism, materialism, and atheism partake of a common way of thought. 'Existentialism', says Sartre, 'is nothing but an attempt to draw the full conclusions from a consistently atheistic position.'⁹ Although a theist, as is evident from his *Risālatun fi 'l-Mawjūd*,¹⁰ Umar Khayyām stands out as a confirmed irrationalist in his *Rubā'iyāt*. 'I saw a Bohemian (rind),' he sings, 'who believed neither in heresy (kufr) nor in Islam, neither in worldliness nor in religion, neither in truth nor in reality, neither in law nor in certitude. Who in the two worlds could have such guts?'

8. *EPM*, p. 111.

9. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, Philip Mairet, tr. (7th reprint, London: Methuen & Co., 1965), p. 56

10. Umar Khayyām, *Risālatun fi 'l-Mawjūd*, published in Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi, *Khayyām* (Azamgarh: Dār al-Muṣannifin, 1932), throughout.

Rind-i dīdam nashistah bar khang-i zimīn
 Nay Kufr na Islām, na duniyā wa na dīn
 Nay ḥaqq na ḥaqīqat, na sharī'at na yaqīn
 Andar do jahān ki rā buwad zahrah-i īn

In India, leaving the ancient Lokāyata alone, about which we possess no firsthand information at all, Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa is a Lokāyata of the eighth century A. D. with a definitely irrationalistic outlook on existence. The Buddha appears to have two roles to play vis-à-vis the present issue. If we go by his recorded avowals, he would appear to be an irrationalist par excellence, despising existence as essentially evil and teaching its annihilation as the summum bonum. If, on the other hand, we give sufficient weight to his reticence about certain most fundamental metaphysical issues, such as the condition of Nirvāṇa, we would be at a loss to say anything definite about his position, unless of course we are prepared to go so far as to assume, with a section of the moderns, that he chose to abstain from a candid confession of his irrationalistic convictions for fear that irrationalism might confound and alienate the people at large. In fact, it has all along been maintained by the Mahāyāna masters that the Buddha did make such concessions to commonsense. Another view of the situation is also possible. As suggested earlier, the Buddha might be credited with a kind of experience wholly incommunicable in any form and by no means conforming literally to his spoken words. In that case, it is difficult to determine what his position is like with regard to the two attitudes to existence. The Mādhyamika's position is unmistakable so far as his philosophy goes. Śūnya-vāda breathes a clearly irrationalistic spirit. According to it, there is no rhyme or reason for things to exist, wherefore they are essenceless, void.

Marx was a prophet, not just a philosopher; a meliorist and soteriologist, not just a social scientist, fundamentally. He had boundless faith in human destiny. Nothing could swerve him from the thought that there is a veritable correlation between the physical and the moral order on the one hand and the natural and the historical on the other, that nature and culture tend at long last, thanks to dialectic, to cooperate in giving birth to the millennium. All his thinking appears to proceed on the tacit assumption that there is a kind of pre-established harmony between nature and culture, fact and value. To Engels, as we shall see in due course, it is the nature of matter to evolve higher and higher forms, higher and higher beings. To Marx and Engels, history is almost inexorably moving towards the Good.

Marx has had the misfortune of being misinterpreted in his own life-time by his own friends and disciples, as also by his sons-in-law, so much so that

he once took everyone by surprise with the remark that he was not a Marxist. Indeed, he once said to Engels, 'I have sowed dragons' teeth and have harvested fleas.' In order, therefore, to guard against misinterpretation, we here try to be as authentic as possible, basing our findings on the actual texts of Marx and Engels tempering them with due collation, coordination, and consolidation. Accordingly, our work abounds in references to, and citations as well as direct quotations from, our primary sources. We are inclined to believe that our writings should be authentic, indeed so authentic that their authenticity becomes self-certified, self-evident, apparent. Which is possible only when the reader is convinced at every step that 'Nothing unfounded is being written, nothing irrelevant is being said (Nāmūlaṁ likhya-te kiñcin, nānapekṣitam ucyate).

In composing this work, we have drawn profusely upon our work entitled *Evolution of Dialectic in Western Thought* as well as our paper entitled 'The Role of Personality in History', the latter published in *Modern Review*, CVI, 5 (November, 1959), 370-383. Another paper of ours, entitled 'A Transmaterialistic Interpretation of Dialectical Materialism' and published in *D. D. Kosambi Commemoration Volume*, Lallanji Gopal, ed. (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1977), 207-217, forms Chapter III of the present work, in an extended form. We gratefully acknowledge our indebtedness to the publishers of the afore-mentioned book and to the editors and publishers of the publications containing the afore-mentioned papers.

We are extremely beholden to Lucknow Akademi for undertaking to publish this work against all odds. Special thanks are due to Dr. Ashok Kumar Kalia, General Secretary of the Akademi, and Dr. Navajeevan Rastogi, Treasurer of the Akademi—both founder members of the Akademi and our dearest friends—, without whose cordial exertations and wholehearted co-operation the work would not have seen the light of day. Thanks are also due to our equally dear friend Mr. K. C. Sonrexa for his interest in my work.

Here we cannot fail to remember gratefully Professor N. K. Devaraja, in a controversy with whom over Marxism, in the columns of the *National Herald* in 1953-54, our appetite for a critical and constructive study of Marxism was greatly whetted. We must also record our deep debt of gratitude to him, to Professor Lallanji Gopal and to administrator scholar Dr. J. D. Shukla for taking interest in all our publications.

Thanks are also due to our student Mr. Syed Shahid Ahmad, Research Scholar, for his assistance in preparing the Word Index, and to Mr. Vishwa Mohan, Proprietor of the Pnar Mudrak, Lucknow, for ungrudgingly putting up with our insufferably intermittent supply of typescripts for printing.

CHAPTER II

Marxism as an Open System

Marx and Engels tend to take every opportunity of cautioning their readers that they lay no claim to founding a system cut and dried and universally valid. A system, according to Engels, 'is necessarily transitory'. Marxists in general, the world over, are usually predisposed to out-Marx Marx by treating Marxism as a closely knit system and dismissing all talk of its revision as unmitigably blasphemous, thereby reminding us of Marx's breathtaking statement, which he used to make while commenting on the French 'Marxists' of the late seventies: 'All I know is that I am not a Marxist.'¹

The full passage in which Engels' afore-quoted words occur reads thus: 'A man who judges every philosopher not by the enduring and progressive part of his activity but by what is necessarily transitory and reactionary—by his *system*—would have done better to remain silent.'² Marxism is a variety of what may be termed dialecticism, and, dialectic being essentially dynamic,

1. Engels' letter to Conrad Schmidt, dated August 5, 1890, *S.C.*, p. 496.

2. Engels' letter to Conrad Schmidt, dated July 1, 1891.

it cannot brook a static system. Engels duly acknowledges this fact when he writes: 'A system of natural and historical knowledge embracing everything and final for all time, is contradiction to the fundamental law of dialectic reasoning.'³

That Marx and Engels claim no finality for their theses in general is thrown into bolder relief by their candid avowals that much of the *Communist Manifesto* 'would, in many respects, be very differently worded today'⁴, that 'this programme [of the *Communist Manifesto*] has in some details become antiquated'⁵, that 'the remarks of the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed'⁶, and that 'the advance of theoretical natural science may possibly make my work to a great extent or even altogether superfluous'⁷. It will also be shown somewhere in the sequel that Engels confesses overstatements on the part of Marx as well as on his own part so far as their 'historical materialism' is concerned.

Marx protests against generalizing or metamorphosing 'my historical sketch of the origin of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances in which it finds itself'.⁸ In this connexion, he cites the failure of Rome to usher in an era of capitalism despite the favouring conditions of big landed property and big money capital on one side and a large dispossessed proletariat on the other, and suggests that, instead of 'using as one's master-key a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical', one should study 'each of these forms of evolution separately'.⁹ He defines his own approach in the *Capital* thus: 'The chapter on primitive accumulation does not pretend to do more than trace the path by which, in Western Europe, the capitalist order of economy emerged from the womb of the feudal order of economy.'¹⁰

3. *AD*, p. 39.

4. Marx and Engels, Preface to the 1872, German edition of *CM*, *S.W.*, I, p. 22.

5. Engels, Preface to the 1888, English edition of *CM*, *S.W.*, I, p. 29.

6. Marx and Engels, Preface to the 1872, German edition of *CM*, *S.W.*, I, p. 22.

7. *AD*, p. 20.

8. Marx's letter to the editorial board of the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (Fatherland Notes), dated November 1877, *SC*, p. 379.

9. *Loc. cit.*

10. *Ibid.*, p. 378.

He also suggests that this historical sketch of the inauguration of capitalism may not apply to Russia.¹¹

According to Herbert Marcuse, Marx confines the jurisdiction of his dialectic to 'a particular stage of the historical process'.¹² On the strength of a relatively obscure passage in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, to be quoted presently, Marcuse maintains that 'Marx criticizes Hegel's dialectic for generalizing the dialectical movement into a movement of all being'.¹³ Marx's words are: 'But because Hegel has conceived the negation from the point of view of the positive relation inherent in it as the true and only positive, and from the point of view of the negative relation inherent in it as the only true act and self-realizing act of all being, he has only found the *abstract, logical, speculative* expression for the movement of history; and this historical process is not yet the *real* history of man—of man as a given subject, but only man's *act of genesis*—the *story* of man's *origin*.'¹⁴ Marx, as interpreted by Marcuse, confines the jurisdiction of even Hegel's dialectic to the particular phase of man's history styled '*Entstehungsgeschichte*', translated by Marcuse as 'the story of man's origin' in the above passage and 'the history of his maturing'.¹⁵ This phase of human history Marx elsewhere designates as 'prehistory',¹⁶ distinguishing it here from 'real history'¹⁷ and elsewhere from 'history proper'.¹⁸ This prehistory is the history of class society; and history, the history of classless society. 'The Hegelian dialectic', writes Marcuse, 'gives the *abstract logical* form of the pre-historical development, the Marxian dialectic its *real concrete* movement. Marx's dialectic, therefore, is still bound up with the pre-historical phase.'¹⁹ Though Marcuse's finding does not seem to be without truth, especially his discovery of Marx's interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic that it is in fact valid only for a particular phase of human history, we for our part fail to find a single suggestion in Marx and Engels binding *their* dialectic down to the 'pre-history' of mankind. The particular manifestation of dialectic, known as

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 378-379.

12. Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 315.

13. *Loc. cit.*

14. *EPM*, p. 146.

15. Marcuse, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

16. *CCPE*, p. 22 (Preface).

17. *EPM*, p. 146.

18. *GI*, p. 40.

19. Marcuse, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

class struggle, alone, broadly speaking, would be regarded by Marx and Engels as a creature of prehistory.

Well, even Lenin, who is responsible for pinning down the ideas of Marx and Engels to a rigid dogma, goes to the length of asserting, 'No Marxist has ever regarded Marx's theory as a general and compulsory philosophical scheme of history, or as anything more than an explanation of a particular socio-economic formation.'²⁰ Immediately after, he charges Mikhailovsky with betraying 'such a lack of understanding of Marx as to attribute to him a general philosophical theory, in reply to which he received from Marx the quite explicit explanation that he was barking up the wrong tree.'²¹

Marx unequivocally denies that 'the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past.'²² He does not countenance the existence of such abstract laws and asserts that 'every historical period has laws of its own', for the simple reason that 'social organisms differ among themselves as plants or animals'.²³

From the foregoing considerations it is evident that Marx and Engels had no presumption to give a well-knit, closed system for all time to come. It does not mean, however, that they were not interested in discovering laws of history applicable to all or almost all social formations. Indeed, it is Marx's interest in 'the discovery of the natural laws of its [the capitalist system's] movement'²⁴ which appears to guide him through the vast material of the *Capital*. In fact, he himself acknowledges that 'it is the ultimate aim of this work, to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society.'²⁵ In the *Communist Manifesto*, according to Engels, Marx applied his materialist conception of history in broad outline to the whole of modern history.²⁶ Marx also suggests sometimes that the development of material production is the basis of *all* social life, of *all* real history²⁷ In fact, Marx and Engels were staunch believers in the inexorableness of the dialectical laws of motion of society. 'With the same certainty', writes Engels, 'with

20. Lenin, 'What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight Social Democrats' (1894), *Selected Works of V. I. Lenin*, I, p. 124.

21. *Loc. cit.*

22. Marx, Afterword to the Second German Edition of the *Capital*, I, p. 18.

23. *Loc. cit.*

24. Marx, Preface to the First German Edition of the *Capital*, I, p. 10.

25. *Loc. cit.*

26. Engels' Introduction (1895) to Marx, *The Class Struggle in France 1848 to 1850*, S.W., I, p. 109.

27. Marx, *Capital*, I, p. 180, f.n.

which from a given mathematical proposition a new one is deduced, with the same certainty can we deduce the social revolution from the existing social conditions and principles of political economy.²⁸ The laws of capitalist system 'work with iron necessity toward inevitable results'.²⁹ But they nowhere claim to have uttered the last word on truth with regard to these laws.

28. See S. Radhakrishnan, *Religion and Society* (4th impression of the 2nd ed., London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959), p. 31.

29. *Loc. cit.*

CHAPTER III

A Transmaterialistic Interpretation of Dialectical Materialism

Marxism is known as 'dialectical materialism', an expression introduced by Plekhanov and then adopted by Lenin. Some contemporary Marxologists have expressed themselves in favour of regarding Marxism as a far cry from materialism and redesignating it as naturalism-humanism, following Marx's own express or implied preference for the term in some of his early writings.¹ 'This communism', says Marx, 'as fully-developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism.'² He also writes, 'Like Owen, the more scientific French communists, Dezamy, Gay and others, developed the teaching of *materialism* as the teaching of *real humanism* and the *logical* basis of *communism*.'³ He writes again : 'Here we see how consistent naturalism or humanism distinguishes itself both from idealism and materialism, constituting at the same time the unifying truth of both.'⁴ Naturalism is wider than materialism, in so far as nature includes both matter and mind, atom and man. 'Nature is material but not materialistic,'

1. *EPM*, pp. 102, 104, 156; *HF*, p. 177.

2. *EPM*, p. 102.

3. *HF*, p. 177.

4. *EPM*, p. 156.

says George Santayana.⁵ In his naturalism, Marx seems to follow Feuerbach, who regards his philosophy as neither materialist nor idealist on the ground that his primary concern is man.⁶ Feuerbach writes : 'As man belongs to the essence of nature, in opposition to common materialism, so nature belongs to the essence of man, in opposition to subjective idealism.'⁷ Jacques Monod, the French scientist, dubs dialectical materialism as animism, construing it to purport to project consciousness into nature.⁸

We may take leave of the animist hypothesis which appears to go to unwarrantable extremes. The naturalist hypothesis is certainly sober so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. To our way of thinking, dialectical materialism culminates in and is in effect tantamount to a kind of what may safely be described as 'transmaterialism', which alone is capable of doing justice to the self-transcendent character of the Marxian dialectic. Marx and Engels do describe their philosophy as materialism, but they seem to do so for want of a better term. In their search for a suitable label for their philosophy in contradistinction to 'idealism', they found the term 'materialism' ready to hand.

The term 'materialism' has ceased to be popular in the non-red world of philosophy, because, for one thing, the status of matter today is scarcely better than that of an airy nothing. The history of conceptions about matter is the history of its progressive dematerialization. Originally, it seems, matter was regarded as earth, fire, and water ; and Empedocles admitted air—the first step towards mystification of matter. Then it was discovered that it was not earth, water, fire, and air perceived by us that are collectively called matter but that they are reducible to molecules and atoms which alone deserve the designation of matter. Later, space was also added to the list of the elements of matter, which marked a further stage in the mystification of matter. Some traditions derive everything from space⁹ or space-time¹⁰, which renders matter incredibly abstract. The analysis of atoms yielded electrons and protons, which, too, came to be analyzed into electric waves. Matter has of late disappeared as a 'thing' ; been replaced by emanations from a locality, 'the sort of influences that characterize haunted rooms in ghost

5. George Santayana, *Character and Opinion in the United States* (New York, 1956), p. 114, quoted in Z. A. Jordan, *The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism* (London, Melbourne, Toronto: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 16-17.

6. Feuerbach, quoted in Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

8. Jacques Monod, *Chance and Necessity*.

9. Plato, for example, in *Timaeus*, 51e-52b.

10. Samuel Alexander, in *The Space, Time, and Deity*.

stories';¹¹ and been reduced to the status of 'a lump in space-time, a "mush" of electricity, a wave of probability undulating into nothingness'.¹² Jordan, the author of the *Twentieth Century Physics* (1936), describes the atom as a system of mathematical formulas. Bertrand Russell reduces everything to strings of sets of events, which are neither physical nor mental but a kind of neutral stuff. Such men of science as Arthur Eddington and James Jeans reduced all reality into terms of mind-stuff, of projection from the percipient's consciousness. This all seems to suggest that 'materialism' is now an anachronism and must transcend itself.

The situation had not come to such a head during the life-time of Marx and Engels. Nevertheless, even then, the situation was ripe for bidding good-bye to the then materialism based on the notion of solid, indivisible, impregnable bits of matter called atoms mechanically arranged so as to form the brickwork of our cosmos or the bedrock of reality.

It must be acknowledged, however, that materialism cannot be summarily dismissed on the ground that, thanks to the recent developments in physics, matter has dematerialized, finally disappeared, and turned out to be no more real than mathematical equations. Lenin has countered the argument against materialism from the dematerialization of matter in the following words: "Matter is disappearing" means that the limit within which we have hitherto known matter is vanishing and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter are disappearing which formerly seemed absolute, immutable, and primary (impenetrability, inertia, mass, etc.) and which are now revealed to be relative and characteristic only of certain states of matter.'¹³ According to him, the recent developments in physics call for not repudiation but redefinition of matter. He himself suggests the lines along which matter can be redefined: 'matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation; matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation, and so forth.'¹⁴ This is akin to Mill's definition of matter as a permanent possibility of sensation. According to Lenin, 'the sole "property" of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of *being an objective reality*, existing outside our mind.'¹⁵ George Santayana is more emphatic in maintaining that matter continues to be a

11. Bertrand Russell, *An Outline of Philosophy* (3rd impression, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1941), p. 112.

12. C. E. M. Joad, *God and Evil* (4th impression, London: Faber and Faber, 1945), p. 121.

13. *MEC*, p. 267.

14. *MEC*, p. 147. Also see *MEC*, p. 128.

15. *MEC*, p. 267. Also see *MEC*, p. 268.

reality even in this age of the so-called disappearance of matter. He contends that 'whatever matter may be, I call it matter boldly, as I call my acquaintances Smith and Jones without knowing their secrets....'¹⁶

Well, what Marx and Engels call mechanistic or 'vulgar' materialism and what now passes for reductive materialism, in that it seeks to reduce everything animate and inanimate to atoms, Marx and Engels spared no chance to condemn and in emphatic terms. Contradistinguishingly to the Democritian-Cartesian-Newtonian mechanistic conception of nature, Engels maintains that 'the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made *things*, but as a complex of *processes*....'¹⁷ Thus, the solid substance that was matter exits from the scene yielding place to process, something much less material. At the hands of Marx and Engels, matter also ceased to be the indeterminate 'x' operating as the substratum for various modes supervenient upon or superadded to it. 'Matter is nothing,' says Engels, 'but the totality of material things from which this concept is abstracted...; words like matter and motion are nothing but *abbreviations* in which we comprehend different sensuously perceptible things according to their common properties.'¹⁸ Matter, motion, space, time, cause, and effect *are*, according to him, 'abstractions' or 'creations of thought and not sensuous objects.'¹⁹ Elaborating upon the idea later, he contends, with reference to Hegel, that 'matter as such, as distinct from definite existing pieces of matter, is not anything sensuously existing. When natural science directs its efforts to seeking out uniform matter as such, to reducing qualitative differences to merely quantitative differences in combining identical smallest particles, it is doing the same thing as demanding to see fruit as such instead of cherries, pears, apples, or the mammal as such instead of cats, sheep, etc., gas as such, metal, chemical compound as such, motion as such.'²⁰ Marx and Engels develop this idea at a great length in the *Holy Family*.²¹ They have, to be sure, taken their cue from Hegel,²² who observes that we can eat

16. George Santayana, *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (Broadway, N. Y.: Dover Publications, 1955), Preface, p. viii.

17. *LF*, p. 351.

18. *DN*, pp. 312-313.

19. *DN*, p. 313.

20. *DN*, p. 337.

21. *HF*, pp. 78-82.

22. G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, Part I of his *The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, William Wallace, tr. (2nd ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 99, Addition, pp. 186-187; 128, Addition pp. 236-237.

cherries and plums but not *fruit*.²³ Ridiculing the idea of 'fruit' as the true essence, *matter*, of the pear, the apple, etc., Marx and Engels remark, inter alia, that 'if the Christian religion knows only *one* Incarnation of God, speculative philosophy has as many incarnations as there are things, just as it has in every fruit an incarnation of the "substance", of the absolute "Fruit"'.²⁴ Berkeley had already dealt a death-blow to material substance. Indeterminate universal matter came to grief at the hands of Hegel also. But Marx and Engels' real fore-runners on this issue were Helvetius and Holbach, to whom, too, matter is not a material substance, *un etre unique*, but *un genre d'etre*, 'the *summum genus* of the classification of bodies on the basis of their physical and chemical properties'. Matter is to them, not a substance but a concept, and in this sense a creation of man. 'Matter is not a being,' writes Helvetius, 'for in nature there are only individuals to which the same *body* has been given ... The word "matter" can only be understood to connote the collection of properties common to all these bodies.'²⁵ The word "matter" is, therefore, 'part of the metalanguage of science rather than of its object language'.²⁶

So, Marx and Engels discard matter as original, pre-existent, formless substance appearing to the Greeks as chaos and to Laplace as nebula representing the uniform substratum of the world. In this respect, they differed radically from Leucippus and Democritus, Descartes and Hobbes—yes, even from Aristotle, the advocate of *materia prima*.

Rejection of matter as something shared in common by and subjacent to the plurality of things is a *sine qua non* of the evolutionary-dialectical view of reality sponsored by Marx and Engels. If the primordial matter is fixed and immutable, otherwise it would not be ultimate in any sense, then there is no real change, no real novelty. This Engels dubs as the 'unhistorical view of nature' based on 'the metaphysical, that is, anti-dialectical manner of philosophizing',²⁷ whereas, according to him, nature 'goes through a real historical evolution'.²⁸ The truth of the view that dialectical materialism cannot envisage an ultimate, immutable principle of being to which all else is reducible has begun to dawn upon the Soviet mind.²⁹

23. *DN*, p. 313.

24. *HF*, p. 80.

25. See Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

26. *Loc. cit.*

27. *LF*, p. 338.

28. *SUS*, p. 121.

29. See Gustav A. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, Peter Heath, tr. from the German (2nd impression, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 292-293; Alfred

Engels maintains that '*Motion is the mode of existence of matter*, hence more than a mere property of it.'³⁰ According to him, 'All rest' all equilibrium is only relative, only has meaning in relation to one or other definite form of motion.'³¹ Each separate movement strives towards equilibrium, and the motion as a whole puts an end again to the equilibrium.'³² Here, motion should not be understood merely as local, mechanical motion. 'Motion is not merely change in place,' says Engels, 'in fields higher than mechanics it is also change in quality.'³³ The major forms of motion are: 'Motion in cosmic space, mechanical motion of smaller masses on a single celestial body, the vibration of molecules as heat, electric tension, magnetic polarization, chemical decomposition and combination, organic life up to its highest product, thought—at each given moment each individual atom of matter is in one or other of these forms of motion.'³⁴ This list of motions includes life and thought also; but, as Engels hastens to add, higher forms of motion like life and thought are far from reducible to lower forms of motion like molecular and chemical motions in the brain.'³⁵ Taking their cue from such an observation, the Deborinists in the USSR went to the length of attributing thought and extension to matter much on the lines of Spinoza. The official Soviet philosophy, however, recognizes only one attribute of matter, motion in general, accommodating thought within it as a special form. Marx and Engels also assert that motion as the most important inherent quality of matter is 'not only *mechanical* and *mathematical* movement, but still more *impulse*, *vital life-spirit*..The primary forms of matter are the living, individualizing *forces of being* inherent in it and producing the distinction between the species.'³⁶ Engels also maintains that 'it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings...'³⁷ Bacon, whose 'blooming sensuousness' Marx and Engels preferred to Hobbes' 'abstract sensuousness of the geometrician'³⁸ thought matter to be so formed that 'all virtues, essence, action, and motion may be the natural consequence

Schmidt, *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, Ben Fowkes, tr. from the German (London NLB, 1971), pp. 202-203.

30. AD, pp. 86, 470.

31. AD, p. 86.

32. AD, p. 90.

33. DN, p. 334.

34. AD, pp. 470-471.

35. DN, p. 328.

36. HF, p. 172.

37. DN, p. 278.

38. HF, p. 173.

and emanation thereof'.³⁹ The mechanistic conception of nature 'explains all change from change of place, all qualitative differences from quantitative ones', but Engels contends that 'the relation of quality and quantity is reciprocal, that quality can become transformed into quantity just as much as quantity into quality, that, in fact, reciprocal action takes place'.⁴⁰

The whole burden of the materialisms and positivisms other than dialectical and emergent materialisms has from the first been to explain consciousness away, or to explain it either as a function of the dead, inconscient matter or, in the case of J. B. Watson, Bertrand Russell, and Gilbert Ryle to some extent or other, as descriptive of human behaviour rather than as naming an entity—as a logical construction, in effect. It is evident that here all-out importance is sought to be attached to 'matter' or the physical reality. Hegel, in effect, goes to the other extreme of remaining preoccupied with the spirit throughout. Marx seems to strike a middle path by setting man as 'the immediate object of natural science'.⁴¹ His approach is so humanistic that the external world seldom enters his universe of discourse on its own account, save as man's 'inorganic body'.⁴² According to him, 'man is the supreme being for mankind'.⁴³ 'The essence of man consists so much in freedom; that even its opponents admit as such,'⁴⁴ and '*Man* is directly a *natural being*',⁴⁵ Nature as nature never impressed him as a reality. '*Nature as nature*,' he contends, '—that is to say, in so far as it is still sensuously distinguished from that secret sense hidden within it—nature isolated, distinguished from these abstractions, is *nothing*—a nothing *proving itself to be nothing*—is devoid of sense, or has only the sense of being an externality which has to be annulled'.⁴⁶ A little later, he adds that externality 'is to be taken here in the sense of alienation—a mistake, a defect, which ought not to be'.⁴⁷ Engels seems to echo these words when he remarks that 'it is precisely *the alteration of nature by men*, not solely nature as such, which is the most essential and immediate basis of human thought'.⁴⁸ It is neither

39. See Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 427, n. 45

40. *DN*, p. 335.

41. *EPM*, p. 111.

42. *EPM*, p. 74.

43. Sidney Hook (ed.), *John Dewey : A Symposium* (1950), p. 346.

44. David McLellan, *Marx before Marxism*, Penguin Books, revised edition, 1972, p. 114.

45. *EPM*, p. 156.

46. *EPM*, p. 170.

47. *Loc. cit.*

48. *DN*, p. 306.

matter nor mind—both abstractions—but man that is the goal of nature and history. ‘All history,’ says Marx, ‘is the preparation for “man” to become the object of *sensuous* consciousness, and for the needs of “man as man” to become [natural, sensuous] needs. History itself is a *real* part of *natural history*—of nature’s coming to be man.’⁴⁹ On this issue, Marx is clearly under the influence of Feuerbach, who ‘makes man the sole, universal and highest object of philosophy, makes, therefore, of anthropology, including physiology, the universal science.’⁵⁰

The naturalistic, humanistic, or transmaterialistic dimensions of dialectical materialism are thrown into further relief by the Marxian theory of knowledge, which sees virtues in idealism unsuspected by the materialist tradition. ‘The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism’, says Marx, ‘...is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of *contemplation*, but not as *human sensuous activity, practice*, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the *active* side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism ...’⁵¹ So, Marx discards the passivist theory of knowledge, so to speak, upheld by traditional materialism, and seeks to replace interpretation-oriented philosophy by a change-oriented one, according to which knowing is changing.⁵² When we know a thing, we do not remain passive recipients of impressions of the object; on the other hand, we actively transform it. Knowing or sensing, that is to say, is not contemplating or *sensum*-receiving but ‘handling’ or ‘noticing’ things, to use Bertrand Russell’s expression.⁵³ So, according to Marx, pure, objective truth is a fiction, an abstraction, at best pure academics; all truth is subjective, the result of an interaction between subject and object. ‘The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but a *practical* question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic* question’.⁵⁴ Knowing worth the name is, therefore, a part of the process called *praxis* (practice): it is knowing on the part of the one who means business, so to speak. Quite consistently,

49. *EPM*, p. 111.

50. Feuerbach, quoted in Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

51. Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, Thesis I, *GI*, p. 659.

52. Cp. Harsh Narain, *Evolution of Dialectic in Western Thought* (Delhi, Patna, Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), p. 100, n 26.

53. Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (9th impression, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), pp. 749-750.

54. Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, Thesis II, *GI*, p. 659.

Marx avers; 'The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways [scholastically]; the point, however, is to change it'.⁵⁵

On the basis of the foregoing statement of the Marxian activist or praxiological theory of knowledge, it would not be going too far to maintain that Marx considers it futile to view reality 'in the form of the object'. And it needs no saying that he would be the last to view reality in the form of the subject, like idealism. To him, subject and object both are abstractions, practically speaking. He is inclined to viewing reality integrally, as subject-object. Theoretically, nature 'preceded human history'⁵⁶, but this is, in the ultimate analysis, an '*abstraction* from the existence of nature and man', which 'has no meaning'.⁵⁷ As a matter of fact, '*the entire so-called history of the world* is nothing but the begetting of man through human labour, nothing but the coming-to-be of nature for man'.⁵⁸

The ideal of dialectical materialism is not objective truth but creative truth, as it were. Positivism as exclusive allegiance to the given, as object surrender to the status quo, is foreign to dialectical materialism, which, therefore tends to transcend materialism and draw near idealism.

As a matter of fact, dialectic is a trans-empirical concept, dialectical matter is transmatter, and dialectical materialism is transmaterialism. 'Naturalism' and 'humanism' measure only part of the transmaterialism. Its 'matter, involves and is opposed to non-matter and would hence be far from ultimate. In fact, in dialectic, the ultimate is never reached at all. Dialectic is a self-transcending process, which must stretch into what is called the Absolute. Dialectic knows no limits, forwards or backwards. It emerges from unsuspected depths and lose itself into the beyond. If one chooses to describe the depth and the beyond as those of matter, then matter is infinite in depth, as well as in height. Lenin describes 'the infiniteness of matter' as 'deep within'.⁵⁹ Such matter surely transcends materiality. Dialectic is a crusade against absolute barriers in the *rerum natura*, against 'absolute boundaries in nature', as Lenin would have it.⁶⁰ But the conception of matter as the absolute reality sanctioned by materialism does serve to raise such boundaries, inasmuch as it renders mind and spirit less real than dead matter. It thereby runs the risk of being construed to imply that

55. *Ibid.*, Thesis XI, GI, p. 662.

56. GI, p. 59.

57. EPM, p. 113.

58. EPM, pp. 113-114.

59. PN, p. 112.

60. MEC, p. 268.

matter is absolute and mind or spirit relative. But Marxism proclaims that 'nothing is final, absolute, sacred' and that 'nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher.'⁶¹ In very truth, the 'matter' of dialectical materialism is not so material as that of what is called reductive, mechanistic, or vulgar materialism. Reductive materialism interprets all phenomena in terms of inorganic, inanimate matter, reducing the former to the latter without residue. To it the rational, moral, and spiritual being called man is nothing but thinking matter, thinking matter is nothing but living matter, and living matter is nothing but inorganic matter. The mechanistic materialism is all for applying, exclusively, the standards of mechanics to the phenomena of life and mind, unmindful of the fact, noted by Engels, that, valid as the laws of mechanics are per se, they 'are pushed into the background by other higher laws...'⁶² On the other hand, dialectical materialism is emphatic in maintaining that, thanks to its indwelling dialectic, there is real qualitative change in 'matter,' real development from the lower to the higher, real novelty. Abram Moiseyevich Deborin (Yoffe) (b. 1881), acclaimed by many as the most important exponent of dialectical materialism in the post-Lenin Russia, has a remarkable passage on the subject: 'Either there is an absolute identity between inorganic and organic matter, and organic matter can be completely derived from the inorganic, in which case there is no sense at all in speaking of a transformation of the inorganic into the organic; or else, besides the unity of inorganic and organic, there is also a difference between them, in which case organic matter represents something qualitatively and specifically different from the inorganic.'⁶³ Elucidating the point further, much later, he remarks: 'So far as its *origin* is concerned, *the living is descended from the inanimate*, but so far as its specific *form* is concerned it cannot be derived from inorganic matter.'⁶⁴ Thus what is called 'matter' is far from being a simple affair: it is something complex, so complex as to manifest itself as now dead, now living, now thinking.

The Marxian 'matter' is a reality whose very nature it is to transcend itself by evolving into higher and higher forms of existence. The ascription of such a creative role to matter turns it into a veritable absolute which it is a

61. *LF*, p. 328.

62. *LF*, p. 338,

63. A. M. Deborin, quoted in Gustav A. Wetter, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

misnomer to term 'matter'. Vulgar materialism repudiated by Marxism is out to reduce everything to inanimate matter, whereas dialectical materialism views the world-process as a process of continual ascent extending into infinity and capable of evolving life, mind, spirit, and what not, thereby vesting matter with infinite creative powers with (potential ?) omnipotence and omniscience, the proverbial attributes of the Godhead. Nicholai Berdyaev has very aptly remarked, 'Dialectic, which stands for complexity, and materialism, which results in a narrow one-sidedness of view, are as mutually repellent as water and oil'.⁶⁵

The foregoing considerations lead to the irresistible conclusion that dialectical philosophy, Marxian no less than Hegelian, can envisage only a perennially self-transcending developmental reality which cannot be whittled down to the much narrower concept of matter. Indeed, dialectic leads to transmaterialistic integralism, neither anti-idealistic materialism nor anti-materialistic idealism. Engels contends that 'the Hegelian system represents merely a materialism idealistically turned upside down in method and content'.⁶⁶ Upon this, in the circumstances discussed above, one is tempted to retort that the Marxian system represent merely an integralism or holism materialistically turned inside out in method and content.

The starting-point of the Hegelian dialectic is pure being, which is the poorest category, absolutely indistinguishable from and identical with pure nothing. From this base, dialectic proceeds to create or occasion richer and richer forms of being culminating in the Absolute Idea, which is the richest and fullest of all categories, a concrete universal. Dialectical materialism, too, follows a similar procedure, without positing a hierarchy of categories, however, like Hegel. It chooses to designate its starting-point or poorest category as matter, which, thanks to its dialectical character, goes on evolving out of itself, ad infinitum, higher and higher forms of existence, ever richer in content. What is the source of this ever-growing, inexhaustible richness ? Hegel's position is clear : the world represents the self-enfoldment or self-alienation of the Absolute Spirit, a self-invited fall of the Absolute Spirit from its pristine perfection. Dialectic is the way of its self-unfoldment or self-recovery. So on the Hegelian view, richness in content, fullness, or perfection is already there, hidden under a bushel, so to speak : it has but to be realized and recovered, through dialectic. Such an explanation is not available to Marxism, which does not believe in the pre-

65. Nicholai Berdyaev, *Wahrheit des Kommunismus*, Lucerne 1934, p. 84, quoted in Wetter, p. 551.

66. *LF*, p. 336.

existence of perfection waiting to be realized and recovered. Then, whence the perfection presupposed by dialectic? All dialectic aims at the attainment of perfection, of fullness, of wholeness, through self-transcendence, through demolition of cut and dried boundaries in nature and life. As we have seen already, the lower categories tend to break down for the simple reason that they are felt to be inadequate approximations to the Absolute Spirit struggling to overcome its self-alienation and become completely itself, in its pristine perfection. Marxism dispenses with the Absolute Spirit and its self-alienation and thereby removes the very lubricant from the wheels and cranks of dialectic, which, therefore, fail to turn at all. If fullness is not already there, it never can be, otherwise the principle of sufficient reason would be a nullity. If emergence of a non-existent fullness is a fact, if non-existent fullness can come to be, everything non-existent would become existent. Hence dialectic and materialism ill go together: they cannot co-exist. If, therefore, Marxism is dialectical, it cannot be materialist; if materialist, it cannot be dialectical. In order to be dialectical, it will have to be integralist, like Hegelianism; in order to retain its materialism, it will have to bid good-bye to dialectic. It is true that, vesting matter with the power of self-movement through the conflict of opposites, dialectic obviates the necessity of an unmoved mover outside matter, altogether. But it does not and cannot obviate the necessity of a source of perfection towards which the universe is inexorably tending through the dialectical process.

Dialectic is divine discontent: it cannot cry a halt till it reaches the Absolute, it cannot stop short at less than the Absolute. Here one is tempted to hark to Iqbal's Persian couplet:

Dar dasht-i junūn-i man Jibril zabūn said-i
Yazdān ba-kamand āwar, Ay Himmat-i Mardānah

(In the jungle of my frenzy, Gabriel is a bad game. O Manly Courage! throw thy noose round God.)

There is, therefore, nothing strange when Hegel observes, with characteristic profundity, 'Regarding that Absolute Being, enlightenment itself falls out with itself in the same way as it did formerly with belief, and is divided between the views of two parties....The one kind of enlightenment calls absolute Being that predicateless Absolute, which exists in thought beyond the actual consciousness from which this enlightenment started; the other calls it matter....Both...are entirely the same notion; the distinction lies not in objective fact, but purely in the diversity of starting-point adopted by the two developments of thought, and in the fact that each stops

at its own special point in the thought-process.⁶⁷ Marx and Engels quote this passage without demur.⁶⁸ That is presumably why Lenin remarks, 'intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism.'⁶⁹ From the standpoint of older materialism, he maintains, idealism is only nonsense; from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, it is only one-sided.⁷⁰

Marx and Engels appear to metamorphose Hegel's dialectical absolutism into dialectical materialism. But materialism, too, has changed in the process, in certain respects beyond recognition. The synthesis attempted between Hegel and materialism is nearly as daring as the one attempted by the schoolmen between Aristotle and Christianity in mediaeval times on one hand and by the Muslim philosophers between Aristotle and Islam on the other, and by Iqbal in our time between Nietzsche and Islam on the third, with this difference, however, that chances of rapprochement between Marxism and Hegel are brighter.

It is also pertinent to point out that dialectic tends to take a turn to teleology. It presupposes the stage nicely set from the first for the grand denouement called communism or transcommunism,⁷¹ 'in which...a progressive development asserts itself in the end'.⁷² More or less like the Advaitin's Mokṣa or the Buddhist's Nirvāṇa which requires nothing but the removal of ignorance for its realization, the ideal of dialectical materialism, too, requires only the removal of the obstructions to its realization. In fact, the Marxists 'have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant'.⁷³ The 'present society is inevitably tending' to 'that higher form'.⁷⁴ Marx and Engels also make the declaration, 'Communism is for us not a *state of affairs* which is to be established, an *ideal* to which reality (will) have to adjust itself. We call communism the *real* movement which abolishes the present state of things.'⁷⁵ As a matter of fact, dialectical materialism presupposes a correlation, a pre-established harmony, between the physical and

67. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, J. B. Baillie, tr. (6th impression, London : George Allen & Unwin, 1964), pp. 591-593.

68. *HF*, p. 177.

69. *PN*, p. 276.

70. Lenin, 'On Dialectics' (1915/1916), *MEM*, p. 336.

71. For 'transcommunism', see Harsh Narain, *op. cit.*, pp. 85, 86.

72. *LF*, p. 351.

73. *CWF*, pp. 474-475.

74. *CWF*, p. 474.

75. *GI*, p. 48.

moral order on one hand the natural and the historical on the other. Thus, the dialectical process is a process of perennially creative self-transcendence in determinable directions, and 'matter' appears to be too poor a category to match it.

Dialectic presupposes the pre-existence of perfection, of an infinite whole made up by the finites. The finites represent a lapse from the pristine perfection and crave to return to their original self by referring beyond themselves. They cannot afford to bear the pangs of separation for long. They are in fact in the nature of abstractions from an infinite context, parts torn out of a whole. Abstraction implies that originally united elements of thought come to be violently held apart, striving to extricate themselves from the clutches of finitude. Abstractions cannot rest content with themselves; they must ultimately revert to and get reunited with their concrete ground. Everything finite involves, to Hegel, a 'restless activity of cancelling and superseding itself'.⁷⁶ He is right in judging the finite to be 'radically self-contradictory' and involving 'its own self-supersession'.⁷⁷ The lower categories subsist in and through the higher categories. Marx propounds no such thesis; his acceptance of dialectic does, however, entail acceptance of this position. And it is evident that 'matter' is too poor a category to aspire to perfection, unless it transcends itself radically. There is no reason why Marx should demur to such transcendence of matter, or, rather, why he should not be held to imply a belief in transmatter.

76. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, J. H. Muirhead, ed., J. B. Baillie, tr., in two Vols. (London : Swan Sonnenschein & Co. ; New York : Macmillan Company, 1910), Vol. 11, p. 819.

77. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, W. H. Johnston and L. C. Struthers, tr., in two Vols. (2nd impression, London : George Allen & Unwin ; New York : Macmillan Company, 1951), Vol. 1, p. 148.

CHAPTER IV

The Nature of Dialectic

The concept of dialectic took its birth in the Hellenic world with all its important ramifications. Thence it travelled to Germany. It was noticed by Kant when it was still in its infancy. It attained discretion in Fichte and came of age in Hegel. Thereafter, it wedded materialism in Marx and Engels, to whom, strikingly incongruous and unhappy as the wedlock was bound to prove and did prove, its fidelity has all along been unquestioned, undivided, and absolute, short of the possible exception in the case of Jean-Paul Sartre.

Dialectic has developed, in the main, along two more or less independent lines, viz. dialectic as a form of reasoning and dialectic as the concept of struggle of opposites. The first kind of dialectic may be called diatological dialectic or, in the words of Arthur Schopenhauer, dialectic as 'technic of reason' and the second, cosmological dialectic. Schopenhauer's distinction between logic, dialectic, and rhetoric is instructive: 'Logic, Dialectic, and Rhetoric go together, because they make up the whole of a *technic of reason*, and under this title they ought also to be taught—Logic as the technic of our own thinking, Dialectic of disputing with others, and Rhetoric of speaking to many (concionatio); thus corresponding to the singular, dual, and plural, and to the monologue, dialogue, and the panegyric.'¹

1. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, R. P. Haldane and J. Kemp, trs. (9th impression, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), Vol. II, p. 285.

Dialogical dialectic does not figure in Marx. His dialectic is dialectic of nature and society.

Both the Hegelian and the Marxian dialectic are rooted in what is called the dialectic of nature. Engels holds that 'Nature is the proof of dialectics.'² It is an irony of the situation that the dialectic of nature happens to be the weakest link in the dialectical chains of both the schools of dialectical thought. It is, indeed, not child's play to introduce order into the hopelessly confused region of the phenomena of nature and fit them into a neat dialectical framework. Some of the contemporary protagonists of dialectic hope to succeed in doing so just by muttering dialectical formulae. We have, therefore, not considered it worth while to devote much time and space to the discussion of this rather underdeveloped aspect of dialectic, although we are inclined to believe that, if there can be a test of dialectic, it can be only nature. As a matter of fact, in this work we are concerned more with the fundamental concept of dialectic in general than its application in special fields.

As we have noticed, dialectic has had an honourable lineage and some of the finest philosophical minds of all times have brought profoundest thought to bear upon it with no mean results. As is evident from the foregoing account, out of the two main lines along which it has developed, viz. dialectic as a technic of reason and dialectic as the concept of constant conflict of contraries/contradictories ingrained in the texture of things, as a cosmological principle, we have chosen to concentrate upon and follow the second line. Whoever be credited with the invention of dialectic in general—to the author both the lines are found to converge first in Zeno of Elea—it is Heraclitus who so richly deserves the title of being the first and foremost seer of dialectic as constant conflict of contradictories. His insights were so profound that even the great Hegel could not resist the temptation of incorporating each and every remnant of the former into his logic. Unfortunately, the work of Heraclitus has been lost to us irretrievably, leaving stray sentences numbering scarcely one hundred and a half in the form of quotations in later writers.

In fact, dialectic as a cosmological principle, i.e. as harmony, reconciliation, or struggle of opposites, is as old as human thought itself. Most of the ancients seem to recognize this principle to be at the root of things some way or other. The table of opposites propounded by the Pythagoreans³ is an instance in point. Anaximander's Unlimited Body and Empedocles' Sphere

2. *SUS*, p. 121 ; *AD*, p. 36.

3. F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (2nd impression, London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), p. 6.

also tend to differentiate into opposites. Even Parmenides, the philosopher of the One absolutely untainted by contradiction and the first to have mooted the idea that the real is rational (without any serious concern to explain, or explain away, the irrational, however) had to assume two contrary principles—hot and cold, fire and earth—by way of explaining the difference between a rational reality and irrational appearance.⁴

The next great name in the history of dialectic is Plato. In him dialectic makes its appearance as conversational thinking, logic, categoriology, and metaphysics. This multidimensional character of dialectic continues in Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic mind of classical antiquity. Incidentally, Cornford repudiates the idea of equating dialectic with formal logic, vis-à-vis Plato.⁵ But Plato and Aristotle's reasoning dialectic cannot be denied the status of logic of some sort or other, be it ever so crude.

In one of the aforesaid senses of the term, Plato conceives dialectic as the highest kind of knowledge, the knowledge of the highest kind of reality, the knowledge of the highest form called the Form of the Good. The state of mind conducive to such knowledge is technically designated as Intelligence.⁶ The mathematical forms belong to a lower order and are apprehended by Reason, a state of mind inferior to Intelligence. Such apprehension is also called knowledge, however.⁷ The world of forms is the world of reality, the world of being, the world of first principles. Lower down in the scale of epistemological categories is Opinion or Belief, yielded by a peculiar state of mind jointly with sense, its object being the things of the world, the world of becoming.⁸ Lowest in the scale is situated Illusion or Ignorance yielded by unreal objects, by shadows and images, by non-being, pure and simple. According to Plato, space is also a reality which 'in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most incomprehensible'⁹ and 'which is apprehended when all sense is absent, by a kind of spurious reason, and is hardly real.'¹⁰ The four elements—air, fire, water, and earth—are said to be 'parts' of space.¹¹ This being the case, space is no less real than the

4. *Metaphysics* 986b.

5. F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, (5th impression, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 264ff.

6. *Republic* 511.

7. *Ibid.* 510a.

8. *Republic* 510a, 511: *Timaeus* 52a.

9. *Timaeus* 51b.

10. *Ibid.* 52b.

11. *Ibid.* 51b.

space (ākāśa) of the Upaniṣad which is the source of the aforesaid elements.¹² We are inclined to the view that Plato's space and the spurious reason by which it comes to be cognized must find place between being and becoming on one hand and knowledge and opinion on the other, in the scale of categories.

It is clear that dialectic here means pure philosophy, pure metaphysics, culminating in what is called Gnosis.

The next philosopher who makes important use of dialectic in the architecture of his philosophy, is Kant. It fell to the lot of the Encyclopaedic Hegel, however, to work out dialectic as the most architectonic system in the Western tradition. He is universally acknowledged as the very culmination of dialectical thought—the prince of dialectic, so to speak. Whatever turn dialectic has taken after Hegel and may take in the future, the Hegelian dialectic has been and will remain an inexhaustible source of inspiration for it as 'the basic form of all dialectics', as Marx would have it. Indeed, Hegel occupies the unique position of being a perennial source of inspiration for the idealist as well as such a formidable opponent of idealism as Karl Marx. Yes, Marx was so passionately enamoured of Hegel that, once, while writing about Dietzgen, the tanner-thinker of Germany, he exclaimed, 'It is his hard luck that precisely Hegel he did *not* study.'¹³

Even though the Hegelian absolute is a stupendous whole, a universal web of connexion, a gigantic system of an all-embracing nature claiming to pigeonhole everything that is the case in a dialectical framework, yet it does not appear to be gigantic enough to embrace the entire multiplicity of the recalcitrant phenomena of nature which have successfully defied all attempt to fit them into a neat dialectical scheme.

Indeed, Hegel has, along with all other dialecticians, failed to establish the universality of contradiction or dialectical process. As has already been observed, his dialectical philosophy of nature is the weakest link in the chain of his dialectical philosophy in general. Competent critics have found fault with the examples of contradiction selected by him to illustrate the operation of dialectic in the realm of nature. It is indeed not very difficult to establish the charge of arbitrariness on his part in this behalf.

Marx has the distinction of performing the apparently impossible feat of turning Hegel right side up and thereby metamorphosing his dialectical absolutism into dialectical materialism. We have seen, however,

12. *Taittiriya-Upaniṣad* 2; 1. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 1. 9. 1; 8. 14. 1.

13. Marx's letter to Engels, dated November 7, 1868, *SC*, p. 262.

that materialism, too, has changed in the process, in some respects beyond recognition. Marx has been able to do little, however, beyond creating a 'materialist' superstructure on the substructure of the Hegelian dialectic. In any case, the Marxian experiment with dialectic has been one of the most hazardous ventures in the history of philosophy. The wedlock of dialectic with materialism and that, too, not for academic but for pragmatic needs, for one of the most ambitious experiments in the reconstruction of humanity, for providing a credal base to a worldwide movement aiming at world-revolution, is, whatever be its merits or demerits, a prodigious feat by itself, which only the genius of Marx could have performed. However, the minds of Marx and Engels were so empiricistically cast that at times their empiricism got the better of their dialecticism and rode roughshod over the verdicts of dialectical reason. In later Marxism, the fate of dialectic is no better than that of the platitudes that God willed this or that, that Allāh is great, and that what is lotted cannot be blotted. And then there is the standard joke that the Marxists first equate an economic measure with a Marxian idea and then proceed to carry out the measure.

Marx and Engels are responsible for giving a definite 'materialist' orientation to the Hegelian dialectic; which, nevertheless, according to Marx, 'is the basic form of all dialectic'.¹⁴ Engels avers that the materialist dialectic—or 'objective dialectic', as he styles it otherwise,¹⁵ in the present context in particular—was also discovered by the German tanner-philosopher Joseph Dietzgen (1828-1888), 'independently of us and even of Hegel'.¹⁶

It must be stated at the very outset that the work of Marx and Engels is confined mostly to dialectical practice and procedure and that they have little contribution to their credit so far as dialectical theory is concerned. In fact, a materialist dialectical theory, if within the realm of possibility, remains a quaesitum even to this day. In a recent work, Jean-Paul Sartre remarks, 'Far from being exhausted, Marxism is still very young, almost in its infancy; it has scarcely begun to develop'.¹⁷ This remark is fully justified, at any rate in the present context.

According to Lenin, the materialist dialectic preached by Marx and Engels does not hold fast to the idealistic triad of 'thesis, negation, negation

14. *DN*, p. 280.

15. Marx's letter to Kugelmann, dated March 6, 1868, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Correspondence*, 1846-1898, a selection with Commentary and Notes (1st Indian ed., Calcutta : National Book Agency, 1948), p. 208.

16. *LF*, pp. 350-351.

17. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Problem of Method*, Hazel E. Barnes, tr. (London : Methuen & Co., 1963), p. 30.

of the negation.¹⁸ He writes, 'It is clear to everybody that the main burden of Engels's argument is that materialists must depict the historical process correctly and accurately and that insistence on...selection of examples which demonstrate the correctness of the triad is nothing but a relic of Hegelianism.... And, indeed, once it has been categorically declared that to attempt to "prove" anything by triads is absurd, what significance can examples of "dialectical" process have? ...Anyone who reads the definition and description of the dialectical method given either by Engels or by Marx... will see that the Hegelian triads are not even mentioned....' Then what is the dialectical procedure of Marx and Engels? Lenin goes on, 'What Marx and Engels called the dialectical method is nothing more nor less than the scientific method in sociology, which consists in regarding society as a living organism in a constant state of development, the study of which requires an objective analysis of the relations of production which constitute the given social formation and an investigation of its laws of functioning and development.'¹⁹ Lenin is only partly right. If not Engels, Karl Marx does use the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in the *Poverty of Philosophy* several times,²⁰ besides employing such expressions as 'negation' and 'negation of the negation' in the *Capital*, too.²¹

Marx considered his dialectic to be 'not only different from the Hegelian but...its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i. e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the idea". With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.'²² That is why he had to perform the feat of turning the Hegelian dialectic right side up.²³

The most fundamental difference between the Hegelian and the Marxian dialectic is that Hegel is predominantly a rationalist or apriorist, as they say, while Marx and Engels are predominantly (professedly) empiricists or aposteriorists, whatever influence Hegel might have exercised over them in

18. Lenin, 'What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats' (1894), *Selected Works of V. I. Lenin*, Vol. I, p. 101.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

20. *PP*, pp. 117-118, 120, 123, 132 (leaving out 'synthesis', however), 169.

21. See, for example, *Capital*, I, p. 763.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 91 (Afterword to the Second German Edition).

23. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

the course of the shaping of their ideas. This is the reason why they tend to repudiate systematical rigidity at times despite being tempted to dogmatize about their predilections at other times. Accordingly, Engels says that 'there could be no question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it.'²⁴ He also maintains that it is 'from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectic are abstracted.'²⁵

Man has never in the past owed so exclusive allegiance to the given as he tends to do today. This is an age of stark positivism, of abject acquiescence in the status quo. The datum is its supreme desideratum, its God, the exclusive and absolute devotion to which has become a sure mark of modernity. The Hegelian-Marxian dialectical negativism, in its pristine purity, remains a standing challenge to all positivism. That way, too, Marxism is akin to idealism, not its enemy. In a broad sense, as Hegel would have it, all philosophy is at bottom idealistic, inasmuch as it has of necessity to proceed on the assumption, express or implied, that seeming is not being, that the finite being of appearance is not the 'veritable being' of reality.²⁶ Even Marx seems to echo Hegel when he writes: 'But all science would be superfluous, if the appearance, the form, and the nature of things were wholly identical.'²⁷ The recognition of this fact by Marx is significant, indeed. Here we are tempted to add in parenthesis that the Hegelian distinction between appearance and reality and the Marxian between the appearance of things and the nature of things correspond to the Jaina distinction between syādvāda (relative or partial truth) and kevala-jñāna (absolute or whole truth) on one hand²⁸ and naya (a partially true statement) and pramāṇa (a wholly true statement) on the other²⁹ rather than to the Advaitin's distinction between vyavahāra (empirical truth) and paramārtha (absolute truth);³⁰ in that, for Hegel and Marx as for Jainism, the distinction purports primarily to be quantitative rather than qualitative, as between

24. *AD*, 19 (Preface).

25. *DN*, p. 83.

26. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 168.

27. Marx, *Capital*, III, Frederick Engels, ed., Ernest Untermann, tr. from the 1st German ed. (1st Indian ed., Calcutta : Saraswati Library, 1946), p. 649. Cp. *Capital*, I, p. 316.

28. Samantabhadra, *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā*, Gajadhara Lal Jaina, ed., Sanātāna-Jaina-Grantha-mālā, No. 10 (Varanasi : Chandraprabha Press, 1914), 10.105.

29. Umāsvāti, *Tattvārthadhigama-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, Kesava Lal, ed. (Calcutta : Asiatic Society, 1903), 1. 9-12.

30. Śaṅkara, *Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya*, Mahadeva Sastri Bakre and Wasudeva Laxman Sastri Panasikara, eds. (3rd. ed., Bombay : Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1914), 2. 1. 14.

part and whole, whereas, for the Advaitin, it is first and last qualitative, the higher truth marking an improvement upon the lower.

In dialectic, things are studied 'in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one another', which involves us in contradictions. 'Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of position can only come about through a body being at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous origination and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is.'³¹ According to Engels, life is also a contradiction, for 'life consists precisely and primarily in this—that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else'.³² Indeed, dialectic is defined by him exactly as 'the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought'.³³ Both the Hegelian and the Marxian dialectic are essentially at one on the 'great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made *things*, but as a complex of *processes*, in which...a progressive development asserts itself in the end...'³⁴ The materialist dialectic 'holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy.'³⁵ Finding that dialectic is at work in different sciences in different forms, Lenin discovers the following pairs of dialectical opposites in them:

'In mathematics: + and —. Differential and integral.

'In mechanics: action and reaction.

'In physics: positive and negative electricity.

'In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms.

'In social science: the class struggle.'³⁶

According to Lenin, there are 'two basic (or two possible?) or two

31. *AD*, p. 167. Cp. Hegel: 'Something moves, not because it is here at one point of time and there at another, but because at one and the same point of time it is here and not here, and in this here both is and is not. We must grant the old dialecticians the contradictions which they prove in motion; but what follows is not that there is no motion, but rather that motion is existent Contradiction itself.' (*The Science of Logic*, II, p. 67). One sentence later, Hegel adds: 'Abstract self-identity has no life; but the fact that Positive in itself is negativity causes it to pass outside itself and to change.' (*Ibid.*, p. 68).

32. *AD*, p. 168.

33. *AD*, p. 195; also see p. 510; *DN*, p. 353; *SUS*, p. 121.

34. *LF*, p. 351.

35. *AD*, p. 195. So does the Hegelian dialectic. See *Logic*, pp. 147, 150, 221-222, etc.

36. 'On Dialectics', *MEM*, p. 332.

historically observable ?) conceptions of development (evolution)', which are : 'development as decrease and increase, as repetition, *and* development as a unity of opposites...' ³⁷ The latter is a 'development that seemingly repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis ("negation of negation"), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in straight lines;—a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolution;—"breaks in continuity"; the transformation of quantity into quality....' ³⁸ This is dialectical development. He elsewhere describes the distinguishing features of dialectic as 'The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity) of Being and non-Being.' ³⁹

Engels juxtaposes dialectic to metaphysics. ⁴⁰ 'To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. "His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay'; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.' ⁴¹ And dialectic ? 'Dialectics, on the other hand, comprehends things and their representations, in their essential connection, concatenation, motion, origin, and ending.' ⁴² Engels applauds Darwin for dealing the metaphysical view of nature 'the heaviest blow' by showing that all organic beings are the products of a process of evolution. ⁴³

Incidentally, Marx and Engels go to the extent of declaring that dialectic 'no longer needs any philosophy standing above the other sciences', ⁴⁴ that everything else than logic and dialectic 'is subsumed in the positive science of nature and history,' ⁴⁵ and that 'philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by a summing-up of the most general results.' ⁴⁶

Engels defines dialectic otherwise as comprehending 'things in their

37. *Ibid.*, p. 333.

38. Lenin, 'Karl Marx' (1915), *MEM*, p. 25.

39. *PN*, p. 284.

40. *AD*, p. 35, for example.

41. *AD*, pp. 34-35.

42. *AD*, p. 36.

43. *AD*, pp. 36-37.

44. *AD*, p. 40; *SUS*, p. 123. Also see *DN*, p. 279.

45. *Loc. cit.*

46. *GI*, p. 33.

interconnexion instead of in isolation.⁴⁷ Dialectic, according to him, is an unending process, for which 'nothing is final, absolute, sacred.'⁴⁸ Theoretically not postulating an absolute, the materialist dialectic differs from the Hegelian in a large measure. According to the Marxian dialectic, says Lenin, 'the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative' and 'there is an absolute *within* the relative.'⁴⁹

From the discussions in Hegel's *Logic*, Engels culls and adopts the following general laws of dialectic :

1. The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
2. The law of the interpenetration of opposites
3. The law of the negation of the negation⁵⁰

In illustration of the first law, Engels says that, under normal atmospheric pressure, water 'changes at O°C. from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C. from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water.'⁵¹ When water is being boiled, it does not go on getting hotter and hotter indefinitely; it undergoes a qualitative change from liquidity to gaseousness at a given stage. Likewise, the co-operation of a number of people creates a new power, essentially different from the sum of their separate forces. It was Mirzā Ghālīb (1797-1869), the great Urdu-Persian poet of India and a senior contemporary of Marx, who sang the following dialectical lines :

‘Ishrat-e qatraḥ hai daryā meṅ fanā ho jānā
 ‘Dard kā had se guzarnā hai dawā ho jānā’
 (In vanishing into the ocean does
 the joy of the drop consist.
 In pain surpassing the bounds does
 the cure of the pain consist.)

The second law can be expressed by the formula, A is A (in one respect) and also not-A (in another respect). It is a meeting ground of opposite tendencies. The atom has positrons and neutrons both. The third law refers to the synthesis which supervenes upon the combination of thesis and antithesis. In history and philosophy, Marx and Engels observe the

47. *DN*, p. 351.

48. *LF*, p. 328.

49. ‘On Dialectics’, *MEM*, p. 333.

50. *DN*, p. 83.

51. *AD*, p. 175.

working of their dialectical law in such trilogies, respectively, as the following :

Primitive communism	Private property	Socialism
Primitive materialism	Idealism	Scientific materialism ⁵²

Summing up the principal feature of the Marxist dialectical method, Stalin gives us a list of four items, which are :

First, 'Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent upon, and determined by each other.'

Second, 'Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that nature is not a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development....'

Third, 'Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard the process of development as a simple process of growth...but as a development which passes from insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes to open, fundamental changes, to qualitative changes; a development in which the qualitative changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another....'

Fourth, 'Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature....'⁵³

It is significant, however, that the great law of the negation of the negation is conspicuous by its absence in this list.

The most exhaustive inventory of the elements of dialectic is found in Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*, which must be noted here in full :

- '1) the *objectivity* of consideration....
- '2) the entire totality of the manifold *relations* of this thing to others.
- '3) the *development* of this thing, (phenomenon, respectively), its own movement, its own life.
- '4) the internally contradictory *tendencies* (and sides) in this thing.
- '5) the thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum *and unity of opposites*.

52. AD, pp. 191-192.

53. Joseph Stalin, *Philosophy of Marxism* (Bombay : People's Publishing House, 1945), pp. 3-7. This work was originally published under the title 'Dialectical and Historical Materialism' (September 1938) and included in the same author's *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), pp. 713-745, the passages quoted occurring on pp. 714-717.

- '6) the *struggle*, respectively unfolding, of these opposites, contradictory strivings, etc.
- '7) the union of analysis and synthesis—the breakdown of the separate parts and the totality, the summation of these parts.
- '8) the relations of each thing (phenomenon, etc.) are not only manifold, but general, universal. Each thing is connected with *every other*.
- '9) not only the unity of opposites, but the *transitions of every* determination, quality, feature, side, property into *every* other [into its opposite ?].
- '10) the endless process of the discovery of *new* sides, relations, etc.
- '11) the endless process of the deepening of man's knowledge of the thing, of phenomena, processes, etc., from appearance to essence and from less profound to more profound essence.
- '12) from co-existence to causality and from one form of connection and reciprocal dependence to another, deeper, more general form.
- '13) the repetition at a higher stage of certain features, properties, etc., of the lower and
- '14) the apparent return to the old (negation of the negation).
- '15) the struggle of content with form and conversely. The throwing off of the form, the transformation of the content.
- '16) the transition of quantity into quality and *vice versa*. ((15 and 16 are *examples* of 9))⁵⁴

It is interesting to note that transformation of quantity into quality, which Engels considered the first and foremost feature of dialectic, is here relegated not only to the last position but also to the position of mere examples of the unity of opposites.

If anything, dialectic is an infinitizing, concretizing, and holistic process, so to speak. The only conceivable rationale of dialectic is the belief, firstly, that things are finite, incomplete, and in the nature of abstractions from some concrete reality and are perpetually trying to overreach, transcend, and complete themselves by positing their own contradictories and then being synthetized with them into a higher category comprehensive enough to have them as its own two moments. Indeed, dialectic is a declaration of war by things against their finitude. The lower categories subsist in and through the highest category, the only real category existing in its own right, matter or the universal being an abstraction, as a collective name for them. We would do well to note what Engels has to say in this behalf: 'Matter is

54. *PN*, pp. 221-222.

nothing but the totality of material things from which this concept is abstracted...; words like matter and motion are nothing but *abbreviations* in which we comprehend many different sensuously perceptible things according to their common properties.'⁵⁵ Such Marxism is neither universalism nor idealism but particularism and matter-of-fact practicalism, the particulars of which are self-contained and self-content, having no ambition, so to speak, for self-aggrandizement through self-transcendence. This being so, it is difficult to see how dialectic could be considered essential or germane to, or even compatible with, Marxism as usually interpreted.

For Hegel, the Absolute Spirit is the one, all-inclusive reality which alienates itself into the world of finite things, through some inscrutable finitizing principle or process. The finite things, representing as they do a lapse from the pristine absoluteness of the Absolute Spirit, crave to return to their original self by referring beyond themselves and positing their complement masquerading as their negation, and then being synthetized with it into a higher unity. Marx propounds no such theory of alienation, whence he has no warrant for dabbling with dialectic. He does employ the concept of alienation or estrangement in a different context, as 'man's externalization in the thing,'⁵⁶ 'estrangement of man from nature and himself,'⁵⁷ the alienation of the producer (worker) from the product of his own labour,⁵⁸ etc.; but it is far from germane to the above issue.

Hegel's Absolute is thought thinking about thought. He proceeds to deduce the necessity of the worlds of Nature and Spirit (not the worlds themselves) from Logic, from pure thought, which is necessarily of a dialectical character. Each thought engenders its opposite, so much so that in meditation every conscious effort to concentrate upon a given object and keep at bay all else is often defeated by an equally strong gust of the opposite. This being the case, if Hegel sees dialectic in the very nature of things, he is quite comprehensible. But it passes one's comprehension how a 'materialist', to whom thought is a secondary or tertiary product of nature—purely an accident, not affecting the constitution of the cosmos in any way whatsoever—, can claim to see dialectic at the root of the cosmos. Engels' discovery of 'the truth that it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings',⁵⁹ is purely an empirical discovery without any

55. *DN*, pp. 312-313.

56. *EPM*, p. 94.

57. *EPM*, p. 74.

58. *EPM*, pp. 72, 78.

59. *DN*, p. 278.

sound logical basis. Therefore, unless transmaterialistically interpreted, Marx will have to forfeit all claim upon dialectic.

Even granting that Marx and Engels are entitled to own dialectic, we must say that their dialectic can at best operate only on the cosmological plane, and not on the historiological plane. They overstep the bounds of their competence when they import the concept into history. In fact, Hegel also is guilty of applying his dialectic in the empirical sphere as a matter of course. If at all, dialectic can be taken to operate at the root rather than in the branches of the world-process. It is far from incumbent upon it to be at work everywhere, even in the realm of subjective choices.

From these considerations it is pretty clear that only a Transcendentalist like Kant or Absolutist like Hegel can be a true dialectician.

On a close and critical scrutiny of the relation between the materialist dialectic and the rest of Marxism, the conclusion is irresistible that the two are not inextricably bound up with, or organically related to, each other. Marx does not make important use of dialectic in his dissertations on philosophy. It does not figure as a cut and dried concept in the *German Ideology* including the *Eleven Theses on Feuerbach* and the Introduction to the *Critique of Political Economy* wherein he tries to set forth the summary of his philosophy of history. Significantly enough, dialectic is conspicuous by its absence in the *Communist Manifesto* as well. Bertrand Russell's statement, therefore, that 'the whole of his history of economic development may perfectly well be true if his metaphysic is false, and false if his metaphysic is true,'⁶⁰ does appear to have some force. Mikhailovsky also reaches an identical conclusion when he says, 'Marx filled the empty dialectical scheme so full with factual content that it could be removed from this content like a lid from a bowl without anything being changed.'⁶¹ Certain statements in Engels' writings, too, serve to confirm this view. In reply to Dühring's dig at Marx's so-called 'dialectical frills and mazes', 'dialectical miracles', and 'dialectical rubbish', Engels remarks, 'Marx merely shows from history... that just as formerly petty industry by its very development necessarily created the conditions of its own annihilation, i. e., of the expropriation of the small proprietors, so now the capitalist mode of production has likewise

60. Bertrand Russell, *Freedom and Organization* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1934), p. 220.

61. Mikhailovsky, quoted in Lenin, 'What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats', *Selected Works of V. I. Lenin*, I, p. 102.

itself created the material conditions from which it must perish.'⁶² That is to say, the process delineated by Marx is a historical one arrived at by him independently of dialectic. That is why Engels hastens to add immediately after, 'The process is a historical one, and if it is at the same time a dialectical process, this is not Marx's fault.'⁶³ In the *Capital*, Marx observes, 'The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of nature, its own negation. It is the negation of the negation.'⁶⁴ Upon this statement of Marx, Engels comments, 'Thus, by characterizing the process as the negation of the negation, Marx does not intend to prove that the process was historically necessary. On the contrary: only after he has proved from history that in fact the process has partially already occurred, and partially must occur in the future, he in addition characterizes it as a process which develops in accordance with a definite dialectical law. That is all. It is therefore once again a pure distortion of the facts by Herr Dühring when he declares that the negation of the negation has to serve here as the midwife to deliver the future from the womb of the past, or that Marx wants anyone to be convinced of the necessity of the common ownership of land and capital (which is itself a Dühringian contradiction in corporal form) on the basis of credence in the negation of the negation.'⁶⁵ These words leave no doubt whatever that dialectic is far from integral or organic to Marxism, which is complete without it. In Marx and Engels, dialectic does not appear to be a law of thought and things but merely an empirical observation. Their use of dialectic appears to be an attempt at the apotheosis or consecration of their findings independently arrived at. The Marxists' habit of swearing in season and out of season by such a gratuitous and, from the materialist point of view, far-fetched assumption as dialectic sometimes assumes ridiculous proportions. 'It is a standard joke', writes Milovan Djilas, 'that the Communists first equate an economic measure with a Marxist idea and then proceed to carry out the measure.'⁶⁶

62. *AD*, p. 185.

63. *Loc. cit.*

64. *Capital*, I, p. 763.

65. *AD*, p. 186.

66. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (5th printing, New York : Frederick A. Praeger, August 1957), p. 104.

Early 'revisionists' sought to dispense with dialectic altogether. E. Bernstein, indeed, went to the extent of dubbing dialectic as 'the treacherous element in the Marxian doctrine, the trap that is laid for all consistent thinking.'⁶⁷ He also came to hold, 'If we wish to comprehend the world, we have to conceive it as a complex of ready-made objects and processes'.⁶⁸

Marxists tend to vulgarize dialectic by designating any and every term that suits them as thesis and then proceeding to complete the triad. It never occurs to them to first decide where logically to begin. Terms are not interchangeable. It is not open to us to start from anywhere we like and designate the term as thesis, arbitrarily. A is A, B is B, and C is C. If we come upon A, then we have to hunt up B and C; if B, then A and C; and, if C, then A and B. In their arbitrary procedure, they invariably tend to be guided, or rather misguided, by chronology. Theirs is the theory of linear progress.⁶⁹ They seem to proceed on the assumption that what precedes is the thesis and what succeeds is the antithesis or the synthesis, the latest member of the series being regarded as the synthesis. They are, therefore, guilty of confusing logical with chronological sequence. It must, however, be acknowledged that, in his dialectical practice, Hegel is no less to blame for such a fault. McTaggart has dealt with this difficulty in Hegel at sufficient length.⁷⁰

67. E. Bernstein, *Zür Theorie und Geschichte des Sozialismus*, Berlin, 1904, Part III, p. 75, quoted in Marcuse, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 74, quoted in Marcuse, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

69. Lenin regards the dialectical development as 'a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line;—a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolution;—"breaks in continuity"; the transformation of quantity into quality' (Lenin, 'Karl Marx' (1914), *MEM*, p. 25). Engels also speaks of the 'eternal cycle in which matter moves' (*DN*, p. 54). But spirals and cycles are within the lines, and not the other way round. Stalin regards the process of development 'not as movement in a circle, not as a simple repetition of what has already occurred, but as an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher' (*Philosophy of Marxism*, p. 5). Engels Demurs to the view that 'since the dark Middle Ages a steady progress to a better state of things must surely have taken place', underlining 'the antagonistic character of real progress' and 'the individual retrogression', vide his letter to Marx, dated December 15, 1882 (*SC*, p. 428), but the overall result remains the same: history is working towards a definite goal, the establishment of a Communist millennium, upto which a not-uniformly-straight line but yet a line can be drawn from the stage of primitive communism.

70. J. M. E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* (2nd ed., Cambridge: University Press, 1922), pp. 238 ff.

Both Hegel and Marx-Engels, while practising dialectic, deal with only one aspect of reality, to the neglect of all other aspects. Even in discovering contradictions native to a thing, they do not worry about examining which of these are essential and which otherwise. Unless the essential and basal elements or contradictions are discovered, it would be simply unwarrantable on one's part to pass one's verdict on the thing in general. Even such a Marxist as Mao Tse-Tung shows an inkling of this issue. 'There are', he says, 'many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence or development of the other contradictions.'⁷¹ According to him, contradiction is present in the process of development of all things, throughout. This he calls 'the universality and absoluteness of contradiction',⁷² distinguishing it from 'the particularity of contradiction'.⁷³ Universality of contradiction seems to mean the universal presence of contradiction and the particularity of contradiction, the principal contradiction, or the contradiction peculiar to a particular thing 'determining the particular essence of a thing which differentiates it from other things'.⁷⁴

At the risk of repetition, we would do well to record here that what is shockingly missing from the materialist dialectic is the key-notion, so conspicuous in Hegel, of the self-differentiating unity, characteristic only of the self-conscious, Absolute Spirit, in the infinitizing movement toward which the lower categories have to break down as imperfections. Findlay calls this key-notion 'the lubricant without whose secretly applied unction the dialectical wheels and cranks would not turn at all'.⁷⁵ As we have already seen, Engels maintains that it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings....⁷⁶ But why? Hegel is ready with an answer, Marxists are struck dumb.

Whatever be the merits or demerits of the dialectic of Hegel as well as Marx and Engels, it must be admitted in fairness to it, that it can lay claim to no less respectability and validity than the various other theories proposed

71. Mao Tse-Tung, *On Contradiction, Selected Writings* (Calcutta: National Book Agency, 1967), p. 674.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 664.

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 657 ff.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 664-665, *passim*.

75. J. N. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-examination* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), p. 76.

76. *DN*, p. 278.

in the West in explanation of the world-process. The question why nature should go on developing higher and higher forms perpetually is the crux of all theories of evolution. Samuel Alexander, the greatest of the emergent evolutionists, at one place declares the problem insoluble while at another seeks to solve it by postulating a mysterious creative principle entitled *nisus*⁷⁷ ensouling the primordial space-time and goading it to evolve higher and higher forms till the emergence of deity. This *nisus* is no less mysterious than any other mysterious principle including the Godhead. 'Primordial space-time and a *nisus*', remarks Radhakrishnan, 'are Alexander's substitutes for the Void and God of the Old Testament'.⁷⁸ Indeed, Lloyd Morgan, another emergent evolutionist, goes to the extent of equating the *nisus* with God, without reservation.⁷⁹ Bergson's *élan Vital* (original impetus of life, Vital impetus)⁸⁰ does point to the root of the matter, but then he, too, has to make important use of dialectical opposition. Whitehead's theory of ingression of eternal objects into the world of space-time⁸¹ does not lead us even as far.

Since Marxism does not countenance the pre-existence of perfection towards which the world-process dialectically gravitates, it is too much for it to take it for granted axiomatically that the dialectical process must needs bring about the development of a higher form of existence. What is there to determine the tendency and direction of the process? What is the warrant for the assertion that a qualitative change supervenient upon a quantitative change necessarily marks a higher stage in the process of evolution? Does it not imply a final cause, a proleptic influence of the result on the process leading up to it, a pull from without, a push from within, a propelling force behind evolution, a will dictating the process its course? And what is the criterion to judge what is higher and what is lower at all? Such questions remain unanswered on the Marxian view.

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- 77. Samuel Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1920), Vol. II, p. 353.
 - 78. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life* (5th impression, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957), p. 323.
 - 79. C. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, Gifford Lectures, 1922 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1923), p. 36.
 - 80. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Arthur Mitchell, tr., Papermac 100 (11th reprint, London: Macmillan & Co., 1964), pp. 53, 56, 92, 93, 102, 107, 142, 267, etc.
 - 81. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, Gifford Lectures, 1927-28, A Free Press Paperback (New York: The Free Press, n. d.), p. 30.

In dialectic, antithesis represents the unity and struggle of opposites. The struggle of opposites becomes possible only when they are basically one, when they characterize the subject in the same respect. If they belong to the subject in different respects, they will fail to struggle with each other. In Marxian parlance, dialectical unity may be said to be the substructure and the struggle of opposites the superstructure of the dialectical fabric. So, the unity of opposites is a must for their struggle. But Lenin assigns the first place to the struggle of opposites: 'The unity (coincidence, identity, resultant) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute'.⁸² The importance of the factor of unity was highlighted by Stalin as against conflict while discussing the problem of linguistics. In this connexion, he sought to make three points. First, he repudiated the view that language is a superstructure on the economic structure of society.⁸³ Second, he made bold to repudiate the class character of language and put forward the thesis that 'language serves all classes of... society equally and in this respect displays what may be called an indifference to classes'.⁸⁴ Third, he held that, between the warring classes in society, there is such a strong bond of unity that 'however sharp the class struggle may be, it cannot lead to the disintegration of society'.⁸⁵ N. Y. Bukharin also stressed the unity of opposites, maintaining that synthesis is not the negation of negation but a unification and reconciliation of opposites, 'a unifying position, in which contradictions are reconciled'.⁸⁶ Deborin also expressed a similar predilection in taking dialectical materialism to be a reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism.

As a matter of fact, both the unity and the struggle of opposites are equally necessary for the operation of dialectic and the stress that has been laid on the one or the other is purely pragmatical, provisional, and relative. As regards the question of reconciliation versus negation at the stage of synthesis, it must be allowed that all dialectical processes are not identical in this respect: some end in reconciliation and some in the negation of negation. As we have noticed elsewhere,⁸⁷ even Hegel does not countenance a uniform

82. Lenin, 'On Dialectics', MEM, p. 333.

83. Stalin, *Concerning Marxism in Linguistics* (New Delhi: Tass Representative in India, December 1953), pp. 3 ff.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

86. Bukharin, quoted in Wetter, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

87. See Harsh Narain, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

dialectical pattern in all cases. As his dialectic progresses, there is progressively increasing identification of thesis and antithesis. While dealing with the problem of linguistics, Stalin rules 'that the law of transition from an old quality to a new by means of an explosion is inapplicable...to the history of the development of languages' and 'does not necessarily apply to a society which has no hostile classes'.⁸⁸ This is a clear recognition of the diversity of dialectical patterns.

Dialectic, Hegelian as well as well as Marxian, implies that the world is not merely a congeries of disjointed objects or facts but a unity, a system, a developmental organism determining the direction it should take. Indeed, carried to its logical extreme, dialectic must involve an organismic view of reality. Hegel was fully conscious of this implication of his theory of dialectic. We are inclined to believe that, had Marx had time to work out the implications of his dialectic, he would have come nearer to Hegel.

88. Stalin, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

CHAPTER V

Dialectic of History

The main field in which Marx and Engels seek to apply dialectic is history, wherein 'class' takes the place of Hegel's 'Idea' as the prime mover of the historical process. What is a class? Says Marx: 'The separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against another class.'¹ Also: 'In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class.'² In fact, Marx attempted a fuller definition of class towards the close of *Capital*, Volume III, but unfortunately could not complete it.³ History has been the history of an unceasing struggle between the exploiter- and exploited classes, which are believed to represent thesis and antithesis respectively,⁴ the final synthesis being ordained as the establishment of a classless society. 'The history of all hitherto-existing society is the history of class struggles,' wrote Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto*. They continued, 'Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant

1. *GI*, p. 69.

2. *EBLB*, p. 303.

3. See *Capital*, III, pp. 703-704.

4. *HF*, p. 51.

opposition to one another....⁵ Engels subsequently made the emendation, that 'all past history, with the exception of its primitive stages, was the history of class struggles....'⁶ That is to say, all history is marked by class-struggle save primitive stages, pre-history, or proto-history—primitive communistic society, as Engels would have it otherwise.⁷ Class-struggle is the sociological counterpart of the biological theory of the struggle for existence.⁸ The idea of a class struggle is found mooted in Plato as well.⁹

The modern dialectical classes are bourgeoisie and proletariat. 'By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage-labour. By proletariat, the class of modern wage labourers. ...'¹⁰

The classes are economic in origin but class-struggle is far from confined to the economic sphere. Class-struggle is a universal, all-embracing phenomenon. Engels makes it clear that 'all historical struggles, whether they proceed in the political, religious, philosophical or some other ideological domain, are in fact only the more or less clear expression of struggles of social classes,¹¹ and that the existence and thereby the collisions, too, between these classes are in turn conditioned by the degree of development of their economic position, by the mode of their production and of their exchange determined by it.'¹² According to Marx and Engels, the ruling class is at once 'the ruling *material* force of society' and 'its ruling *intellectual* force'¹³ and the ruling ideas are the ideas of the ruling class'¹⁴ for the simple reasons that 'The "*idea*" always disgraced itself in so far as it differed from the "*interest*" '¹⁵ and that 'theory, too, becomes a material force once it seizes the masses.'¹⁶ Marx also holds that 'It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness.'¹⁷

5. *CM*, p. 33. Cp. *GI*, p. 487.

6. *AD*, p. 41; *SUS*, p. 124.

7. See note 'b' by Engels, *CM*, p. 33.

8. *DN*, p. 405.

9. *Republic*, 422e sq.; 551 d. Cp. 566 a,

10. *CM*, p. 33, Note '(a)' by Engels.

11. Cp. *Republic* 338 ff.

12. Engels, Preface (1885) to to the Third German Edition of *EBLB*, pp. 223-224.

13. *GI*, p. 61.

14. *Loc. cit.*

15. *HF*, p. 109.

16. *CCHPR*, p. 137.

17. *CCPE*, Author's Preface, pp. 11-12.

Dialectic has much to do with the law of polarity, in deference to which Marx and Engels postulated that in the capitalist society there is bound to take place a polarization of classes, all classes being ultimately reduced to the exploiting class and the exploited class, at daggers drawn with each other. 'Society as a whole,' they declare in the historic *Communist Manifesto*, 'is more and more splitting into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.'¹⁸ But what about the middle classes so much in evidence even at the advanced stage of capitalism? Their answer is that they will, in the long run, have to sink into the bourgeoisie or the proletariat and finally exit from the scene for good.¹⁹ In fact, polarity is the *sine qua non* of dialectic.

In the process of polarization of classes, however, the proletariat is, according to Marx and Engels, bound to be faced with the phenomenon of increasing pauperization, increasing misery. According to the law of increasing misery, as this phenomenon has come to be styled, with the increasing development of industry there will be an increasing accumulation or monopolization of wealth on the side of the bourgeoisie and increasing pauperization or misery on the side of proletariat. 'The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces,' says Marx.²⁰

The centralization of wealth will go on increasing with a corresponding increase in the misery of the proletariat which, when at the point of starvation, will have no alternative but to destroy capitalism and put an end to its the proletariat's) troubles for good. Marx describes the phenomenon with characteristic fire: 'Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation....Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.'²¹

But, thanks to the inception of labour legislation, colonization, and conquest, the lot of the proletariat had begun to show signs of improvement in Marx's own time. Marx admits this but tries to explain it away, with the remark that, 'although the enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social

18. *CM*, pp. 33-34, 39-40, 41-42, 53. Also See *EPM*, pp. 24-25, 67, 206.

19. *CM*, pp. 39-40, 53. This prophecy has failed to materialize. The middle class is expanding and going stronger and stronger day by day.

20. *EPM*, p. 69.

21. *Capital* I, p. 763. Cp. *EPM*, pp. 21, 24-25, 28, 30, 67, 69, 70-71, 116, 118; *Grundrisse*, p. 750.

satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the state of development of society in general.' Generalizing the point, he continues: 'Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.'²² Marx also admits that capitals invested in colonies etc. may weaken the effect of the law of increasing misery, but the law itself, he adds, 'is not suspended' or abolished. In fact, according to him, the law 'shows itself only as a tendency, whose effects become clearly marked only under certain conditions and in the course of long periods.'²³ He also came to have some appreciation of some of the implications of the development of joint-stock company system which promised to offset the tendency of the polarization of classes. The system, according to him, 'is the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within capitalist production itself...which represents on its face a mere phase of transition to a new form of production.'²⁴ In the newly established co-operative factories of the labourers, the associated labourers become 'their own capitalists,' rather than be subjected to exploitation by the capitalist class. Within them, 'the antagonism between capital and labour is overcome'. His following words are of the greatest significance in this connexion: 'The capitalist stock companies as well as the co-operative factories may be considered as forms of transition from the capitalist mode of production to the associated one, with this distinction, that the antagonism is met negatively in the one, positively in the other.'²⁵ Then, it is difficult to see how the theory of increasing misery can be sustained in the form in which Marx and Engels have stated it. Is it not the victory of reform over revolution, of crawl over leap, of gradualism over dialectic?

Marx and Engels even look askance at the reform measures seeking, ostensibly, to improve the lot of the proletariat. In fact they take exception to them on the ground that, by so doing, the democratic petty bourgeois 'hope to bribe the workers by more or less concealed alms and to break their revolutionary potency by making their position tolerable for the moment.'²⁶ Explaining their aim, they write, 'For us the issue cannot be

22. *WLC*, p. 87.

23. *Capital*, III, p. 187.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 352.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 353.

26. Marx and Engels, 'Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League' (1850), *S. W.*, I, p. 101.

the alteration of private property but only its annihilation, not the smoothing over of class antagonisms but the abolition of classes, not the improvement of existing society but the foundation of a new one.²⁷ In a nutshell, not reform but revolution.

As regards the bearing of national conquests on the law of increasing misery, Marx and Engels have themselves recognized that their 'whole interpretation of history appears to be contradicted by the fact of conquest.'²⁸ They recur to this issue a number of times.²⁹

It seems to be clearer that Marx and Engels greatly underrate the role of the middle classes, with the result that the orthodox Marxists find themselves hard put to it to account for the rise of Nazism and Fascism as also the power wielded by bureaucracy, business managers, and scientists. Among Marx-influenced thinkers it is James Burnham, the author of the *Managerial Revolution*, who gives to the middle classes their due by assigning a decisive role to them in modern society as well as in the society to come. According to him, capitalism will yield place not to socialism, as Marx visualized (which will come up for discussion in the sequel), but to the rule of the managerial section of the middle class who will establish what he calls the managerial society.³⁰ Needless to point out that Burnham's forecast is coming true, slowly but surely. In fact, his analysis of post-capitalist society is almost as important as Marx's analysis of capitalist society.

It is significant, however, that even Engels sometimes came to realize that modern economy has begun to be run by salaried employees rather than capitalists themselves. 'At first', he contends, 'the capitalist mode of production forces out the workers. Now it forces out the capitalsts....'³¹ Had he pursued this point in all its implications, he would in all probability have been led to a position akin to Burnham's.

Well, what follows upon the success of the revolution is characterized by Marx and Engels as the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. This concept, with slight verbal variations, occurs in Marx and Engels, subject to the present writer's computation, eleven times.³² The dictator-

27. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

28. *GI*, p. 34.

29. *GI*, p. 92, for example.

30. James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, Pelican Books, Services Edition (New York: Penguin Books, 1945), pp. 63 ff.

31. *SUS*, p. 136.

32. *CSF*, pp. 149, 203; Marx's letter to Weydemeyer, dated March 5, 1852, *S. W.*, II, p. 410; Marx's article entitled 'Political Indifferentism' contributed in 1873 to the German *Neue Zeit*, Vol. XXXII, I, 1913-14, p. 40, quoted in Lenin, *The State and*

ship of the proletariat is a condition of society rather than the dictatorial form of government, despite Lenin's diatribe against Karl Kautsky for holding such a view.³³ Engels considers 'a democratic republic' to be 'the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat.'³⁴ In reply to a supposed question as to the course of the proletarian revolution which, according to him, is going to come, he contends that the revolution 'will inaugurate a *democratic constitution* and thereby directly or indirectly the political rule of the proletariat.'³⁵ More concretely: 'Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.'³⁶ The Paris Commune, which lasted for two months (March 28 to May 28, 1871), was a model democratic republic, formed of municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage and 'composed of several parties, among which the Marxist party was neither the smallest nor the most significant.'³⁷ In fact, the dictatorship of the proletariat is a condition favouring 'the expropriation of a few usurpers by the people' as against capitalism which means 'the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers.'³⁸

This is the state of affairs which Marx originally chose to term 'crude communism'. It differs from 'communism' in an important respect. Communism means 'Abolition of private property', a rubric in which 'the theory of the Communists may be summed up.'³⁹ But in crude communism private property is not abolished; it is generalized, universalized, and consummated; the 'category of *labourer* is not done away with, but extended to all men', envy and avarice are not eliminated, but re-established for satisfaction in another way.⁴⁰ 'General *envy* constituting itself as power is the

Revolution (1918) (Moscow, 1951), p. 97; CWF, Engels' Introduction, p. 440; Engels, *The Housing Question* (1872-73), S. W., I, pp. 555, 556: Engels' letter to Schmidt, dated October 27, 1890, S. W., II, p. 450; Engels, 'A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891' (1901-2), S. W., III (1970), p. 435, read with pp. 108 and 197; Engels, 'Programme of the Blanquist Commune Emigrants' (1874), S. W., II (1969), p. 381; CGP, p. 30.

33. Lenin, 'The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky' (1918), MEM pp. 443 ff.

34. Engels, 'A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891', S. W., III (1970), p. 435, read with pp. 108 and 197.

35. PC, p. 90.

36. CWF, Engels' Introduction, p. 440.

37. CWF, p. 471.

38. *Capital*, I, p. 764.

39. CM, p. 45.

40. EPM, pp. 99-100.

disguise in which *avarice* re-establishes itself and satisfies itself, only in another way.⁴¹ Sometimes Marx and Engels appear to welcome this state of affairs. They commend all sorts of excesses on the part of the proletariat during and immediately after the revolution, with a view to feeding the direct revolutionary excitement. 'Far from opposing so-called excesses,' write they, 'instances of popular revenge against hated individuals or public buildings that are associated only with hateful recollections, such instances must not only be tolerated but the leadership of them taken in hand.'⁴²

With the increasing success of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 'State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then withers away of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. 'The State is not "abolished". It withers away.'⁴³ Or, then, society 'will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the spinning wheel and the bronze axe'.⁴⁴ Or the proletariat will 'throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap heap'.⁴⁵ This is the theory of the withering away of the state.

The dictatorship of the proletariat or crude communism is followed by communism divisible into two phases.⁴⁶ The 'first phase of communist society' came to be called 'socialism' and the 'higher phase of communist society', 'communism'. Marxism seems to stop here, but not Marx, the author of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, who envisages the possibility of transcendence of communism as well. This we shall advert to in the sequel.

Thus, the sequence of future events constituting the grand Synthesis of all history, the Negation of all negation, according to Marxism, would be something like this :

41. *EPM*, p. 100.

42. Marx and Engels, 'Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League' (1850), *S. W.*, I, pp. 103-104.

43. *AD* (1969), p. 333. Also see *SUS*, p. 138 and *AD*, p. 389, which have '*dies out*' for 'withers away'. Engels also uses other synonymous expressions in this connexion, such as 'will inevitably fall', in *OFPPS*, p. 292; 'will fall of itself' in his letter to T. Cuno, dated January 24, 1872, *S.W.*, II, p. 424; 'will disappear', that is, 'public functions will lose their political character and be transformed into the simple administrative functions of watching over the true interests of society', in 'On Authority' (1873), *S. W.*, I, p. 577.

44. *OFPPS*, p. 292.

45. *CWF*, p. 440.

46. *CGP*, pp. 23 and 30.

1. Smashing, annulment, or abolition of the bourgeois state by the revolutionary proletariat.
2. Establishment of a proletarian state characterized, first, as 'crude communism' and, later, as 'the dictatorship of the proletariat'.
3. Withering away of the proletarian state and establishment of socialism.
4. Communism
5. Transcommunism.

Translated into history, the laws of dialectic enunciated by Engels imply that every social order or historical epoch carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction, is pregnant with its own negation, and that, though there is an underlying continuity as well as unity between the old order and the new, the transformation of the old order is abrupt, sudden, and violent, like a flash of lightning which is the result of long-gathering forces in the clouds, like revelation which is the result of long-accumulating inner experience. In G. B. Shaw's *Back to Methuselah*, Conrad remarks: 'Nature always proceeds by jumps. She may spend twenty thousand years making up her mind to jump; but when she makes it up at last, the jump is big enough to take us into a new age.'⁴⁷ That is why orthodox Marxists tend to reject reform in favour of revolution.

According to the first law of dialectic, transformation of a social order takes place only when the full sum of its possibilities has been realized, when it has reached its culmination. 'No social order ever disappears', says Marx, 'before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society.'⁴⁸

According to Marx and Engels, the whole of human history is divisible into seven stages out of which the first four⁴⁹ represent the prehistoric, viz. presocialistic, and the remaining three historic ones:

1. Primitive communism.
2. Ancient slavery.
3. Mediaeval feudalism.

47. George Bernard Shaw, *Back to Methuselah: A Metabiological Pentateuch* (2nd reprint of the 2nd ed., London: Constable Company, 1949), p. 79.

48. *CCPE*, Preface, p. 12; *S. W.*, I, p. 329 (with 'perishes' for 'disappears' and 'itself' added at the end).

49. *GI* (pp. 33ff.) distinguishes four main prehistoric epochs—the tribal, ancient communal (based on slavery), feudal, and modern capitalistic—to which *CCPE* (Preface, p. 21) adds the Asiatic type.

4. Modern capitalism,
5. Ultra-modern crude communism, dictatorship of the proletariat, or socialism.
6. Post-modern communism.
7. Transcommunism.

This order is unchangeable and irreversible. Society cannot overleap the natural phases of its evolution; it can, at best, shorten and lessen its birth-pangs.⁵⁰ Force, which 'is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one',⁵¹ can only supplement a revolutionary situation prepared by economic development. If the situation has not been so prepared, it will be abortive in the long run, whatever force is applied to it. Of course, as some critic has remarked, force is the midwife, not the mother, of revolutionary transformation.

For the same reason, Marx and Engels looked forward to the coming of the proletarian revolution in Germany,⁵² France,⁵³ England,⁵⁴ Great Britain,⁵⁵ or 'in all civilized countries, that is, at least simultaneously in England, America, France, and Germany'.⁵⁶ In fact, to the question whether it will be possible for the socialist or proletarian revolution to take place in one country alone, Engels said, 'No', and proceeded to give reason therefor, concluding that it 'is to be a world revolution, and will, therefore, have the whole world as its arena'.⁵⁷ This is all in full consonance with the laws of dialectic. But ugly facts have killed the beautiful theory, in so far as, like Islam which is spreading in Africa south of Sahara, 'socialist' revolution has come about not in the advanced countries but in such a backward, pre-capitalist country, inter alia, as Tsarist Russia, where Engels had once ruled out the possibility of a 'socialist revolution' altogether.⁵⁸ Engels appears to have been firmly of the opinion that no *socialist* revolution is possible in Russia till a proletarian revolution is successfully carried out in the West,⁵⁹ though 'Russia undoubtedly is on the eve of a *social* revolution'.⁶⁰

50. *Capital*, I, Preface to the First German Edition, p. 10.

51. *Capital*, I, p. 751.

52. *CM*, p. 61.

53. *EBLB*, Engels' Preface (1885) to the 3rd German Edition, p. 224.

54. See Brij Narain, *Marxism Is Dead* (Lahore : Ram Krishna & Sons, 1939), p. 72.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

56. *PC*, pp. 91-92.

57. *PC*, p. 92. Cp. *SUS*, Special Introduction to the Edition of 1892, pp. 105-106.

58. Engels, 'On Social Relations in Russia' (1875), *S. W.*, II, pp. 46-47, 49, 51.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 56 read with p. 49.

In fact, as pointed out earlier, Marx and Engels were believers in the inexorableness of the dialectical laws of motion of society. 'With the same certainty with which from a given mathematical proposition a new one is deduced, with the same certainty can we deduce the social revolution from the existing social conditions and the principles of political economy.'⁶¹ History is moving in, say, a predetermined course, so that the proletarians are said to 'have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.'⁶²

By and by, however, Marx and Engels seem to have visualized the possibility of a Russian Revolution becoming 'the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other', as well as of 'the present Russian common ownership of land' serving 'as the starting point for a communist development.'⁶³ In 1877, Marx suggested that, since 1861, the year of the emancipation of her serfs, Russia had been in a position to avoid the catastrophe of capitalism and to make a direct change to communism.⁶⁴ In the same year, Marx also came to believe that this time 'the revolution will begin in the East....'⁶⁵ In 1885, he was convinced that a '*Russian defeat would have greatly hastened the social revolution in Russia, and with it the revolution throughout Europe.*'⁶⁶ In fact, Engels once clearly admitted that 'as to what social and political phases these (backward) countries will have to pass through before they likewise (i. e. like Europe and North America) arrive at socialist organization, I think we today can advance only rather idle hypotheses.'⁶⁷

It must be clearly understood, however, that Marx and Engels are primarily concerned to lay bare the economic laws of motion of modern society and the successive phases of its normal development, rather than to study the impact of one civilization upon another, which latter is more or

61. See S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

62. CWF, pp. 474-475.

63. CM, Preface to the 1882 Russian Edition, pp. 23-24.

64. Marx's letter to the Editorial Board of the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, dated November, 1877, SC, pp. 377-378.

65. Marx's letter to Sorge, dated September 27, 1877, *Correspondence*, p. 309.

66. Marx's letter to Liebknecht, dated February 4, 1878, referred to in the *Correspondence*, p. 316, in a letter to him dated February 11, 1878. Cp. Engels' letter to Bebel, dated December 11, 1884, pp. 380-384, and to Zasulich, dated April 23, 1885, pp. 384-387.

67. Engels' letter to Karl Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, SC., p. 423.

less an impossibility in the present state of human knowledge. Indeed, from the Appendix to his *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* it appears that Marx had a plan to deal with this aspect of the matter as well.⁶⁸

The logic of the dialectical transformation of capitalist society into socialist society consists in 'the social character of the means of production and of the products'⁶⁹ and 'the complete development of modern productive forces,'⁷⁰ on the inception of which 'the existence of class distinction itself has become an obsolete anachronism' and 'appropriation of the means of production and of the product...has become not only superfluous but economically, politically, intellectually, a hindrance to development'⁷¹ giving rise to economic crises, slumps, depressions, etc. 'The expansive force,' says Engels, 'of the means of production bursts the bonds that the capitalist mode of production had imposed upon them.'⁷²

What would the classless, and consequently conflictless, society be like? Would it be static and immutable in so far as history would have reached its culmination point therein, in so far as, that is to say, history would have achieved its denouement therein? To Engels' mind, 'the so-called "socialist society" is nothing immutable. Like all other social formations, it should be conceived in a state of constant flux and change.'⁷³ Marx writes, 'It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonism that *social evolution* will cease to be *political revolutions*.'⁷⁴ But what becomes of the dialectical process, whose lever, according to Marx and Engels, is contradiction or the struggle of opposites? Does it cease to operate? This question does not seem to have bothered them. N. I. Bukharin expressed the view that in classless society there would be no contradiction at all, to which Lenin reacted, 'Antagonism and contradiction are not at all one and the same. Under socialism, the first will disappear, the second will remain.'⁷⁵ To this, Mao Tse-Tung adds, 'That is to say,

68. *CCPE*, Appendix, pp. 306, 308-309.

69. *SUS*, p. 137.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

71. *Loc. cit.*

72. *SUS*, pp. 139-140.

73. Engels' letter to Otto Von Boeningk in Breslau, dated August 21, 1890, *S.W.*, III (1970), p. 485.

74. *PP*, p. 197.

75. Lenin, 'Remarks on N.I. Bukharin's *Economics of the Transitional Period*', *Selected Works*, (Moscow-Leningrad, 1931), II, p. 357, quoted in Mao Tse-Tung, *On Contradiction* (August 1937), *Selected Writings* (Calcutta : National Book Agency, 1967), p. 687.

antagonism is one form, but not the only form, of the struggle of opposites; the formula of antagonism cannot be arbitrarily applied everywhere.⁷⁶

What actually is the position in Soviet society, claimed to be classless? A. A. Zhdanov remarks that there contradiction operates 'in the form of criticism and self-criticism,' which, according to him, is the real motive force of development in Soviet society. This he calls 'a new form of movement, a new type of development, a new dialectical law'.⁷⁷

The Text-Book of Marxist Philosophy essays the task of elucidating the concept of antagonistic contradiction thus: 'Those contradictions...are antagonistic, in which the struggle of indissolubly connected opposites proceeds in the form of their external collisions, which are directed on the part of the dominant opposite so as to preserve the subordination of its opposite and of the type of contradiction itself; and on the part of the subordinated opposite to the destruction of the dominant opposite and of the contradiction itself as well.'⁷⁸ According to this book, the (antagonistic) contradiction in a capitalist society 'can be solved only by socialist revolution', whereas the (normal, non-antagonistic) 'contradiction of the transitional economy' can be solved 'by the industrialization of the country, by collectivization and Soviet farm construction'.⁷⁹ That is to say, antagonistic contradiction cannot be resolved save by revolution, whereas non-antagonistic contradiction would lead to social evolution without causing a complete break with the past. The authors of the book appear to have taken their cue from the following passage from Marx already quoted: 'It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonism that social evolution will cease to be *political revolutions*'.⁸⁰

The book under reference essays the task of demonstrating how contradiction would exist and operate in a classless society.⁸¹ According to it, in the first, socialistic phase of communism, there 'will be the contradiction between the socialist character of production...and the distribution of the

76. Mao Tse-Tung, *On Contradiction*, p. 687.

77. A. A. Zhdanov, *On the History of Philosophy*, quoted in Maurice Cornforth, *Science Versus Idealism* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1955), p. 259.

78. *A Text-Book of Marxist Philosophy*, prepared by the Leningrad Institute of Philosophy, A. C. Mosley, tr., revised and edited by Dr. John Lewis (Allahabad: Kitab-Mahal, 1944), p. 166.

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.

80. *PP*, p. 197.

81. *A Text-Book of Marxist Philosophy*, pp. 152-154, 166-168.

"means of existence and enjoyment"...according to work done'. How will this contradiction be resolved? By revolutionary activity? No. 'It will be resolved by the growth of the productivity of labour and on that basis by such a refashioning of our people as will make possible the realization of the principle: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."' ⁸²

It is, however, difficult to see what would sustain contradiction and the consequent process of progress in society when 'there are no more classes and class antagonisms'⁸³ and all that they imply; when 'the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all';⁸⁴ when the 'realm of necessity' yields place to 'the realm of freedom' lying 'beyond the sphere of material production', whose 'fundamental basis' is the shortening of the working day;⁸⁵ and when 'there is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom',⁸⁶ where 'the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things'⁸⁷ as Engels would have it, using an expression of St. Simon). In fact Marx himself observes that with the disappearance of capitalism 'this contradiction... disappears'.⁸⁸ Significantly enough, Marx also remarks, 'No antagonism, no progress',⁸⁹ obviously employing the term 'antagonism' in the sense of contradiction.

From a startling passage, rarely noticed, in Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, it transpires that, instead of stopping short at communism, he goes beyond it, thereby suggesting that the dialectical process knows no stop. Writes he, 'Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, and is hence the *actual* phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and recovery. *Communism* is the necessary pattern and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development—the structure of human society.'⁹⁰ The editor of the work tries to gloss over the patent import of the passage with the remark that by

82. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

83. *PP*, p. 197.

84. *CM*, p. 51.

85. *Capital*, III, pp. 651-652.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 393.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 389.

88. *GI*, p. 272.

89. *PP*, p. 68.

90. *EPM*, p. 114.

'communism as such' Marx means crude, equalitarian communism, such as propounded by Babeuf and his followers. But there is no such indication in Marx's passage.

In *applying* his dialectic to history, Hegel, too, appears to bring the dialectical process to a stop with the Prussian state,⁹¹ or rather America.⁹² The case with the *theoretical* Hegel is different, however. In its purely philosophical aspect, his dialectic moves from the realm of time to that of timelessness, where the question of an end is simply ruled out.

The most conspicuous feature of classless society in the womb of the future is its statelessness, a stage where Marxism and anarchism meet; the only difference between them on this issue being that, according to anarchism, the state has to be abolished or destroyed, while, according to Marxism, it withers away of itself, for the simple reason that 'the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another',⁹³ 'an engine of class despotism',⁹⁴ and that way 'only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, in order to hold down one's adversaries by force'.⁹⁵ When actually does it happen? After 'such time as a generation reared in new, free social conditions is able to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap heap'.⁹⁶ Again: 'As soon as there is no longer any class to be held in subjection, as soon as class rule, and the individual struggle for existence based upon our present anarchy in production ..., are removed, nothing more remains to be suppressed, and a special repressive force, a State, is no longer necessary'.⁹⁷ Lenin also once held that the proletarian state 'will begin to wither away immediately after its victory'.⁹⁸ The upshot of all this is that the state has to wither away as a matter of course immediately after the abolition of the exploiting class. This has not happened, however, even in Soviet Russia. It was as far back as November 25, 1936, when the new Constitution was

91. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, p. 341.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 86: 'America is therefore the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World History shall reveal itself—perhaps in a contest between North and South America. It is a land of desire for all those who are weary of the historical lumber-room of old Europe.'

93. CWF, Engels' Introduction, p. 440.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 469.

95. Engels' letter to Bebel, dated March 18-28, 1875, S. W., II, p. 39.

96. CWF, Engels' Introduction, p. 440.

97. SUS, p. 138; AD, p. 389.

98. *State and Revolution*, p. 47.

promulgated, that Stalin proclaimed that 'all the exploiting classes have now been eliminated.'⁹⁹ But the Soviet state has shown no signs of withering away. Why? Stalin argues that the theory of the withering away of the state is correct only on one of two conditions: first, 'if we study the socialist state only from the angle of the internal development of a country, ... isolating, for the convenience of investigation, the country and the state from the international situation;' or, secondly, 'if we assume that socialism is already victorious in all countries, or in the majority of countries, that a socialist encirclement exists instead of a capitalist encirclement....'¹⁰⁰ According to Stalin, 'Engels proceeds from the assumption that socialism has already been victorious more or less simultaneously in all countries, or in a majority of countries'.¹⁰¹ Stalin's explanation is not without force. As we have already remarked, Marx and Engels were concerned to analyze internal developments of society rather than its transformation under the impact of alien powers. This being the case, the general theory of the withering away of the state is bound to undergo modification in practice. But, then, it does not justify the withholding from the people by the state several liberties allowed in democracies the world over.

It must, incidentally, be added that Hegel, too, once envisaged the perishing of the state in his ideal society. In his *Erstes Systemprogramm des Deutschen Idealismus*, written in 1796, there is the significant passage: 'I shall demonstrate that just as there is no idea of a machine, there is no idea of the State, for the State is something mechanical. Only that which is an object of freedom may be called an idea. We must, therefore, transcend the State. For every State is bound to treat free men as cogs in a machine. And this is precisely what it should not do; hence, the State must perish.'¹⁰²

According to Herbert Marcuse, Marx confines the jurisdiction of his dialectic to 'a particular stage of the historical process'.¹⁰³ On the strength of a relatively obscure passage in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of*

99. Stalin, 'On the Draft Constitution of the U. S. S. R.', Report Delivered at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U. S. S. R., November 25, 1936, *Problems of Leninism*, p. 683.

100. Stalin, 'Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the C. P. S. U. (B.) on the Work of the Central Committee', dated March 10, 1939, *Problems of Leninism*, p. 793.

101. *Loc. cit.*

102. *Dokument zu Hegels Entwicklung*, ed., J. Hoffmeister, Stuttgart, 1936, p. 219 f., quoted in Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, p. 12.

103. Marcuse, *ibid.*, p. 315.

1844.¹⁰⁴ Marcuse maintains that 'Marx criticizes Hegel's dialectic for generalizing the dialectical movement into a movement of all being'.¹⁰⁵ Marx's passage is as follows: 'But because Hegel has conceived the negation of the negation from the point of view of the positive relation inherent in it as the true and only positive, and from the point of the negative relation inherent in it as the only true act and self-realizing act of all being, he has only found the *abstract, logical, speculative* expression for the movement of history; and this historical process is not yet the real history of man—of man as a given subject, but only man's *act of genesis*—the *story* of man's *origin*'.¹⁰⁶ According to Marcuse's lights, Marx confines the jurisdiction of even Hegel's dialectic to the particular phase of man's history styled 'Entstehungsgeschichte', translated by Marcuse as 'the story of man's origin' in the above passage and 'the history of his maturing'.¹⁰⁷ This phase of human history Marx elsewhere designates as 'Prehistory',¹⁰⁸ distinguishing it here from 'real history'¹⁰⁹ and elsewhere from 'history proper'.¹¹⁰ This prehistory is the history of class society; and history, the history of classless society. 'The Hegelian dialectic gives the *abstract logical* form of the pre-historical development, the Marxian dialectic its *real concrete* movement. Marx's dialectic, therefore, is still bound up with the pre-historical phase'.¹¹¹ Certain other parallels of the dyads prehistory and history, found in Marx and Engels, are culled below :

Prehistory	History
History of man's origin	Real history
Animal conditions of existence	Human conditions of existence ¹¹²
Kingdom of necessity	Kingdom of freedom ¹¹³
Class society	Classless society
Statism	Statelessness

Though Marcuse's finding is not without truth, especially his discovery

104. He relies on the sole authority of the Manuscripts despite his view that 'Marx's early writings are mere preliminary stages to his mature theory, stages that should not be overemphasized'. *Loc. cit.*, p. 295.

105. *Loc. cit.*, p. 315.

106. *EPM*, p. 146.

107. Marcuse, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

108. *CCPE*, Preface, p. 329. Cp. *GI*, p. 40.

109. *EPM*, p. 146.

110. *GI*, p. 40.

111. Marcuse, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

112. *AD*, p. 392.

113. *AD*, p. 393.

of Marx's view of the Hegelian dialectic being in fact valid for a particular phase of human history, we for our part fail to find a single suggestion in Marx and Engels binding *their* dialectic down to the 'prehistory' of mankind. The particular manifestation of dialectic, known as class struggle, alone, broadly speaking, would be regarded by Marx and Engels as a creature of prehistory.

In the ultimate analysis, dialectic seems to be a transcendental or trans-empirical concept. If it is carried to its logical extreme, matter would involve and be opposed to no-matter and would hence be far from ultimate. In fact, in dialectic, the ultimate is never reached at all. We have shown elsewhere how Nāgārjuna's dialectic reaches a stage even beyond void and non-void.¹¹⁴ As a matter of fact, dialectic must be conceived as a self-transcending process. That way, Nāgārjuna's five-moment dialectic is rather in a better position to bring out in full relief this most fundamental fact than the three-term one of Marx.¹¹⁵ So, it is difficult to see how, one who, like Marx and Engels, believes in the ultimacy and irreducibility of matter can make bold to declare dialectic as the ultimate law of thought and things. Hegel's too, is a three-term dialectic, but, since it stretches into the Absolute which outflanks the question of a 'beyond,' there is scarcely any room for such an objection in his case.

114. See Harsh Narain, 'Śūnyavāda : A Reinterpretation', *Philosophy East and West*, XII, 4, pp. 327 ff.

115. *Loc. cit.*, p. 332.

CHAPTER VI

Substructure and Superstructure

History is, in a way, the story of liberty even in quite a down-to-earth sense. Granted that all human striving is directed towards the attainment of abiding happiness¹ and elimination of all semblance of unhappiness, happiness is, to follow Manu, equatable with self-determination or freedom, and unhappiness, with subjection or bondage. Nature, left to itself, is an instrument of man's bondage and, duly conquered, becomes the doorway to his freedom. Hence man's foremost concern is to conquer nature and turn it to his advantage. Such manipulation of nature is variously described as technique, technics, and technology. 'Technology discloses', says Marx, 'man's mode of dealing with Nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life....'²

Engels contends that 'each step forward in the field of culture was a step towards freedom' and illustrates the point by reference to 'the gigantic liberating revolution in the social world' carried through by the steam-engine

1. 'The urge towards happiness is innate in man,...' *LF*, p. 346,

2. *Capital*, I, p. 372, f. n. 3.

and to 'an even greater effect on the liberation of mankind' had and 'control over one of the forces of nature' given by 'the generation of fire by friction'.³

Now, man is characterized by an innate capacity of learning by experience and always aiming at the better. He is never satisfied with what he has achieved and is ever on the look-out for better and better technique of conquest of nature in order thereby to secure greater and greater freedom. Nature throws its noose round man in the form of basic material needs such as 'eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things'. The 'production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself', constitutes the 'first historical act'⁴ calculated to counter nature's design. To Marx and Engels, this technological dynamics has so far been the chief factor, at any rate one of the chief factors, at the root of the dynamics of history, of civilization. Marx writes, for example, 'The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist.'⁵

The Communist Manifesto contains the assertion: 'The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.'⁶ On Marx's view, technique is so organically related to its socio-economic formation that Marx goes to the extent of declaring, 'Relics of by-gone instruments of labour possess the same importance for the investigation of extinct economical forms of society, as do fossil bones for the determination of extinct species of animals.' Elaborating upon the idea he continues, 'It is not the articles made, but how they are made, and by what instruments, that enables us to distinguish different economic epochs. Instruments of labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development to which human labour has attained, but they are also indicators of the social conditions under which that labour is carried on.'⁷ In this connexion, Marx notices a tacit acknowledgement of his point in the division of prehistoric times 'into the stone, the bronze and the iron ages' which clearly 'correspond with the materials from which their implements and weapons were made'.⁸

It is quite logical to suppose, and Marx and Engels do suppose, that technique determines the mode of production: different technique, different mode of production. 'In acquiring new productive forces', says Marx,

3. *AD*, p. 159.

4. *GI*, p. 39.

5. *PP*, p. 122. Cp. *GI*, p. 581.

6. *CM*, p. 36.

7. *Capital*, pp. 179-180. Cp. p. 372, f. n. 3.

8. *Ibid.*, I, p. 180, f. n. 1.

suggesting a causal relation between technique, which, as will transpire in the sequel, is a productive force, on the one hand and the mode of production on the other, 'men change their mode of production....'⁹ Contending that the 'technical and social conditions of the process' of production must be revolutionized if productivity of labour is to be increased, Marx hastens to add that 'consequently the very mode of production', too, 'must be revolutionized'.¹⁰

Marx defines the productive forces, or factors involved in the process of production, thus: 'The elementary factors of the labour-process are 1, the personal activity of man, *i.e.*, work itself, 2, the subject of that work, and 3, its instruments.'¹¹ Here Marx seems to have taken his cue from the 'trinitarian formula' of land, labour, and capital—or labour, land, and capital, in the Marxian order. He also designates 'both the instruments and the subject of labour' as 'means of production'.¹² An instrument of labour, the third factor in Marx's list, is defined as 'a thing, or a complex of things, which the labourer interposes between himself and the subject of his labour, and which serves as the conductor of his activity.' Not only this: proceeding further he includes under instruments of labour even 'the mechanical, physical, and chemical properties of some substances' which man makes use of 'in order to make other substances subservient to his aims.'¹³ Becoming more specific, he includes in his list of instruments of labour the earth as used in agriculture and as a *locus standi* to the labourer and a field of employment for his activity; domesticated animals, specially prepared stones, wood, bones, and shells in the earliest period of human history; mechanical devices which, taken as a whole, he calls the bone and muscle of production; pipes, tubes, baskets, jars, etc. which serve only to hold the materials for labour and which, taken as a whole, he calls the vascular system of production; workshop, canals, roads, 'and so forth.'¹⁴ Marx's list should, one is tempted to suggest, include a fourth factor also, the entrepreneur, a risk-taking magnate, a commanding will, a directing authority—in short, the presiding deity of the whole show of the process of production. He need not be the capitalist himself, necessarily. Even the hired managers can do the job, leaving the capitalist to while his time away. Marx does say so, without, however, augmenting his list.¹⁵ Besides, Marx and Engels enumerate many

9. *PP*, p. 122.

10. *Capital*, I, p. 315.

11. *Ibid.*, I, p. 178.

12. *Ibid.*, I, p. 181.

13. *Ibid.*, I, p. 179.

14. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 179-180.

15. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 191 ff.

more productive forces, which are, of course, subsumable under the given heads in the ultimate analysis. They are: 'Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground....'¹⁶ They also regard science as 'a productive force distinct from labour'.¹⁷

But technique does not seem to be a necessary item in the Marxian list of productive forces determinant or distinctive of the socio-economic formations. It is, for example, conspicuous by its absence from the inventory of the ten measures which Marx and Engels consider 'unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production'.¹⁸ Engels speaks of revolutionizing the old mode of production with special reference to the abolition of the former division of labour with a view to ushering in an era of socialism, but he forgets technique altogether.¹⁹ Therefore, whatever might have been the case in precapitalist societies, technique does not play the role of a necessary or the chief productive force in the transition from capitalism to socialism.

It appears that the mode of production with or without technique but necessarily with certain factors of production is the keystone of revolutionary change in society. 'The mode of production of material life', Marx contends, 'conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life.'²⁰ The mode of production gives rise to personal 'relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production.'²¹ Marx, following Hegel, embraces the totality of the material conditions of life within the term 'civil society', a term originated by English and French thinkers of the eighteenth century, and regards the 'totality of these relations of production' as 'the economic structure of society, the real foundation' which throws up 'a legal and political superstructure' and 'to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.'²² Marx writes elsewhere in a similar vein, 'Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with

16. *CM*, p. 37.

17. *Capital*. I, p. 361.

18. *CM*, pp. 50-51.

19. *AD*, pp. 408 ff.

20. *CCPE*, Preface, pp. 20-21.

21. *CCPE*, Preface, p. 20.

22. *Loc. cit.* Cp. *GI*, pp. 48-49 By 'civil society' Engels means the realm of economic relations. See *LF*, p. 357.

Nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations and the mental conceptions that flow from them.'²³ Again, 'each special mode of production and social relations corresponding to it, in short,...the economic structure of society, is the real basis on which the juridical and political social structure is raised, and to which definite social forms of thought correspond...[and] the mode of production determines the character of the social, political, and intellectual life generally....'²⁴

The totality of the relations of production is also to be called the class-structure,

Thus, the substructure of civilization consists of two tiers—the mode of production on the one hand and the economic relations or classes called into being by the former on the other.

To modes of production Engels seldom fails to add the exchange of things produced. 'The materialist conception of history', he writes, for example, 'starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged.'²⁵ It is to be noted here that Marx regards exchange as an aspect of production and as comprised in the concept of production.²⁶ Hence he does not mention it separately.

So, the civilizational superstructure rests upon the structure, substructure, or infrastructure that is the economic structure of society. In spite of the fact that, on the Marxian view, science as a productive force in modern industry forms part of the substructure, it is not, say Marx and Engels, the philosophy but the economics of each particular epoch in which 'the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought.'²⁷ As Marx contends elsewhere, 'It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness,'²⁸ even as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about

23. *Capital*, I, p. 372, f.n. 3.

24. *Ibid.*, I, p. 82 n.

25. *SUS*, p. 125.

26. *CCPE*, Appendix, p. 204.

27. *Loc. cit.*

28. *CCPE*, Preface, p. 21.

himself'.²⁹ Marx and Engels put it elsewhere slightly differently: 'Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.'³⁰ For according to them, 'Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process.'³¹

If we scrutinize their utterances closely, Marx and Engels would seem to analyze society into three layers—productive forces, social relations, and ideas;³² or the instruments of production, the relations of production, and the whole relations of society.³³ In fact, as indicated earlier, society consists of the substructure and the superstructure; and the substructure, too, has two tiers, the system of production and the socio-economic relations called classes. The substructure supports the superstructure and within the substructure, too, the system of production supports the class-structure. Engels makes it perfectly clear that the class pattern of society is caused by the modes of production and exchange.³⁴ To him the 'warring classes of society are always the products of the modes of production and exchange—in a word, of the *economic* conditions of their time.'³⁵

It is to be noted, however, that this is the position in ancient slavery, mediaeval feudalism, and modern capitalism—namely, in societies other than primitive communist and post-modern communist, which are classless as well as stateless. About the state of affairs in the primitive Iroquois Indian gens of North America Engels remarks, 'Everything runs smoothly without soldiers, gendarmes or police; without nobles, kings, governors, prefects or judges; without prisons; without trials.'³⁶ And he specifically observes that 'all past history [with the exception of its primitive stages,] was the history of class struggles...'³⁷

The interconnexion between the various strata of civilization, according to Marx, may be demonstrated in his own words as follows: 'Assume a particular state of development in the productive forces of man and you will get a particular form of commerce and consumption. Assume particular stages of development in production, commerce and consumption and you will have a corresponding social constitution, a corresponding organization of the family,

29. *Loc. cit.*

30. *GI*, p. 38.

31. *GI*, p. 37.

32. Cp. *PP*, pp. 122-123.

33. *CM*, p. 36.

34. *SUS*, p. 94.

35. *AD*, p. 41.

36. *OFPPS*, p. 230.

37. *AD*, p. 41. Box brackets in the original.

of orders or of classes, in a word, a corresponding civil society. Assume a particular society and you will get particular political conditions which are only the official expression of civil society.³⁸

Originally, Marx and Engels were believed by their contemporaries to have sported with the idea that the relation between the substructure and the superstructure is a one-way process; that the substructure is active while the superstructure is wholly passive; and that, therefore, it is only the substructure which is dynamic, which has history, and not the superstructure which knows no independent development, no history of its own. 'Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness,' say they, 'no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development....'³⁹

The superstructure consists of what Marx and Engels choose to call ideology or false consciousness, comprising sublimates of the substructural states of affairs. Engels defines ideology, much on the lines of the Freudian concept of rationalization, as 'a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him.... Hence he imagines false or seeming motive forces.'⁴⁰ Marx and Engels also take it that 'in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*,' the phenomenon arising just as much from the historical life-process of men 'as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.'⁴¹

In fact, the superstructure is hardly better than a mere shadow of the substructure, and shadows never change of themselves. It is true that sometimes some pure thought not substructurally determined or conditioned does arise, thanks to the inbuilt necessity of a particular ideological tradition, but such thought is too ethereal and nominal to have any effect. Marx and Engels duly acknowledge this fact, contending that 'a theory and history of pure thought could arise among philosophers owing to the divorce between ideas and individuals and their empirical relations which serve as the basis of these ideas', but in that case, they add, 'they are no longer ruling, but nominal.'⁴²

In four letters written after Marx's death, Engels postulates a kind of

38. Marx's letter dated December 28, 1846, to P. V. Annenkov, *PP*, pp. 202-203; *SW.*, II, p. 401; *SC*, p. 40.

39. *GI*, p. 38. Also see p. 671.

40. Engels' letter dated July 14, 1893, to F. Mehring, *S. W.*, II, p. 451; *SC*, p. 541.

41. *GI*, p. 37.

42. *GI*, p. 367.

interaction between the substructure and the superstructure so that the relation between them becomes a two-way process, substructure, however, remaining the ultimate determining factor in history. The original thesis of Marx and Engels was, as summed up by Engels, that 'the *ultimately* determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life.' He adds that 'More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted.'⁴³ Marx's contemporaries, he complains, tried to read more in the above thesis and began to draw the conclusion that, because Marx and Engels 'deny an independent historical development to the various ideological spheres which play a part in history', they 'also deny them any *effect upon history*.'⁴⁴ In two of the four letters, however, Engels takes part of the blame of the misinterpretation of the Marxian position upon himself and makes the candid confession that both Marx and he are guilty of overstatement of their case. 'Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame', writes he, 'for the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it.'⁴⁵ Explaining the circumstances in which they had to overrate the role of the substructure he continues, 'We had to emphasize the main principle vis-à-vis our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place or the opportunity to allow the other elements involved in the interaction to come into their rights.'⁴⁶ Elsewhere, too, he confesses to a similar fault on the part of both Marx and himself.⁴⁷

The restated version of the Marxian thesis of the relation between the substructure and the superstructure is something like this. Civilization is a co-operative enterprise between the substructure and the superstructure. The substructure is the cause and the superstructure the effect, in the ultimate analysis, and only in the ultimate analysis. Once the superstructure has come into being, it acquires a relative independence with the passage of time. Primarily it is the substructure which acts upon, determines, and shapes the superstructure, but by and by the superstructure attains independence enough to react upon, determine, and shape the substructure in its own turn. As Engels would have it, 'while the material mode of existence

43. Engels' letter dated September 21-22, 1890, to J. Bloch, *S. W.*, II, p. 443; *SC*, p. 498.

44. Engels' letter dated July 14, 1893, to F. Mehring, *S. W.*, II, p. 452; *SC*, p. 542..

45. Engel's letter dated September 21-22, 1890, to J. Bloch, *S. W.*, II, p. 444; *SC*, p. 500.

46. *Loc. cit.*

47. Engels' letter dated July 14, 1893, to F. Mehring, *S. W.*, II, p. 451; *SC*, p. 540.

is the *primum agens*⁴⁸ this does not preclude the ideological spheres from reacting upon it in their turn, though with a secondary effect.⁴⁹ Elucidating the idea further, he observes, 'The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure: political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit : constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and then even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further developments into systems of dogmas, also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their *form*.'⁵⁰ The superstructural development is based on the substructural development. All expressions of the superstructure—political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., developments—'react upon one another and also upon the economic basis. It is not that the economic condition is the *cause* and *alone active*, while everything else only has a passive effect. There is rather interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which *ultimately* always asserts itself.'⁵¹

The interactive relation between the substructure and the superstructure has its own mechanism. Engels suggests a whole hierarchy of the superstructural phenomena which enables one to determine the degree of interaction that sustains between the superstructural sublimates and the substructural realities. 'It is the interaction of two unequal forces,' says Engels.⁵²

Now, the lowest, the nethermost, stratum of civilization is civil society. Next above it is the state, namely the political order,⁵³ which is said to be the first ideological power over mankind. Next above the state is law, a second ideology produced by the first ideology called state.⁵⁴ The next higher ideology is philosophy, the third ideology. Then come religion, art, literature, etc.⁵⁵ The higher the ideology soars from its socio-economic substructure, the harder is one put to it to trace the genesis of the former to

48. Primary agent, prime cause.

49. Engels' letter dated August 5, 1890, to C. Schmidt, *S.W.*, II, p. 441; *SC*, p. 496.

50. Engels' letter dated September 21-22, 1890, to J. Bloch, *S.W.*, II, p. 443; *SC*, p. 498.

51. Engels' letter dated January 25, 1894, to H. Starkenburg, *S.W.*, II, p. 457; *SC*, p. 549.

52. Engels' letter dated October 27, 1890, to C. Schmidt, *S.W.*, II, p. 447; *SC*, p. 503.

53. *LF*, p. 357.

54. *LF*, p. 359.

55. *Loc. cit.*

the latter. 'The further the particular sphere which we are investigating', says Engels, 'is removed from the economic sphere and approaches that of pure abstract ideology, the more shall we find it exhibiting accidents in its development, the more will its curve run in a zigzag.'⁵⁶ There does subsist a causal relation between the ideology, howsoever abstract, and the economic sphere, howsoever remote, at a deeper level. 'But if you plot the average axis of the curve,' observes Engels, 'you will find that the axis of this curve will run more and more nearly parallel to the axis of the curve of economic development the longer the period considered and wider the field dealt with.'⁵⁷

It is quite in keeping with the dialectical view of things to take an integral view of civilization by relating its substructure and superstructure into an organic whole. Engels' thesis of interaction and interrelation between the two is a logical corollary of his dialectic. It is worthy of reiteration again and again, as Marx and Engels themselves thought it fit to do, that their approach is far from dogmatic, that they believe in examining each and every social formation with a view to discovering the laws of its own development rather than prejudging the issue by trying to fit the subject-matter into an a priori framework, howsoever logical or dialectical. 'All history must be studied afresh,' says Engels, 'the conditions of existence of the different formations of society must be examined in detail before the attempt is made to deduce from them the political, civil-legal, esthetic, philosophic, religious, etc., notions corresponding to them.'⁵⁸ Besides, it has not been possible for him to be as exact in his expressions as he is supposed to have been, and warns his readers not to take his expressions too literally. 'Please do not weigh each word in the above too scrupulously, but keep the general connection in mind; I regret that I have not the time to word what I am writing to you as exactly as I should be obliged to do for publication....'⁵⁹

We should like to close this chapter with a suggestion with regard to the relation between the substructure and superstructure. There is a dialectical and creative relation between the two. It would be preposterous to consider the relation to be in the nature of a mechanical relation. The superstructure is an emergent from, or, as Marx himself suggests, a sublimate

56. Engels' letter dated June 25, 1894, to H. Starkenburg, *S. W.*, II, p. 458; *SC*, p. 550.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 458-459; *SC*, p. 550.

58. Engels' letter dated August 5, 1890, to C. Schmidt, *S. W.*, II, p. 442; *SC*, pp. 496-497.

59. Engels' letter dated January 25, 1894, to H. Starkenburg, *S. W.*, II, p. 459; *SC*, p. 551.

of, the substructure, not a mere copy thereof. The relation between the two is more or less akin to the one subsisting between the root on the one hand and the flower and fruit on the other. Civilization is comparable to a tree which branches off into legal and political superstructure on the one side and definite forms of consciousness on the other,⁶⁰ juridical and political superstructure on the one side and definite forms of thought on the other,⁶¹ social institutions on the one side and ideas or belief systems on the other. This root-fruit relation is richly suggestive. It is a two-way process. The root is the determinant of fruit in one place, but is determined by it in another. It is not for nothing that Marx is inclined to believe that 'social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals.'⁶²

60. *CCPE*, Preface, p. 20.

61. *Capital*, I, p. 82n.

62. *Ibid.*, Afterword to the Second German Edition, p. 18.

CHAPTER VII

Dialectic of the Hero

That the course of history is determined by the activities of great men is a view as old as Herodotus, the Father of History. From the time of Herodotus down to recent past, historians, who are rightly dubbed military historians, have been taking it for granted that all history is wrought by great men or rather military conquerors. To Thomas Carlyle, however, goes the credit of first formulating the idea as a more or less self-contained philosophy of history. 'The History of the world', says Carlyle, 'is but the Biography of great men.'¹

He divides society into Heroes and ordinary mortals, the leaders and the led, commanders and obeyers, and cites the analogy of a ship which cannot round Cape Horn without a rigid division between commanders and

1. Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Warship, and the Heroic in History*, otherwise known as *Heroes and Hero-Worship* (first published in book-form in 1841 from a course of lectures delivered by Carlyle in London in 1840) (London & Glasgow : Collin's Clear Type Press, n.d.), p. 23.

obeyers.² He delineates six types of Heroes :³

1. the Hero as Divinity, such as Odin;
2. the Hero as Prophet, such as Mahomet;
3. the Hero as Poet, such as Dante, Shakespeare;
4. the Hero as Priest, such as Luther, Knox;
5. the Hero as a Man of Letters, such as Johnson, Rousseau, Burns, Goethe; and
- (6) the Hero as King, such as Cromwell, Napoleon.

Carlyle describes the Hero as King, the Commander over Men, as 'the most important of Great Men', 'practically the summary for us of all the various figures of Heroism.'⁴

Carlyle believes in the essential unity of the 'heroic quality': that all Heroes are fundamentally of the same stuff and that their outward shape—the part they would play—depends on the kind of world they find themselves born into.⁵

In another connexion, Carlyle speaks of two types of Heroes, the Great Man and the Noted Man. The Great Man moulds his age after his own image and 'the Noted Man of an age is the emblem and summary of the Ideal which the age has fashioned for itself: show me the noted man of an age, you show me the age that produced him.'⁶ A similar typology has been enunciated by Sidney Hook, who speaks of eventful and event-making men.⁷ He compares the role of the merely eventful man to that of 'the little Dutch boy who kept his finger in the hole of the dike and saved the town'. The great events wrought by the eventful man are due not to the

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2. Carlyle. *Latter-Day Pamphlets*, quoted in Eric Bentley, *The Cult of the Superman* (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1947), pp. 101-102.
 3. Carlyle, *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, throughout. However, as noted by B. H. Lehman, 'Carlyle did not limit the types of Hero to the six which he chose under the exigencies of his programme of lectures. He mentions the Hero Painter (ii), the Hero-Cavalier (Montrose) (234), and at the opening of the third lecture after reviewing his types, Divinity, Prophet, Poet, he adds: "We might give many more names, on this same principle". (89)' B. H. Lehman, *Carlyle's Theory of the Hero: Its Sources, Development, History, and Influence on Carlyle's Work* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1928), p. 59. (The figures within brackets represent pagination of the first edn. of Carlyle's book given at foot-note no. 1 *supra*.)
 4. Carlyle, *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, p. 251.
 5. *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 104-105, 150-151. Also see pp. 41, 201, and 229.
 6. Carlyle, "Goethe's Works", 1832, incorporated in his *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. IV (Piccadilly: Chapman and Hall, 1872, p. 141.
 7. Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1945) p. 109.

intrinsic worth of the latter but to the fateful situation he happened to be in. Anybody could have taken the place of the little Dutch boy, and with exactly the same results.⁸ It is, therefore, evident that the eventful man has as little a claim to greatness as the microbe which put an end to Alexander's world-wide military conquests by killing him at the age of thirty-two. Hence it is the event-making man who is the really great man, or Hero. Also one need not always be a really great man to effect great changes in history.

It appears that Carlyle sometimes—let us suppose, unwittingly—deviates from his thesis in interpreting history. After ridiculing the suggestion that the Hero is the 'creature of the Time',⁹ he proceeds to characterize Dante as the 'voice of ten silent centuries'¹⁰ and to undo his (Carlyle's) original position thus: 'The *Divine Comedy* is of Dante's writing; yet in truth it belongs to ten Christian centuries, only the finalizing of it Dante's. So always.'¹¹

Carlyle's Heroism should not be confounded with the cult of the Superman fathered by Nietzsche,¹² Shaw, and others, who can hardly be classed among philosophers of history. They apply their theory of what Eric Bentley christens Heroic Vitalism in given spheres, without any ambition to explain history.

The real successor of Carlyle, i. e. the greatest champion of the heroic interpretation of history after him, is Frederick Adams Wood, whose position is summed up below in his own words: 'Strong, mediocre, and weak monarchs are associated with strong, mediocre, and weak periods respectively in about 70 per cent. of the cases. Strong monarchs are associated with weak periods, and weak monarchs (including non-royal regents) with strong periods in about 10 per cent. of the cases. In about 20 per cent. of the cases mediocre monarchs are associated with strong or with weak periods, or mediocre periods are associated with strong or with weak monarchs.'¹³

8. Cp. Jacob Burckhardt, who, for more or less the same reason, holds that, even though their discoveries have changed the face of whole countries, discoverers are not great men. Vide 'The Great Men of History', in his *Force and Freedom*, Meridian Books, New York, 1955, p. 274.

9. Carlyle, *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, pp. 21-22.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

12. In fact, Nietzsche rebukes those who read into his theory of the overman 'the "hero worship" of that unconscious and involuntary counterfeiter, Carlyle, which I have repudiated so maliciously'. *Ecce Homo* III, 1, p. 261. Cp. *The Gay Science*, 347; *The Twilight of the Idols*, IX, 1, 12; *The Antichrist*, 54.

13. Frederick Adams Wood, *The Influence of Monarchs*, New York, 1913, p. 246, quoted in Sidney Hook, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

Carlyle does not seriously consider the question of the how and why of the Hero. Where, in his work on the Hero, the question does crop up by the way, he contents himself with using some such rhetoric as 'A messenger he, sent from the infinite Unknown with tidings to us.'¹⁴ He does not, however, fall into the error of believing that the Hero is there whenever he is needed by the age. This we shall see in the sequel.

According to Hegel, every age is informed and animated by a spirit of its own, which is represented by World-Historical individuals. These individuals fulfil the will of the World-Spirit by unfolding the spirit of their age. They perform the function of a midwife in expediting the birth and catering to the growth of the new age. Such individuals delude themselves, no less than others, into believing that they work in furtherance of their own individual aims, while the position is that they work for the World-Spirit. When their mission has been fulfilled, they are forsaken by the world mercilessly: 'When their object is attained they fall off like empty hulls from the kernel. They die early, like Alexander; they are murdered like Caesar; transported to St. Helena, like Napoleon.'¹⁵

Environmentalists as well as Spencer maintain that the great man is a resultant of his antecedents. No cause, no effect.¹⁶ But this is not the point at issue. Invoking the too general law of causation to explain the particular phenomenon of the greatness of a great man is far from explaining it. William James likens the method to the 'Oriental method' of replying any and every question by the unimpeachable truism 'God is great'.¹⁷ The real point at issue is: Anthropological-sociological conditions favouring, is a great man bound to emerge? Buckle and Spencer say, yes. But the question is, why is it that anthropological-sociological conditions are relatively

14. Carlyle, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

15. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Sibree's translation (London: George Bell and Sons, 1890), p. 32.

16. Herbert Spencer, *Study of Sociology* (11th ed., London: Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co., 1883), pp. 33-35.

17. William James, 'Great Men and their Environment', *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (New York: Longman's, Green, and Co., 1921), p. 234. Tolstoy, whose explanation of the heroic in history is, 'In the last analysis we reach the circle of infinity' (his *War and Peace*, Macmillan, 1943, Second Epilogue, p. 1328), is exposed to the same charge. 'The last analysis' is wholly irrelevant to history and historiology. 'In the last analysis' not only the Hero but everything else, too, is reducible to infinity, as admitted by Tolstoy himself, *loc. cit.*

constant while the rise of great men which is described as a resultant thereof is relatively inconstant? Bertrand Russell notes that no genius appeared in the field of experimental science during the period intervening between Archimedes and Leonardo da Vinci.¹⁸ Kroeber finds that England gave birth to 'no geniuses at all between 1450 and 1550 and a whole series of geniuses in literature, music, science, philosophy, and politics between 1550 and 1650. Similarly with the Germany of 1550-1650 and 1700-1800 respectively.'¹⁹ These phenomena are far from explicable on the basis of the situational determinism of Spencer and others. The position is that the question of the birth of a man of genius is biological rather than historiological. William James is at the height of his ingenuity when he writes: 'Can it be that Spencer holds the convergence of sociological pressures to have so impinged on Stratford-upon-Avon about the 26th of April, 1564, that a W. Shakespeare, with all this mental peculiarities, had to be born there,—as the pressure of water outside a certain boat will cause a stream of a certain form to ooze into a particular leak? And does he mean to say that if the aforesaid W. Shakspeare had died of cholera infantum, another mother at Stratford-upon-Avon would needs have engendered a duplicate copy of him, to restore the sociologic equilibrium,—just as the same stream of water will reappear, no matter how often you pass a sponge over the leak, so long as the outside level remains unchanged? Or might the substitute arise at 'Stratford-atte-Bowe?'²⁰

Frederick Engels would answer such questions in the affirmative with the reservation that the substitute might be a little different. 'That such and such a man', he writes, 'and precisely that man arises at a particular time in a particular country is, of course, pure chance. But cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found. That Napoleon, just that particular Corsican, should have been the military dictator whom the French Republic, exhausted by its own warfare, had rendered necessary, was chance; but that, if a Napoleon had been lacking, another would have filled the place, is proved by the fact that the man was always found as soon as he became necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc. While Marx discovered the materialist conception of history Thierry, Mignet, Guizot, and all the English historians upto 1850 are the

18. Bertrand Russell, *Freedom and Organization*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1934), p. 230.

19. A. L. Kroeber, *Configurations of Culture Growths*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1944, pp. 10-11.

20. James, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

proof that it was being striven for, and the discovery of the same conception by Morgan proves that the time was ripe for it and that it simply *had* to be discovered.²¹ That is to say, difficult as it is to spot out the man who is destined to play the Hero in a given situation, it is necessary that some one must play the role. Karl Marx goes to the length of declaring, 'Every social epoch needs its great men, and when it does not find them it invents them, as Helvetius says.'²² This is true not only of statesmen and military generals but also of thinkers. A given situation is bound to give rise to a given ideology, which will invariably seek its spokesman. In case one who has been chosen by a certain ideology to be its spokesman disappears from the scene on account of death or otherwise, the ideology will be on the look-out for a substitute who is bound to come forth. Advocates of the great-man conception of history would contend that, had Marx died in his cradle, the world would have been very different from what it is to-day. Marxists, on the other hand, have it that in the event of his death *infantum* Marx would have sooner or later been succeeded by some one else at the behest of the inexorable logic of the situation. In Engels' passage quoted above it has been suggested that Marx's was not the solitary attempt to propound the ideology he did. Elsewhere he mentions the name of Joseph Dietzgen, a German tanner-thinker, as one who discovered the materialist dialectics independently of him & Marx and even of Hegel.²³ G.V. Plekhanov, a great follower of Marx and Engels, thus describes the process of how if one Hero dies another takes his place: 'When a given state of society sets certain problems before its intellectual representatives, the attention of prominent minds is concentrated upon them until those problems are solved. As soon as they have succeeded in solving them their attention is transferred to another object. By solving problem X a given talent A diverts the attention of talent B from the problem already solved to another problem, Y. And when we are asked: What would have happened if A had died before he had solved problem X?—we imagine that the thread of human intellectual development would have been broken. We forget that had A died B, or C, or D might have tackled the problem ...'²⁴

The Marxist thesis outlined above has been a source of much confusion in both Marxist and non-Marxist thinking. Before we deal with it any further,

21. Engels' letter to Starkenburg, dated January 25, 1894, *S. W.*, II, p. 458.

22. *CSF*, p. 177.

23. *LF*, pp. 350-351.

24. G. V. Plekhanov, *The Role of the Individual in History*, Moscow, 1946, p. 43.

it seems imperative to give a brief account of some intriguing observations of Marx and Engels in regard to the historical role of great men.

Marx and Engels do not share the belief that man is but a tool in the hands of the situation. History, they believe, is a co-operative enterprise between man and situation.²⁵ They take enormous care to do justice to the creative role of personality in history, even at the risk of self-contradiction. They fully acknowledge the historical role of great men in the following words: 'Camille, Desmoulins, Danton, Robespierre, Saint-Just, Napoleon, the heroes as well as the parties and the masses of the old French Revolution, performed the task of their time in Roman costume and with Roman phrases, the task of unchaining and setting up modern bourgeois society. The first one knocked the feudal basis to pieces and moved off the feudal heads which had grown on it.'²⁶ Engels pays glowing tributes to Bacon and others in these words: '...Bacon, Hobbes and Locke are the fathers of that brilliant school of French materialists which made the eighteenth century in spite of all battles on land and sea won over before...French Revolution.'²⁷ Marx describes Feuerbach and Hegel as 'epoch-making'.²⁸ To Engels Hegel's representation of the world as a process was of 'epoch-making merit'.²⁹

The position of Marx and Engels has been sought to be brought into clearer relief, however, by some of their followers. Thus, according to Trotesky, 'great historical forces are refracted through a personality.'³⁰ He also contends that 'a historic personality, with all its peculiarities, should not be taken as a bare list of psychological traits, but as a living reality grown out of definite social conditions and reacting upon them. As a rose does not lose its fragrance because the natural scientist points out upon what ingredients of soil and atmosphere it is nourished, so an exposure of the social roots of a personality does not remove from it either its aroma or its foul smell.'³¹ Bukharin describes the individual as 'a collection of concen-

25. *EBLB*, I, p. 225; Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', Thesis IV, *S. W.*, II, pp. 365-366; *LF*, p. 354; Engels' letter dated January 25, 1894, to Starkenburg, *S. W.*, II, pp. 457-458, and letter dated September 21-22, 1890, to J. Bloch, *ibid.*, pp. 443-444.

26. *EBLB*, pp. 225-226.

27. *SUS*, Special Introduction to the 1892 English edition, p. 91.

28. Marx's letter dated January 24, 1865, to J. B. Schweitzer, incorporated as an appendix to *PP*, p. 219.

29. *AD*, p. 38.

30. Leon Trotesky, *The History of Russian Revolution* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1937), p. 115.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.

trated social influences united in a small unit'.³² Marx himself has remarked that personality is, in essence, 'the ensemble of social relations'.³³

According to the Marxian standpoint, the great man is not a free agent of social change, but one vested, so to say, by the socio-economic formation with the power of attorney to effect social change in their interests. The great man, to use another happy metaphor, is just a manager of the enterprise that is social change, the entrepreneur being the socio-economic formation.

The greatest shortcoming of the individualist, religious ethics is that it holds the individual entirely responsible for his actions to the neglect of the situation in which they are performed. Likewise, the greatest shortcoming of the individualist philosophy of history is that it credits particular individuals with all historic activity to the neglect of the non-personal factors at the root of history. The credit of exploding this myth certainly goes to Marxian and kindred interpretations. Marxism leaves no doubt that its thesis does not comprehend within its compass the question of how great men are born. According to it the birth of a great man, as also of a great idea, is a matter of *accident*, but his or its success or otherwise as a factor of historical change, being governed, conditioned, or determined by other social forces, is a matter of necessity. Marx maintains that 'theory, too, becomes a material force once it seizes the masses'.³⁴ He is convinced that 'world-history...would...be of a very mystical nature, if "accidents" played no part'.³⁵ He adds, however, that 'these accidents naturally form part of the general course of development and are compensated by other accidents'.³⁶ The last clause is pregnant with meaning. It divests accidents of their *accidental* character. It is purely accidental that I should post a card to my friend on a certain day. Such is the case with each and every individual, more or less. But the postal department know it almost for certain that cards, and in a given number, will be posted almost every day and they plan accordingly. And their plan succeeds. It shows that, as Engels contends, 'what is maintained to be necessary is composed of sheer accidents and...the so-called accidental is the form behind which necessity hides itself...'.³⁷ Engels' finding is that

32. Bukharin, *Historical Materialism* (3rd printing, London : George Allen & Unwin, 1928), p. 98.

33. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', Thesis VI, *S. W.*, II, p. 366.

34. *CCHPR*, p. 137.

35. Marx's letter dated April 17, 1871, to Kugelmann, *S. W.*, II, p. 421.

36. *Loc. cit.*

37. *LF*, p. 351.

'accident apparently reigns on the surface' only and 'where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws and it is only a matter of discovering these laws.'³⁸ Then does it mean that events are accidents only in so far as they are taken individually and that taken collectively they lose all their accidental character? Marx's statement on the subject quoted above ends with the clear reservation that 'acceleration and delay are very much dependent upon such "accidents"', including the "accident" of the character of the people who first head the movement.'³⁹ That is to say, although accidents compensate one another, so that they cannot determine the course of history, they do so only with this difference that they often succeed in accelerating or delaying the process of change. Marx and Engels seem to dismiss this question of delay and acceleration of the pace of development as of little consequence. But this is far from justifiable. Max Eastman very aptly remarks: 'In a world in which "everything flows", to hasten or to delay an event is to alter it.'⁴⁰ Accidents 'can not only make the path longer or shorter, but they can make it more or less "thorny", as Kautsky says.'⁴¹ Indeed, there can be nothing to vouch for the fact that accidents must of necessity compensate one another so that they can do little more than make the path of development longer or shorter. Let us pause here to be clear in our minds as regards the meaning of 'accident'. Bradley defines 'chance' as the given fact which falls outside of some given whole or system.⁴² We may replace the word 'system' in the definition by the words 'sphere of study'. Thus, what is a necessity in the sphere of biology may be an accident in the sphere of historiology. Accordingly, accident and necessity are not to be regarded as such in any absolute sense; they are relative to the given sphere of study. Hence, when it is urged that the birth of a great man is an accident, what one seeks to maintain is not that it is uncaused but that its cause is to be traced elsewhere than the given sphere of study. Marxism seeks to account not for the birth but for the success, not for the greatness but for the effective greatness, of great men. The cause of the birth of great men lies outside the domain of historiology.

38. *LF*, p. 354.

39. Marx's letter dated April 17, 1871, to Kugelmann, *S. W.*, II, p. 421.

40. Max Eastman, *Marxism: Is It Science?* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1941), p. 85.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

42. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (10th impression, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 344.

According to Marxism, the state of society is not solely responsible for the birth of the great man. It may serve for one among a number of factors involved which form the subjects of biology, anthropology, geography, and other such sciences and which can by no means be regarded as determined by the state of society in which the great man is born. The birth of the great man is purely a matter of accident.

Now, is it conceivable that it is *accidental* that a great man is born at all but *necessary* that he should invariably be there to fulfil the need of the times? The weakness of the Marxian thesis lies in answering the question in the affirmative. Even such an admirer of Marx and Engels as Sidney Hook has expressed his doubts about the Marxian position thus: 'The resolution of the economic contradiction is historically necessary, says Engels. The union of sperm and egg is historically accidental, he adds. How then does historical necessity get itself transformed into the realm of biology?...Does Engels believe that anybody can be substitute for Caesar, Augustus and Cromwell?'⁴³

In view of the foregoing considerations it becomes incumbent upon the Marxist to explain the element of necessity involved in the birth of the great man, for without such an explanation his belief the great man is bound to be found whenever he is needed cannot have a better claim for consideration than a mere superstition.

The position is that, as Lenin once remarked, talents are not born by the hundred and hence it is not possible for nature to distribute them equitably. If an age is fortunate enough to find its Hero, it is a matter of pure chance. Ordinary historical exigencies are fulfilled even by mediocrities; but to seriously maintain that the requisite number of great men will invariably appear on the scene to meet the challenge of the times would be fatalism of the first magnitude, comparable to the faith inculcated by the *Gītā* that God will himself descend to the earth to set right things that have gone wrong.

Further, that the historic situation always succeeds in finding out the historic personality is also not borne out by recorded history. Time was historically ripe for the emergence of an iron man like Kauṭilya or Candragupta who could work towards the unification of India with a view to withstanding the successive inroads of Mahmud of Ghazni and other ferocious conquerors. But none such was available. The situation failed miserably to give birth to the needed talent. Carlyle writes, 'the time call forth? Alas, we have known Times *call* loudly enough for their great men;

43. Sidney Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

but not find them when they called !...the Time, *calling* its loudest, had to go down to confusion and wreck because he would not come when called.⁴⁴ Indeed, there can be no denying the fact that, had the Hero always been at the beck and call of history, no age or civilization would have succumbed to crisis. If history is to be believed, quite a number of civilizations and races have perished prematurely down the ages, which eventuality would, in all probability, have been averted by the timely emergence of a Hero strong enough to meet the situation. Indeed, if there is due provision in the scheme of things for a great man to be there in response to the call of history, there can be no cause for concern about the future of humanity.

Much is made by Marxists of the concept of the need of the times, of historical necessity; but no serious attempt seems to have been made by them to define the concept. The solitary attempt of Bukharin at a definition of the term 'historical necessity' does not take us far enough. Bukharin writes: 'When we say that a certain phenomenon was a historical necessity, we mean that it necessarily had to follow, without regard to whether it would be good or bad...and when we speak of historical necessity, we do not mean "desirability" from the standpoint of—let us say—social progress, but the *inevitable result* of the course of social evolution.'⁴⁵ This definition seeks to bring home the value-neutral character of the concept of historical necessity as well as to suggest that the course of social evolution is in a way pre-ordained. But what about the premature death of societies and cultures? Why is it that some cultures fail to run the course of their evolution? Is their premature ruin also pre-ordained? An affirmative answer will surely lead us into the abyss of universal determinism, which even the Marxist would shudder to think of countenancing.

The question is, human needs are of myriad kinds: economic, political, aesthetic, etc., etc. If there is due provision in the scheme of things for necessary and timely fulfilment of all the needs, there can be no room for decline and fall in any compartment of culture at any time. It is common knowledge that many needs—such, for example, as the cure of cancer, extermination of mosquitoes, warding off earthquakes—continue unfulfilled for centuries and centuries together. George A. Sarton wonders why the economic needs failed to impel the early Greeks to develop plain arithmetic instead of playing with 'fanciful ideas on the properties of numbers',⁴⁶

44. Carlyle, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

45. Bukharin, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

46. George A. Sarton, *The Study of the History of Mathematics*, p. 18, quoted in

R. K. Merton finds that in the Newtonian age from forty to seventy per cent of the research projects of the Royal Society 'occurred in the category of pure science; and, conversely, that from thirty to sixty per cent were influenced by practical requirements' including non-economic requirements'.⁴⁷ O. T. Mason's finding is that invention is stimulated not only by human wants for food, clothing, shelter, rest, and locomotion but also by wants for delight of senses, knowledge as the explanation of things, social enjoyment, and spiritual satisfaction.⁴⁸

Difficulties arise even when 'social need' is more narrowly defined so that it is not thought to be present in all compartments of culture and in all historical periods. There are certainly heroes who frustrate rather than fulfil social needs. As Sidney Hook has remarked, the masses want peace or socialism and the hero may give them war and dictatorship in the name of their deeper needs.⁴⁹ More often than not, indeed, the social need of a particular historical period is itself the consequence of the activity of a hero and it requires a veritable hero to meet it also.

It must be borne in mind that there are various types of heroes even as there are various types of needs. We would do well to recall here the Carlylian typology of the hero referred to at about the beginning of this chapter. It is an established fact that heroes have often crossed swords with each other, sometimes to the ultimate ruin of the parties concerned. Hitler came to grief at the hands of Stalin. Einstein was exiled by Hitler. One wonders what need was fulfilled by the persecution by Hitler and Stalin of such gifted personalities as Einstein, Bukharin, and a host of others like them. Indeed there is something seriously wrong somewhere with the whole approach of situational determinism.

Generally speaking, Marxists seem to take it for granted that there are no alternative paths of historical development, that from a given economic formation only one other economic formation can emerge, and that consequently one and only one type of culture can flourish on the economic substructure. And this in spite of Marx's warnings, referred to in Chapter II, *supra*, that he possesses no master-key to history and that, therefore, each of the various forms of social evolution needs to be studied

M. M. Bober, *Karl Marx's Interpretation of History* (2nd ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 370.

47. R. K. Merton, 'Science and the Economy of Seventeenth Century England', *Science and Society*, III, No. 1 (1939), 26, quoted in Bober, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

48. O. T. Mason, *The Origins of Invention*, p. 410, quoted in Bober, *loc. cit.*

49. Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

separately. So there may be alternative paths of social development and it may be given to the hero to decide which path is to be taken by history.

Fresh light on the problem of the Hero in history is sought to be thrown by R. M. MacIver, who propounds what he terms the theory of 'levels of historical generality'. The conquest of Chittore by Akbar the Great was of epoch-making importance for the subjects of Pratap, the ruler of Chittore, but it is of a bit lesser consequence to the historian of the Mughal rule in India, of still lesser consequence to the historian of the Muslim rule in India, of far lesser consequence to the historian of India, and of little or no consequence to 'the Universal-historian, who thinks in no time-unit less than a century and no social unit smaller than a whole civilization'. Likewise, even the greatest of conquests will be ignored as of little moment by a historian of modes of production if they make no difference to the system of production prevailing at the time. Likewise, again, an event of to-day, regarded as one of the most significant events of the time, may well be belittled by a historian living thousands of years hence, not because of any paucity of knowledge of details, but because of forfeiture by it of its uniqueness consequent upon the occurrence of similar or even more significant events during the period of these thousand years. Marx does not seem to have attached as much importance to the introduction of power-driven machinery as to the transition from feudalism to capitalism and the introduction, centuries earlier, of the new economic motive of profit. The former he refers to as if it were a mere incident in the subsequent development—just one of the devices of the capitalists to turn the labour-power of the workers more and more to profit. But the historian of thousands of years hence may find the differences made by the transition from feudalism to capitalism to have become almost imperceptible, but the differences made by the power-driven machinery will be impossible to overlook. 'Yet this does not mean either that Marx was mistaken or that the historians of the future will be mistaken, but only that history divides into different periods at different levels of historical generality'.⁵⁰

In this connection, it is interesting to note that Engels had more or less a kindred distinction of levels in mind when he wrote, 'The further the particular sphere which we are investigating is removed from the economic sphere and approaches that of pure ideology, the more shall we find it

50. R. M. MacIver, 'Historical Explanation' (Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XXI, 1947), incorporated in Antony Flew (ed.), *Essays on Logic and Language* (2nd impression, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), Second Series, p. 192.

exhibiting accidents in its development, the more will its curve run in a zigzag.⁵¹

MacIver is of the opinion that, for events at the individual level, explanation must be sought on the same level.⁵² Marxian denunciations of the great-man theory of history are, by and large, characterized by the confusion of levels. To account for the historic activity of the great man, the Marxist usually invokes the whole socio-economic state of society. His position implies—we are not sure how far he is conscious of the implication—that the cause of any phenomenon is neither another phenomenon nor the conjuncture of phenomena but the total antecedent situation. To take an example which he would give were he conscious of the above-mentioned implication, the cause of the oak is not the acorn but the total antecedent situation consisting of the soil, the air, light, water, etc., etc., besides the acorn. In another writing, MacIver raises this point in the context of the general theory of causation and gives his own solution thus: 'We find...that a regularity of sequence is on some occasion interrupted. What is the cause of the interruption?...Perhaps nothing evokes our interest in causation so much as the interruption of an orderly routine. We search for such factor that has been injected into the situation...'⁵³ This argument waives what MacIver calls 'the crux of totality' and vindicates our notion of the cause of the oak being the acorn and of the cause of the historic activity of the great man being the great man himself. In a sardonic comment on Plekhanov's assertion that the cause of the historic activity of the great man is the socio-economic situation *in the last analysis*, Sidney Hook very pertinently remarks, 'the biological cause of John Smith's existence is his parents, of his parents his grand parents, of his grand parents his great-grand parents. John Smith's election to office is the result of another series of causes, social causes. His elopement with the town-secretary stems from still another. Now,...it would be taxing them [great-grand parents] too much to hold them responsible for his birth....Plekhanov insists upon bringing in the great-grand father, not only as the cause of John Smith's existence but of his election and elopement, too.'⁵⁴ In this connection, we would also refer to the distinction, stressed by William James, between necessary conditions and sufficient conditions of a given result. James likens the invocation of the general law of causation to explain the particular

51. Engels' letter dated January 25, 1894, to Starkenburg, *S. W.*, II, p. 458.

52. MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

53. MacIver, *Social Causation* (New York : Ginn and Company, 1942), p. 237.

54. Sidney Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

phenomenon of the emergence of the great man to confusing the necessary conditions with the sufficient ones.

Marxists seem to take it for granted that there are no alternative paths of historical development, that from a given economic system only one other system can emerge, and that consequently one and only one culture can flourish on the economic substructure. But there is no reason to believe that they are correct. There may be alternative paths of social development and the Hero may decide which path history should take. Thanks to the personality of Muḥammad, the Arabs, who were before his advent almost non-entities, became historically the most effective race of the age. It is preposterous to contend that the only course open to them was to turn into an aggressively missionary race at the hands of Muḥammad.

However, the question arises: Can the Hero upset the most general pattern of historical evolution? Can he, for example, manipulate history in such a way as to make feudalism follow capitalism? No, on such a fundamental level, it is the situation, the state of society, or the socio-economic forces which prove stronger; the Hero is powerless to withstand their might. Some such examples Plekhanov seems to have had in mind when he said, 'The character of an individual is a "factor" in social development only where, when, and to the extent that social relations permit it to be such'.⁵⁵ And, considered on the level just indicated by me, he is right. But there is no reason why on a different, appropriate level, such as the one illustrated above with reference to Muḥammad, the Hero should not be found stronger. Hence, when one proceeds to consider the problem of the role of personality in history, one must be clear in one's mind about the level on which the question is being raised.

Again, capacity to make history like capacity to think and know varies from individual to individual. There are those who can influence only a most insignificant part of history, there are others who can make an epoch, and there are still others who can shape the destiny of a whole civilization. Hence MacIver is right when he says that the question that can legitimately arise with regard to the power and potency of great men to make history is not one of the possibility of making history but of the degrees in which history is capable of being made on the various levels of generality. Moreover, as the Sanskrit saying goes, looked at from below everyone looks high, and looked at from above everyone looks low.⁵⁶

55. Plekhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

56. Adho 'dhaḥ paśyataḥ kasya mahimā nopacīyate? Upary upari paśyantaḥ sarva eva daridrati. *Hitopadeśa*, M. R. Kale, ed. (3rd ed., Bombay : The Oriental Publishing Company, 1910), 2.2.

CHAPTER VIII

Dialectic of Revolution

According to Marx and Engels, transition from an old order to a new takes place usually by means of force, of revolution, which is often explosive and violent. They assert that 'not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history',¹ 'the locomotives of history'².

In the preceding chapter we have seen that, according to the two writers, the hero, apart from being a product of the civil society, apart from being an ensemble of social relations, is seldom a successful agent of change by himself. Unless the situation is ripe for it, no revolution can be wrought by an individual howsoever heroic. The relation between the hero and history, between the subjective and the objective, between thought and reality, is a two-way process. 'Revolutions', says Marx, 'require a passive element, a material basis. Theory will be realized in a people only in so far as it is the realization of their needs....It is not enough that thought strive to actualize itself; actuality must itself strive toward thought.'³ If the hero is

1. *GI*, p. 50.

2. *CSF*, p. 198.

3. *CCHPR*, p. 138.

not backed by history in his effort to make history, he can effect not 'a radical revolution' but 'rather a partial, merely political revolution, a revolution that leaves the pillars of the edifice standing.'⁴

For revolution to burst out, both thesis and antithesis must be fully developed, must be in full swing. Thesis and antithesis interpenetrate and form a unity to begin with. In course of time the antithesis develops into an independent identity in constant conflict with the thesis. When the antithesis is in full swing, there is a revolutionary change in the situation. Otherwise the conflict of an undeveloped antithesis with its thesis is likely to end in a mere revolt, rebellion, or cataclysm—namely, in a revolution that has failed, that has proved abortive. Extraordinary circumstances apart, it is difficult to expect a revolutionary transition from capitalism to communism where capitalism has not come of age and civil society does not abound with the proletariat. 'An oppressed class', says Marx, 'is the vital condition for every society founded on the antagonism of classes.'⁵ In fact, as Marx himself avers, 'No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society'.⁶ No society can overleap the successive phases of its normal development.⁷ A certain age of maturity is, generally speaking, a must for a historical form to be discarded and its making way for a higher form.⁸ So, unless the objective situation is ripe enough for it, it is futile to expect a revolutionary transition from an old to a new order. Revolution cannot be thrust upon a people from above, it has to burst out of the inmost core of society. As Engels has been able to show in criticism of Herr Eugen Dühring, force can simply supplement a revolutionary situation prepared by economic development. Force not backed by a favourable, ripe historical situation is bound to prove abortive.⁹ Force is the midwife, and not the mother, of *every society pregnant with the new*, and not of *every society*. The hero can make history only where history is prepared to be made by him. History is a cooperative enterprise between the subjective and the objective, the agent and the patient, thought and reality.

4. CCHPR, p. 139.

5. PP, p. 196.

6. CCPE, Preface, p. 21.

7. Capital, I, Preface to the First German Edition, p. 10.

8. Capital, III, p. 883.

9. AD, pp. 253 ff.

Another factor responsible for the revolutionary transition from one social order to another is the incompatibility between the productive forces and production relations, 'between distribution relations, and thus the specific historical form of their corresponding production relations, on the one hand, and the productive forces, the production powers and the development of their agencies, on the other hand', and consequently 'between the material development of production and its social form.'¹⁰

Society is a going concern, not a closed account. Thanks to its inbuilt dialectic, it does not rest content with any particular stage of development for long. Change is the law of society as much as of nature. The need for change is accentuated and change promises to assume extraordinary proportions when the material productive forces of society come into conflict with property relations. 'From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.'¹¹ The material productive forces of society are themselves responsible for the birth of property relations. The property relations attain a relative independence in course of time, get hardened into established customs and traditions, and turn out 'finally sanctioned as an explicit law.' To be sure, 'such regulation and order are themselves indispensable elements of any mode of production, if it is to assume social stability and independence from mere chance and arbitrariness.'¹² Thus, the property relations tend to turn static, while the material productive forces go on developing with the progress in man's conquest of nature. The property relations become the thesis, and the productive forces the antithesis, and a stage is reached where the latter disrupts and bursts the former asunder leading to a revolutionary transformation of the productive system entire. 'The knell of private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.'¹³ The process seems to Marx to have an inexorability comparable to 'a law of Nature.'¹⁴ Since the law, the state, which Marx and Engels characterize as 'the illusory community', 'has won an existence independent of the individuals', it refuses to change and 'in the last resort can only be broken by a revolution.'¹⁵

Marx and Engels maintain that 'for many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern

10. *Capital*, III, p. 884.

11. *CCPE*, Preface, p. 21.

12. *Capital*, III, p. 793.

13. *Capital*, I, p. 763.

14. *Loc. cit.*

15. *GI*, p. 90. Cp. p. 93.

productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule.¹⁶ In fact, 'all collisions in history have their origin...in the contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse.' This contradiction 'has occurred several times in past history' and 'necessarily on each occasion burst out in a revolution'. Of course, it has not been uniform everywhere: it has taken 'various subsidiary forms, such as all-embracing collisions, collisions of various classes, contradiction of consciousness, battle of ideas, etc., political conflict, etc.'¹⁷

Many critics of Marx contend that his thesis of the necessarily revolutionary character of transition from one social order to another is not borne out by history. No revolutionary class struggle is known to mark primitive communism's transition to slavery. Besides, one's doubts about the Dark Ages feudalism's representing a higher order of civilization than ancient Greece or Rome apart, it is difficult to maintain that the downfall of Rome was caused by a pro-slavery class on the one hand and pro-feudalism class on the other. Even capitalism arose as a result of struggle not between the serf and the nobility or between the journeyman and the guild-master but between the landed interests and the rising bourgeoisie. It is interesting to note that Marx and Engels seem sometimes to suggest that the transition from slavery to feudalism was made possible by such extraneous factors as wars and barbarian invasions which rendered slavery useless by impoverishing Rome and ruining its markets. Even capitalism owes its existence to such fortuitous events as geographical discoveries, the sudden expansion of the world-market, exploitation of the new colonies, and influx of products of Asia and the treasures of America.¹⁸ This circumstance serves to blunt the edge of the Marxian thesis that every social order dies at the hands of forces released by itself, that every socio-economic formation undergoes autolysis.

Marx and Engels also maintain that there is a radical difference between the revolutions of the past and the proletarian revolution. The proletarian revolution is a revolution to end revolution. As we shall see in the sequel, when the proletarian revolution is crowned with success, humanity will bid good-bye to political revolutions once for all. This is because the proletarian revolution aims at the abolition of classes and class antagonisms. 'All previous historical movements', contend Marx and Engels, 'were movements

16. *CM*, p. 38.

17. *GI*, p. 92.

18. *Capital*, I, chapters XXVII and XXXI, passim; *Capital*, III, p. 332.

of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority.¹⁹ To elucidate the point, 'All revolutions upto the present day have resulted in the displacement of one definite class rule by another; but all ruling classes up to now have been only small minorities in relation to the ruled mass of the people. One ruling minority was thus overthrown; another minority seized the helm of state in its stead....'²⁰ So, 'the common form of all these revolutions was that they were minority revolutions.'²¹ But this time the revolution will come off (and, many will add, has already come off in more or less half of the world) 'not in the interest of the minority, but in the veriest interest of the majority.'²² In fact, 'each new class out to oust a ruling class has to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society' and thus to assume universality. It induces the illusion of being not just another class but 'the representative of the whole of society; it appears as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class.'²³ But it is given to the modern proletariat alone to abolish 'the rule of all classes with the classes themselves.'²⁴ In the Marxian perspective, the proletariat is, at bottom, not a class and 'has no longer any particular class interest to assert against the ruling class.'²⁵ It is rather co-extensive with society as a whole and 'has to bear all the burdens of society....' It 'forms the majority of all members of society'.²⁶ That is why 'the emancipation of the workers contains universal human emancipation.'²⁷

This view springs from the assumption on the part of Marx and Engels that a day will come when, barring a few monopolists of economic power, the whole of society will turn into the miserable proletariat and that the gulf between the two classes will be enormously widened, to be bridged ultimately by the dead bodies of the exploiting class falling in the grim battle

19. *CM*, p. 42.

20. *CSF*, p. 113.

21. *CSF*, 114.

22. *Loc. cit.*

23. *GI*, pp. 62-63.

24. *GI*, p. 87.

25. *GI*, p. 94.

26. *GI*, p. 86.

27. *EPM*, p. 82. Cp. *PP*, pp. 196-197; *CM*, p. 51; *AD*, pp. 30, 217, 388-395; *SUS*, p. 139; etc.

between them and the whole mass of society arrayed against them. We have seen, however, that such polarization of classes is not going to come off.

According to Marx and Engels, all states are basically class-states. The state is 'nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another,'²⁸ 'a public force organized for social enslavement,...an engine of class despotism,'²⁹ used by the ruling class to hold down its adversaries by force, so that 'it is pure nonsense to talk of a free people's state.'³⁰ 'Political power', they assert, 'is precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society.'³¹ The executive of the modern state is 'but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.'³² At times Marx and Engels did not spare even democracy from their devastating criticisms. In 1971, Marx sardonically remarks that universal suffrage only helps decide 'once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament.'³³ Such a state is bound to strive to hold down the oppressed class, with the result that revolution breaks out and the old order collapses with a bang. The peculiarity of the proletarian revolution, therefore, is that, unlike the previous revolutions, which helped only perfect the state, it aims at smashing it. 'All revolutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it.'³⁴ The new social order that will follow upon the proletarian revolution will put the whole machinery of state 'into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe.'³⁵

Revolution takes place by way of explosion thanks to the dialectical process which works by leaps, by jerks, and not by degrees. The faith in explosive revolution appears to be a direct or indirect corollary of the laws of dialectic. The second law, the law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa, purports to say that the passing of slow quantitative changes into sudden and abrupt qualitative changes is the law of development of nature and society. Hence radical social change is bound to be in the nature of revolution by means of explosion. Hence transition from capitalism to socialism can be effected not by slow and gradual

28. *CWF*, p. 440. Also see *CM*, p. 51. Cp. *HQ*, p. 547.

29. *CWF*, p. 469.

30. Engels' letter dated March 18-28, 1875, to A. Bebel, *S. W.*, II, p. 39; *SC*, p. 357.

31. *PP*, p. 197.

32. *CM*, p. 35.

33. *CWF*, p. 472.

34. *EBLB*, p. 301.

35. *OFPPS*, p. 292.

changes, not by reform, but by sudden explosion. And such a revolution is bound to be bloody.

The faith in revolution by sudden explosion appears to be rooted in the second law of dialectic, viz. the conflict, interpenetration, and unity of the opposites. Marx and Engels relate capitalist private property and the proletariat by way of thesis and antithesis respectively.³⁶ So, the former is bound to burst at the hands of the latter.

This law also implies mounting polarization and war of the opposites. When the situation comes to a head, it explodes, often into a synthesis. In the economic formation of society, this phenomenon takes the form of increasing centralization of wealth on the one hand and increasing socialization of the proletariat resulting in increasing misery on the other. The ultimate result is that capitalism bursts asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. That the desperate proletariat will have recourse to violence is but a foregone conclusion.

The faith of Marx and Engels in revolution by explosion is indirectly related to the first law of dialectic, viz. the law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa, according to which slow quantitative changes tend to pass into rapid and abrupt qualitative changes. From this, Stalin draws the conclusion that the transition from capitalism to socialism 'cannot be effected by slow changes, by reforms, but only by a qualitative change of the capitalist system, by revolution.'³⁷ Needless to emphasize that abrupt changes cannot be brought about by peaceful means: they are bound to assume violent proportions.

Originally, Marx and Engels conceived the proletarian revolution as violent, bloody revolution, as revolution red in tooth and claw, as it were. In their earlier references to the technique of revolution, their faith in violence appears to be almost fanatical. Marx writes that there is only one way to shorten 'the death agony of the old society and the birth pains of the new society—revolutionary terrorism.'³⁸ He writes elsewhere, 'Indeed, is it at all surprising that a society founded on the opposition of classes should culminate in brutal contradiction, the shock of body against body, as its final *denouement*?...It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonisms that *social evolutions* will cease to be *political revolutions*. Till then, on the eve of every general reshuffling of society, the

36. HF, p. 51.

37. Stalin, *Philosophy of Marxism*, p. 10.

38. Marx and Engels, *Deutsche Ideologie*, p. 60, quoted in Bober, *op. cit.*, p. 263, f. n. 12.

last word of social science will always be: "*Le combat ou la mort; la lutte sanguinaire ou le néant. C'est ainsi que la question est invinciblement posée.*" (Combat or death: bloody struggle or extinction. It is thus that the question is inexorably put.)³⁹ Marx and Engels felt that there was more or less a 'veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie, lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.'⁴⁰ In fact, 'They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution.'⁴¹ They ridicule the utopian socialists who 'reject all political, and especially all revolutionary, action' and 'wish to attain their ends by peaceful means',⁴² petty bourgeois socialism which 'dreams of the peaceful achievement of its Socialism',⁴³ and the Social-Democrats who believe in 'the transformation of society in a democratic way'.⁴⁴ Their final conclusion is 'that every social reform remains a utopia until the proletarian revolution and the feudalistic counter-revolution measure swords in a *world war*'.⁴⁵ Marx is quite faithful to his perspective when in an open circular again Hermann Kriege, 'who substituted a sentimental preachment of love, justice and the like for the class struggle of the proletariat',⁴⁶ he speaks of the ineffectiveness of love as a means for bettering social conditions and as a source of the necessary energetic power of action.

Besides shortening 'the death agony of the old society and the birth pains of the new society', violent revolution has a peculiar purpose to serve. Thanks to the shock of the revolution, the proletariat undergoes a change of heart which proves an asset to the new dispensation. In such a revolution, say Marx and Engels, 'the changing of oneself coincides with the changing of circumstances',⁴⁷ and 'there develops the universal character and energy of the proletariat, without which the revolution cannot be accomplished; and in which, further, the proletariat rids itself of everything that still clings

39. *PP*, p. 197.

40. *CM*, p. 43.

41. *CM*, p. 61.

42. *CM*, p. 59.

43. *CSF*, p. 203.

44. *EBLB*, p. 249.

45. *WLC*, p. 74.

46. *SC*, p. 37, Editor's note; Engels, 'On the History of the Communist League' (1885), *S. W.*, II, p. 313.

47. *GI*, 234.

to it from its previous position in society.⁴⁸ The revolution leads to the emergence of perfect individuals. 'Only at this stage', say the two writers, 'does self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of complete individuals and the casting-off of all natural limitations.'⁴⁹ Revolution is the best way to produce 'the communist consciousness' on a mass scale and 'the alteration of men on a mass scale', so as to enable the proletariat to rid 'itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew.'⁵⁰ Engels indicts Herr Dühring whose contention was that 'all use of force, forsooth, demoralises the person who uses it' and speaks of 'the immense moral and spiritual impetus which has been given by every victorious revolution'.⁵¹ The most forthright statement of the case for violent revolution as a mechanism of transmuting the human material 'corrupted by thousands of years of slavery, serfdom, capitalism and the war of every man against his neighbour', as Lenin would have it,⁵² into the one fit for the new order, was made by Marx in 1850 thus: 'Only through years of struggle can the class which overthrows cleanse itself of the mire of the old society and become fit to create a new society. You must pass through fifteen, twenty, perhaps fifty years of war not merely to change the system but to change yourselves and render yourselves fit for political rule.'⁵³

Marx was so enamoured of revolutionary violence that he sometimes preached its prolongation as much as possible. The proletariat must, he observes, keep the revolutionary excitement 'alive as long as possible' even after their victory. 'Far from opposing so-called excesses,' he continues, 'instances of popular revenge against hated individuals or public buildings that are associated only with hateful recollections, such instances must not only be tolerated but the leadership of them taken in hand.'⁵⁴ It is true that, as Stalin is reported to have told his people during the Second World War, 'it is impossible to defeat the enemy without learning to hate him with all our soul', hatred on the part of the revolutionary class against the

48. *GI*, p. 85.

49. *Loc. cit.*

50. *GI*, p. 87.

51. *AD*, p. 255.

52. John Lewis, *The Marxism of Marx* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1972), p. 206.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

54. Marx and Engels, 'Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League' (1850), *S.W.*, I (1969), p. 180.

ruling class is a necessary precondition for the success of violent revolution, but it is difficult to see how a lifelong practitioner of hatred and violence will cease to feed therewith his second nature acquired thereby.

It is pertinent to point out that Marx sometimes seems to be sceptical about the foregoing evaluation of violent revolution as a mechanism of self-change. He seems to suggest that the revolution leads immediately to the infinite degradation and the total negation of the human personality. The communism that comes into being on the morrow of revolution is 'crude communism', which is 'merely one *form* in which the vileness of private property... comes to the surface.'⁵⁵ It represents not the abolition but 'only a *generalization* and *consummation*' of such private property as 'is not capable of being possessed by all as *private property*.'⁵⁶ Indeed, Marx draws up a grim picture of the degradation of man as the aftermath of revolution. 'In negating the *personality* of man in every sphere,' he observes, this type of communism is really nothing but the logical expression of private property... . General *envy* constituting itself as a power is the disguise in which *avarice* re-establishes itself, only in *another* way.... The crude communism is only the consummation of this *envy*....'⁵⁷ The net result is 'the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization, the regression to the *unnatural* simplicity of the *poor and undemanding* man who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even attained to it.'⁵⁸ What a predicament of revolutionary violence! Here the Gandhian gospel of non-violent revolution and purity of means is bound to force itself on one's attention.

In the beginning, Marx and Engels were inclined to view that capitalism could not be persuaded to yield place to socialism and thereby sign its own death-warrant with equanimity or in a peaceful manner. In the first half of the nineteenth century, factory-owners resisted, generally successfully, all move for the amelioration of the workers' incredibly wretched condition. Between 1802 and 1833, in all five labour-laws could be enacted, and they, too, remained a dead letter, for not a penny was voted for their enforcement.⁵⁹ It was as late as 1853 that a paid government factory-inspector came to be appointed. In fact, thanks to the tough fight put up by the factory-owners, there was hardly any labour-legislation worth the name upto 1860, and whatever labour-laws could successfully struggle to be born failed to be

55. *EPM*, p. 101.

56. *EPM*, p. 99.

57. *EPM*, p. 100.

58. *Loc. cit.*

59. *Capital*, I, p. 278.

enforced properly. This circumstance served to dissuade Marx and Engels from invoking constitutional means for the metamorphosis of the iniquitous social order. They felt that it was preposterous to expect any appreciable change in the situation through constitutionalism and that, even if there could be one, it would come too late, for which they had no patience. The latter half of the nineteenth century, especially since 1860, witnessed the passage as well as practice of various protective labour laws, which Marx in Chapter X entitled 'The Working-Day' of the *Capital*, Vol. I, characterizes as 'cowardly concessions to public opinion' and attributes them to the phenomenal growth of 'the worker's power of offensive' side by side with the weakening of 'the capital's power of resistance'. As we shall see presently, Marx and Engels began later to envisage the possibility as well as advisability of peaceful revolution. It appears that the above development served to suggest to them the corrigibility of the bourgeois republic and the possibility of democratic revolution.

That Marx and Engels preached the violent overthrow of the capitalist order was taken almost for granted till the other day; that, side by side, in a different vein, especially in their later days, they are found to have come to feel that there is scope for gradual and peaceful changes in the scheme of things and thereby to prefer peaceful revolution by constitutional means, was seldom appreciated. We have seen that the inception of protective labour legislation gave rise on the part of Marx and Engels to a belief in the corrigibility of the bourgeois republic and the possibility of revolution through democratic process. The inception of joint-stock companies and the cooperative movement impressed them further and served to reinforce the belief. In 1864, Marx hailed the 'cooperative movement, especially the co-operative factories raised by the unassisted efforts of a few bold "hands", as 'great experiments', which have shown, by deed, 'that production on a large scale, and in accordance with the behests of modern science, may be carried on without the existence of a class of masters employing a class of hands; that to bear fruit, the means of labour need not be monopolised as a means of dominion over, and of extortion against, the labouring man himself; and that, like slave labour, like serf labour, hired labour is but a transitory and inferior form, destined to disappear before associated labour plying its tool with a willing hand, a ready mind, and a joyous heart.'⁶⁰ So, for Marx, the cooperative movement became more or less the prototype of socialist economy and represented the 'victory of the political

60. Marx, 'Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association' (1864), *S. W.*, I, p. 347.

economy of labour over the political economy of property.⁶¹ Would that he had lived long enough to witness the long strides being taken by labour legislation as well as other democratic, then unforeseeable reforms in our century!

It was as early as 1947 that Engels suggested the desirability of peaceful revolution in reply to the question, 'Will it be possible to bring about the abolition of private property by peaceful methods?' Engels' reply is couched in these words: 'It is to be desired that this could happen, and Communists certainly would be the last to resist it. The Communists know only too well that all conspiracies are not only futile but even harmful. They know only too well that revolutions are not made deliberately and arbitrarily, but that everywhere and at all times they were the essential outcome of circumstances quite independent of the will and the leadership of particular parties and entire classes.'⁶² That is to say, violent revolution is distasteful but rendered unavoidable by the circumstances beyond the proletariat's control. After all, the right to revolution is 'the only *really* "historical right"'.⁶³

In the course of a speech at Amsterdam on September 8, 1872, on the morrow of the Hague Congress of the International Working Men's Association popularly known as the First International, Marx granted that 'there are countries such as America, England, and I could add Holland if I know your institutions better, where the working people may achieve their goal by peaceful means.'⁶⁴ Engels also took it, in 1891, that 'the old society may develop peacefully into the new one' in democratic republics such as France and America and in monarchies such as Britain, where people and their representatives have the upper hand.⁶⁵ Marx and Engels set great store by democratic process. In 1875, Marx wrote that 'it is precisely in this last form of state of bourgeois society that the class struggle has to be fought out to a conclusion....'⁶⁶ Engels expressed the same idea again and again even after Marx's death. In 1891, for example, he asserted, 'If one thing is certain it is that our Party and the working class can only come to power under the form of a democratic republic,'⁶⁷ which he calls 'the specific form

61. *Loc. cit.*

62. *PC*, p. 89.

63. *CSF*, Engels' Introduction (1895), p. 124.

64. Marx, 'The Hague Congress' (1872), *S. W.*, II (1969), p. 293.

65. Engels, 'A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891' (1891), *S. W.*, III (1970), p. 434.

66. *CGP*, p. 31.

67. Engels, 'A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891' (1891), *S. W.*, III (1970), p. 435.

for the dictatorship of the proletariat',⁶⁸ which expression we have already discussed.⁶⁹

As a matter of fact, the famous Introduction, written by Engels in 1891, to Marx's *The Class Struggle in France* deserves to be regarded as a veritable panegyric on constitutionalism and democratic process. 'We, the "revolutionists," the "overthrowers,"—we', declares Engels, 'are thriving far better on legal methods than on illegal methods and overthrow. The parties of Order, as they call themselves, are perishing under the legal conditions created by themselves. They cry despairingly with Odilon Barrot: *la légalité nous tue*, legality is the death of us; whereas we, under this legality, get firm muscles and rosy cheeks and look like life eternal.'⁷⁰ There are many more statements eulogistic of universal suffrage and legality in this Introduction, which are not being cited for want of space. Suffice it to say in this behalf that Marx and Engels looked upon the successful utilization of universal suffrage as 'an entirely new method of proletarian struggle', inasmuch as 'the bourgeoisie and the government came to be much more afraid of the legal than of the illegal action of the workers' party, of the results of election than of those of rebellion.'⁷¹

In that Introduction, in fact—believe it or not—Engels went to the length of proclaiming that 'The mode of struggle of 1848 [viz. armed insurrection] is today obsolete in every respect,'⁷² that 'Rebellion in the old style, street fighting with barricades, which decided the issue everywhere up to 1848, was to a considerable extent obsolete',⁷³ that 'The time of surprise attacks, of revolutions carried through by small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious masses, is past.'⁷⁴ The reasons adduced by Engels are noteworthy. The class struggle which was more or less localized in 1848 had spread over the whole of Europe by 1895 and reached a far greater intensity than before. Revolution on such a scale cannot be carried out by a minority. Unlike the revolutions of the past, the proletarian revolution is a revolution of the majority for the majority by the majority, and the majority cannot be mobilized for it. It is now supplied 'with a new weapon, and one of the sharpest,' that is universal suffrage.⁷⁵ Again, 'a real victory of an

68. *Loc. cit.*

69. Pp. 60-61, *supra*.

70. *CSF*, Engels' Introduction (1895), p. 125.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

insurrection over the military in street fighting, a victory as between two armies, is one of the rarest exceptions.⁷⁶ Why do the insurgents stand an extremely remote chance of victory in an open fight with the government? The reason given is plain and convincing: 'the military have at their disposal artillery and fully equipped corps of trained engineers, resources of war which, in nearly every case, the insurgents entirely lack.'⁷⁷ Engels compares the state of affairs in 1895 with that in 1848 and comes to the conclusion that, since 1848, 'there have been very many more changes, and all in favour of the military... On the other hand, all the conditions of the insurgents' side have grown worse.'⁷⁸ He substantiates his statement by marshalling concrete facts and figures. Another reason why armed insurrection is no longer effective is that, as stated earlier, the proletarian revolution is a majority revolution aiming at 'a complete transformation of the social organization', and hence 'the masses themselves must be in it, must themselves already have grasped what is at stake, what they are going in for with body and soul.'⁷⁹ And this is possible only when the revolution is sought to be carried out by peaceful, democratic methods.

Marx is also known to have come to believe, and firmly, that compensation of English landed proprietors would be preferable to a civil war, as less costly. Engels writes, in 1894, 'We by no means consider compensation as impossible in any event; Marx told me (and how many times!) that in his opinion we would get off cheapest if we could buy out the whole lot of them.'⁸⁰ Lenin proceeds to substantiate the master's claim and assign various reasons why 'the subordination of the capitalists to the workers in England would have been assured at that time' in a peaceful manner.⁸¹ It is interesting to note that much of what Lenin says in this behalf rests on the tacit assumption that the democratic atmosphere is quite congenial to peaceful proletarian revolution. Of course, as pointed out by Rosa Luxemburg, Marx's suggestion regarding compensation 'refers to the attitude of the workers only *after* their victory and not before....What Marx had in mind here was the *peaceful exercise of proletarian dictatorship*, and not the

76. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

80. Engels, 'The Peasant Question in France and Germany' (1894), *S.W.* II, p. 397.

81. Lenin, 'The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky' (1918), *MEM*, pp. 447-448.

replacement of the dictatorship by capitalist social reforms.⁸² In fact, as early as 1847, Engels also envisaged gradual expropriation of the bourgeoisie 'partly directly through the payment of compensation in currency notes'⁸³

In his zeal to depict Marx as an uncompromising protagonist of violent revolution, Lenin makes much⁸⁴ of the former's incidental remarks about the advisability of *smashing* the state machinery. In 1871 Marx wrote to Kugelmann, 'If you look at the last chapter of my *Eighteenth Brumaire*, you will find that I say that the next attempt of the French Revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another but to *smash* it, and this is the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution on the continent.'⁸⁵ Allusion is here to the following line of the *Eighteenth Brumaire*: 'All revolutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it.'⁸⁶ Here there is no necessary commitment to violence. What Marx seems to seek to bring home is the fact that the state merits not perfection but abolition, which may or may not assume violent proportions. That is why he refers to *all* revolutions even though they were not non-violent. By 'smashing' he seems to mean 'abolition' or 'elimination' and not necessarily 'destruction'. Besides, the state spoken of here does not appear to be a democratic state but 'the bureaucratic-military machine', as clearly stated in his letter cited above, or 'the centralized state power as stated immediately after the line taken from the *Eighteenth Brumaire*. In fact, Lenin himself helps confirm this interpretation when he writes that the necessity of violence against the bourgeoisie is 'particularly created, as Marx and Engels have rightly explained in detail...by the existence of a *military clique and a bureaucracy*. But it is precisely these institutions that were *non-existent* precisely in England and in America and precisely in the 1870's when Marx made his observations....'⁸⁷ That is why, one is tempted to add, Marx prescribes the smashing of state machinery for the continent only and not for England and America.

82. Lucien Laurat, *Marxism and Democracy*, Edward Fitzgerald, tr. from the German (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1940), pp. 54-55.

83. *PC*, p. 90.

84. Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951), pp. 61 ff.

85. Marx's letter dated April 12, 1871, to Kugelmann, *S. W.*, II, p. 420; *SC*, p. 318.

86. *EBLB*, p. 301.

87. Lenin, 'The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky' (1918), *MEM* p. 448.

After all has been said on the issue of the place of peaceful revolution in the Marxian dialectic of revolution, it would be pertinent to point out that Marx and Engels were not dogmatic about the form of the proletarian revolution and, as such a champion of armed revolution as Lenin himself acknowledges, 'they did not bind the movement to any one particular form of struggle.'⁸⁸ In fact, Marx himself observes, in course of his speech in 1872 at Amsterdam, wherein he made a candid confession of the feasibility of peaceful revolution in democratic countries. 'But we have by no means affirmed that this goal would be achieved by identical means. We know of the allowances we must make for the institutions, customs and traditions of the various countries....'⁸⁹ After conceding that it is possible to effect revolution in democratic countries by peaceful methods, he adds, 'If that is true, we must also recognise that in most of the continental countries it is force that will have to be the lever of our revolutions; it is force that we shall some day have to resort to in order to establish a reign of labour.'⁹⁰ Even at an advanced stage of his career, Engels seemed sometimes to sanction violent revolution in unequivocal terms. On December 18, 1889, for example, he asserted 'that the proletariat cannot conquer its political domination, the only door to the new society, without violent revolution.'⁹¹

In contradistinction to the foregoing considerations, the tone of Marxian psychology is in perfect harmony with revolution by persuasion or peaceful methods. As a true Marxist, one cannot afford to harbour, or be justified in harbouring, any feeling of hatred for the capitalist. This is because, firstly, it is not the individual capitalist or the class of capitalists but the system which is to blame for the iniquitous social organization, for the simple reason, to follow Marx, that no individual, class, or society can overleap the natural phases of his or its normal development and has, therefore, no alternative but to behave as he or it does. Secondly, capitalism is by no means an unmixed evil but has much to its credit as a necessary stage in the general progress of mankind. Marx takes care to make it abundantly clear that, when he speaks of capitalists and land-owners, what he purports to mean is not individuals but 'personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and

88. Lenin, 'Partisan Warfare' (1906), *MEM*, p. 186.

89. Marx, 'The Hague Congress' (1872), *S. W.*, II (1969), pp. 292-293.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

91. Engels' letter dated December 13, 1889, to G. Trier, *SC*, p. 492.

class-interests.⁹² He views 'the evolution of the economic formation of society' simply 'as a process of natural history' and hence will be the last to 'make individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains.'⁹³

As regards the evaluation of capitalism, Lenin quotes Marx as saying to Kriege; 'But the capitalist evil you are vainly hoping to avoid is historically good, for it will frightfully accelerate social development and bring ever so much nearer new and higher forms of the Communist movement.'⁹⁴ There can of course be no denying the fact that, as compared with feudalism, the role of capitalism is essentially more progressive as a stage preparatory to socialism. It is not a deviation or aberration from the path of human progress but a bona fide system 'working in the service of history'. It belongs to the trend line of progress, and not to the category of fluctuations about it.

In the circumstances, none can legitimately bear ill-will or hatred towards the individual capitalists. And it is difficult to see how one can take up arms against them without an intense feeling of hatred for them. Stalin's dictum that 'it is impossible to defeat the enemy without learning to hate him with all our soul' reveals profound psychological insight, so far of course as the mass of the people are concerned. Only exceptional individuals, if at all, can follow the preaching and practice of Kṛṣṇa and Āli. Marx's appeal is directed to the masses and not to the steady-minded (sthita-prajña) of the Gītā, who alone are capable of the miracle of fighting without hatred.

In effect, therefore, the Marxian gospel of non-hatred envisaged above serves to cut the ground from under the feet of revolutionary violence.

92. *Capital*, I, Preface to the First German Edition, p. 10.

93. *Loc. cit.*

94. Lenin, 'Marx on the American "Clean Redistribution"' (1905), *MEM*, p. 172.

CHAPTER IX

Class-Neutral Dimensions of Class-Culture

Marx maintains that successful socialist revolution is normally followed by a gradually supervening state of classlessness. In the present chapter we are going to demonstrate that, according to him, seeds of classlessness are already sown in class-society.

According to Marx and Engels, religion and philosophy, art and literature, are in the nature of ideology, of false consciousness. As ruling ideas they serve the interests of the ruling class, overtly or covertly. Their value and validity are restricted to the particular epoch responsible for their hey-day. They are the mouthpiece of their own socio-cultural formation or rather the class dominating it. Howsoever trans-epochal, inter-epochal, or universal they proclaim themselves to be, in intent and content, they remain wedded to the epoch to which they belong, to the exclusion of other epochs, to which they often prove to be in the nature of an encumbrance. The epoch often tells a lie through them. 'Just as', says Marx, 'one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge' an epoch 'by its consciousness'.¹ In a forthright denunciation of the historians who

1. *CCPE*, Preface, p. 21.

'take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true', he sardonically remarks, 'whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not won even this trivial insight.'² Thus, Marx seemingly binds all compartments of culture down tightly to the socio-economic formation of society to which they belong, with the result that they are bereft of all universality popularly ascribed to them.

Now, if such is the case, the bulk of the classics should not have any appeal for us. Centuries ago, we had bullock-carts where we have railway trains. Now the days of bullock-carts are practically past, and they retain little importance for us. The same should be the fate of the literature of the bullock-cart age. But somehow this is not the case. We have lost all interest in bullock-carts, but the classics of the bullock-cart age retain their lustre for us even in this railway-train age. They tend to whet our interest sometimes to such an extent that we are led to adjudge them in many respects superior to the authors and works of our own age. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* defines a classic as an 'author who has tholed the assize of the centuries or even...one who in his own time is classed with those who have.' Marx was all for study of the classics. In criticism of Dietzgen, the tanner-thinker, he remarks, 'It is his hard luck that precisely Hegel he did not study.'³ Marx was a voracious reader of the classics. He had Heine and Goethe by heart. He had a plan to produce a whole volume on Balzac but was not fortunate enough to see it through. If all literature is class-literature, how can its appeal transcend the barriers of its own class or culture? The class and culture responsible for the emergence of Kālidāsa and Shakespeare are buried within the folds of oblivion but Kālidāsa and Shakespeare themselves command a world of appeal for us even today.

A closer scrutiny of the writings of Marx and Engels would reveal that they repudiate the idea of absolute distinctions between things. According to Engels, 'such metaphysical polar opposites exist in the real world only during crises, while the whole vast process goes on in the form of interaction...here everything is relative and nothing absolute....'⁴ So, there is an unbridged gulf between classes only during crises. Classes are not species or subspecies biologically determined. The individual in class society is first a

2. *GI*, p. 64.

3. Marx's letter to Engels, dated November 7, 1868, *SC*, p. 262.

4. Engels' letter to Conrad Schmidt, dated October 27, 1890, *S.W.*, II, p. 450. Also see *SC*, p. 507.

human individual and then a class individual. His individuality or personality can never be gobbled up as a whole by the class to which he happens to belong. The human person can ill afford to be exhausted by class relations, which can partially represent him. Marx himself describes the phenomenon of such a division within the life of the individual supervenient upon the division of society into classes, in these words: 'But in the course of historical evolution, and precisely through the inevitable fact that within the division of labour social relationships take on an independent existence there appears a division within the life of each individual, insofar as it is personal and insofar as it is determined by some branch of labour and the conditions pertaining to it.'⁵ Elsewhere he describes human essence as 'the ensemble of the social relations.'⁶ and not of class-relations only. While criticizing Bentham for his utilitarianism, he distinguishes between human nature in general and human nature as modified in each historical epoch, in these words: 'To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog-nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticize all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch. Bentham makes short work of it. With the driest naïvete, he takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal man.'⁷

Class-nature does, according to Marx, weigh heavily upon human nature, but it is equally true that the latter often asserts itself against the former. That is why people are, on occasion, found behaving against their class-interests, even knowingly. Classes are not watertight compartments. Total class-conditioning is seldom a fact. Adjudging Lassalle's proposition that 'in relation to the working class all other classes are only one reactionary mass' to be 'historically false', Engels contends, 'This proposition is true only in a few exceptional cases: for instance, in a revolution of the proletariat, like the Commune, or in a country where not only the bourgeoisie has moulded state and society in its own image but where in its wake the democratic petty bourgeoisie, too, has already carried out this remoulding down to its final consequences.'⁸ Elsewhere Marx and Engels aver that 'the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution, the communist consciousness, ... may, of

5. *GI*, p. 95.

6. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', Thesis VI, *S.W.*, II, p. 366; *GI*, pp. 660, 666.

7. Marx, *Capital*, I, p. 609, f.n. 2.

8. Engels' letter to Bebel, dated March 18-28, 1875, *SC*, p. 353. Cp. *CGP*, p. 24.

course, arise among the other classes too through the contemplation of the situation of' the working class.⁹ They visualize the capacity of 'the bourgeois ideologists' to raise themselves 'to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole' and to go over to the proletariat.¹⁰ Here there is a clear recognition of the fact of class-deconditioning of part of the bourgeoisie. Engels narrates in detail how Balzac, who is politically a legitimist and whose 'sympathies are with the class that is doomed to extinction', goes 'against his own class sympathies and political prejudices' in his satires and ironies.¹¹

In fact, class-relations are, essentially, economic relations, and, according to Marx, man produces according not only to the laws of economics but also to the laws of beauty.¹²

The writings of Marx and Engels contain indications that our age is marked by the culmination of the process of polarization of classes, which is why it is going to yield place to a classless age, thanks to the law of the transformation of quantity into quality. They complain, for example, that the bourgeoisie 'has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash-payment" and has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations.'¹³ It implies that in pre-bourgeoisie class-societies human relations were much more a reality than today and that the gulfs between the classes were not so yawning as today. Engels admits that 'The possibility of purely human sentiments in our intercourse with other human beings has nowadays been sufficiently curtailed by the society in which we must live, which is based upon class antagonism and class rule.'¹⁴

What Marx calls human essence is believed to be clouded in class-society. It is not destroyed but becomes dormant and can be awakened by saints and philosophers, artists and litterateurs. Art and literature spring from the wild and anarchic side of human nature, which refuses to be subdued by class-interests. Karl Mannheim's dictum that intellectuals are 'relatively a classless stratum' appears to contain enough truth.¹⁵

9. *GI*, p. 86.

10. *CM*, p. 42.

11. Engels' letter to Margaret Harkness, dated beginning of April 1888, *SC*, p. 480.

12. *EPM*, p. 76.

13. *CM*, p. 35.

14. *LF*, p. 344.

15. Bertrand Russell, *Roads to Freedom* (10th impression, London : George Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 177.

Dialectically speaking, even class-literature and class-philosophy may be said to contain classless or class-neutral elements. In classless society, such literature and philosophy will be both abolished and preserved. The process of thesis-antithesis is not totally negative. Synthesis synthetizes thesis and antithesis, it does not totally negate or discard them. Which means that thesis and antithesis contain some abiding elements which are preserved. And such elements are bound to be classless or class-neutral. Engels illustrates the process in these words: 'The old materialism was therefore negated by idealism. But in the course of the further development of philosophy, idealism too became untenable and was negated by modern materialism. The modern materialism, the negation of the negation, is not the mere re-establishment of the old, but adds to the permanent foundations of this old materialism the whole thought-content of two thousand years of development of philosophy and natural science, as well as of the history of these two thousand years....Philosophy is therefore "sublated" here, that is, both overcome and preserved'; overcome as regards its form, and preserved as regards its real content.¹⁶

Engels analyzes philosophical activity into the enduring and progressive part on the one hand and the transitory and reactionary part that is the system on the other and deals a rebuff to one who does not give due weight to the former, in these words: A man who judges every philosopher not by the enduring and progressive part of his activity but by what is necessarily transitory and reactionary—by the system—would have done better to remain silent.¹⁷ This statement implies that all is not class-conditioned and that there is much that is class-neutral. Engels calls the conception of the world of ancient Greek philosophy primitive, naive, but intrinsically correct,¹⁸ which can be explained and justified only on the assumption of a classless stratum in ancient Greek thought.

But Engels poses a formidable problem for us, even at the risk of self-contradiction. He writes that 'morality was always a class-morality.'¹⁹ In this connexion, he raises an interesting question: 'But all the same, someone may object, good is not bad and bad is not good: if good is confused with bad there is an end to all morality, and everyone can do and leave undone whatever he cares.'²⁰ The reply proposed by Engels to this question has been

16. AD, p. 192.

17. Engels' letter to Conrad Schmidt, dated July 1, 1891.

18. AD, p. 33.

19. AD, p. 132.

20. AD, p. 131.

grossly misunderstood by his critics. He says: 'But the matter cannot be so simply disposed of. If it were such an easy business there would certainly be no dispute at all over good and evil; everyone would know what was good and what was bad. But how do things stand today? What morality is preached to us today? There is first Christian-feudal morality, inherited from earlier religious times; and this is divided, essentially into a Catholic and a Protestant morality, each of which has no lack of subdivisions.... Alongside these we find the modern-bourgeois-morality and beside it also the proletarian morality of the future, so that in the most advanced European countries alone the past, present and future provide three great groups of moral theories which are in force simultaneously and alongside each other. Which, then, is the true one? Not one of them in the sense of absolute finality; but certainly that morality contains the maximum elements promising permanence which, in the present, represents the overthrow of the present, represents the future, and that is proletarian morality.'²¹ Engels purports to say that the simple, elementary, and fundamental notions of good and bad are unchallengeable and beyond dispute. But the matter is not so simple. To find out what is good and what is bad is a hard nut to crack. Here we have to deal with what is called organized morality. When Engels rules that all morality is class-morality, what he has in mind is organized morality and not the afore-said elementary notions. The fabric of organized morality is built upon the foundation of these notions. In the process, however, they often undergo distortion and even mutilation, sometimes to such an extent that they lose their essence and significance altogether. The less the distortion, the higher and the more lasting the morality. When Engels affirms that the proletarian morality contains durable elements more than any other morality, he means to suggest that the fundamental moral notions are less exposed to distortion in the former. The bourgeois morality is born to serve narrow class-interests, hence the danger of distortion is greater in its case. The proletarian morality is less organized and is in the nature of an after-effect or reaction to the bourgeois morality, so it is less liable to distortion and is more humanistic. Marx and Engels have taken pains to bring it home to us that the proletariat cannot be said to be a class in the ordinary sense of the word. The proletariat has no longer any particular class interest to assert itself against the ruling class.'²² It no longer counts as a class in society, is not recognised as a class, and is in itself the expression of the dissolution of all classes, nationalities, etc

21. *Loc. cit.*

22. *GI*, p. 94

within present society'.²³ Besides, it is quite in the interest of the proletariat to fight for emancipation with the ostensible object of emancipating the society. Its struggle... has now reached a state where the exploited and the oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppresses it (the bourgeoisie), without at the same time ever freeing the whole of society from exploitation, oppression and class struggle.²⁴

As a matter of fact, Engels acknowledges unequivocally that even class-morality is capable of contributing its mite to human, universal morality. 'That in this process there has on the whole been progress in morality, as in all other branches of human knowledge, no one will doubt', he asserts.²⁵ It is noteworthy that here progress is acknowledged not only in morality but in all other branches of knowledge as well.

In the foregoing context, Marx's exhortation 'to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations',²⁶ is quite understandable.

So, Marx and Engels are fundamentalists in outlook, in the sense that they regard the fundamental truths and perceptions of philosophy, morals, and literature as of permanent value and class-neutral, more or less. Class-conditioning comes into the picture in institutionalized philosophies, morals, and literature. If the fundamental truths are given their due, it is possible to apply morality even in the sphere of international affairs, by discounting class-elements involved in such philosophies etc. In this matter, they are relativists only in a restricted sense, and that, too, only in the praxiological sphere. Their relative is not antithetical to but constitutive of the absolute. Explaining the position of Marx and Engels vis-à-vis this issue, Lenin writes: 'Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum total of relative truths. Each step in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge. "Absolute truth", says Dietzgen in his *Streifzugen eines Sozialisten*, "can be seen, heard, smelt,

23. *GI*, p. 87.

24. *CM*, Engels' Preface to the 1883 German ed., p. 24.

25. *AD*, p. 133.

26. Marx, 'Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association', *S.W.*, I, p. 349.

touched and, of course, also be known; but it is not entirely absorbed (*geht nicht auf*) into knowledge".²⁷ In a certain novel by Anatole France, the Satan remarks that the colour of the absolute truth is white, in that it is composed of the admixture of all the colours.

To be sure, Marx would be the last to countenance a mechanical relation between class and ideas. It is true that, according to him, superstructure is conditioned by substructure, in the last analysis, but only in the last analysis. Otherwise, the former plays an active role also. Once it has come into being, it is led to making a declaration of independence sooner or later, as also to conditioning its own substructure. Engels has to admit that almost every ideology succeeds in emancipating itself from its socio-economic moorings, more or less, and comes to develop its own code of conduct to govern itself autonomously, in the course of its career. And the farther the ideology is from its socio-economic basis the more is it independent thereof. We have documented all this in a previous chapter.

We have seen that Marx holds man to be creative according to the laws not only of economics but also of beauty. He exhorts the writer to treat the latter's writings not as a mere means to some end but ends in themselves. 'The writer', he contends, 'in no way regards his works as a *means*. They are ends in themselves; so little are they a means for him and others that, when necessary, he sacrifices *his* existence to *theirs*, and, like the preacher of religion, he takes his principle: "Obey God more than men", men among whom he is himself included along with his human needs and desires."²⁸ Here there is a clear recognition of the class-neutral character of great writings.

As a matter of fact, individual ideas or works of art and literature seldom admit of economic interpretation; only an epochal philosophy, art, or literature does, to some extent or other. Marx lays some claim to interpreting in his own way not individual trends and tendencies but historical trends and tendencies. We have seen Engels maintain that the longer the period considered and the wider the field dealt with the more economically determined will the philosophy, art, and literature transpire to be.²⁹ Indeed, Marx seeks to interpret not philosophy, art, or literature as such but ages of philosophy, art, and literature.

27. *MEC*, pp. 133-134.

28. 'Debate on the Freedom of Press', *Literature and Art*: Karl Marx and Frederiek Engels: Selections from their Writings (Bombay: Current Book House, 1958), p. 55.

29. Engels' letter to Starkenburg, dated January 25, 1894, *SC*, p. 550; *S.W.*, II, pp. 458-459.

Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, Marx's statement on the unequal development of material production on one hand and art and literature (for example) on the other no longer remains so paradoxical to us as it has been to many. He draws our attention to the disproportion between art and its socio-economic basis saying that 'some of its [art's] peaks by no means correspond to the general development of society; nor do they therefore to the material substructure, the skeleton as it were of its organisation.' Not only this, 'certain important creations within the compass of art are only possible at an early stage in the development of art.' He contends that it is not difficult to understand 'how Greek art and epic poetry are associated with certain forms of social development.' What is really difficult to understand is the fact 'that they still give us aesthetic pleasure and are in certain respects regarded as a standard and unattainable ideal.'³⁰

According to our interpretation of Marx as recognizing class-neutral elements even in class-culture, the difficulty posed above is far from insurmountable. Class-neutral elements are timeless and have a permanent appeal. Since they are not bound by any particular epoch and are primarily the outcome of insight or genius, they may in certain respects be unrepeatable, shining by their own light as a fixed star, imparting light to the posterity. That is why they appear 'as a standard and unattainable ideal'.

But, after raising the difficulty, Marx tries to explain the charm which the Greek art has for us, as a consequence of 'the immature stage of the society in which it originated' and 'as inseparably linked with the fact that the immature social conditions which gave rise, and which alone could give rise, to this art cannot recur.'³¹ He argues like this: 'An adult cannot become a child again, or he becomes childish. But does the naivete of the child not give him pleasure, and does not he himself endeavour to reproduce the child's veracity on a higher level? Does not the child in every epoch represent the character of the period in its natural veracity? Why should not the historical childhood of humanity, where it attained its most beautiful form, exert an eternal charm because it is a stage that will never recur? There are rude children and precocious children. Many of the ancient peoples belong to this category. The Greeks were normal children.'³²

This argumentation may or may not carry conviction, but it has nothing to do with the question why the Greek art and epic poetry 'are in certain res-

30. *CCPE*, pp. 215-217; *Grundrisse*, pp. 109-111 (with slight variation).

31. *CCPE*, p. 217; *Grundrisse*, p. 111 (with slight variation).

32. *Loc. cit.*; *loc. cit.* (with slight variation).

pects regarded as a standard and unattainable ideal'. In fact, Marx could not give thought to this question at all. We think some justice is done to it by our foregoing interpretation of Marx.

In fact, Marx's own explanation of the charm which Greek art and epic poetry have for us does not take us far enough. Marx would, to our way of thinking, have been quite true to the spirit of his own philosophy if he had argued that the charm is due not only to our awareness of the impossibility of their recurrence, nor even to their creators' being precocious children, but also, rather more, to the permanent, penetrating, and class- and age-transcending insights that have gone into the making of such art and poetry.

As we have already noticed, the process of class-stratification culminates in crises or capitalism. In fact, even in the England of his times, notes Marx, 'where modern society is indisputably most highly and classically developed in economic structure', 'the stratification of classes does not appear in its pure form. Middle and intermediate strata even here obliterate lines of demarcation everywhere (although incomparably less in rural districts than in the cities)'.³³ The farther we travel back in time the less class-stratification comes to view. So, pre-capitalist philosophy, art, and literature are less class-bound or class-conditioned than capitalist. This is a half-truth, however. If today class-consciousness is on the wax, which, too, may be questionable, however, consciousness of such consciousness, self-consciousness of the classes, is on the wax also. That is to say, man is becoming increasingly aware of the bearing of class-interests on intellectual culture. And this awareness on the part of the writer helps emancipate him from the shackles of class-considerations to a considerable extent. Besides, dialectically speaking, class-consciousness is generating its own antithesis, viz. the demand for its total abolition, which acts as a neutralizing agent. After all, it is capitalism which is responsible for the birth of Marx. Indeed, thanks to psycho-analysis, individual as well as collective/social, we are today in a uniquely privileged position to detect, disabuse ourselves of, and discount class-prejudices and thereby have the way for class-neutral philosophy, art, and literature, and, in the long run, for evolution of classless culture. One who knows rationalization can conquer rationalization, and one who detects class-prejudices can conquer class-prejudices. Insight has a veritable cathartic function. That is why the intellectual belongs to the relatively classless stratum of society.

33. *Capital*, III, p. 885.

CHAPTER X

Paradise Lost: The Human Alienation

Marx and Engels are protagonists of the idea of progress in their own way. In the preceding chapter, we have seen Engels maintain that there has been progress in morality. His fundamental point is that 'all successive historical systems are only transitory stages in the endless course of development of human society from the lower to the higher.' History is 'an endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher.'¹ Marx designates 'the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production' as 'epochs marking progress in the economic development of society.'²

Marx and Engels write as if their list of the main epochs of society were exhaustive, with the addition of the socialist-communist-transcommunist finale. We have seen Engels claim to deduce the advent of socialism from the existing bourgeois social conditions, with mathematical precision, for, as Marx would have it, bourgeois society is itself pregnant with the new society. It goes without saying, therefore, that in the Marxian list of the epochs it is

1. *LF*, p. 328.

2. *CCPE*, Preface, p. 21.

difficult to accommodate the epoch of Nazism and Fascism which has passed before our own eyes. Lenin's argument that Nazism and Fascism represent merely the highest stage of imperialism sounds little better than a case of special pleading. It does not of course appear to be so difficult to account, on the Marxian view, for the nascent managerial society envisioned by James Burnham, as crude socialism, if such a phenomenon is a fact. Any way, if Marx's list of the epochs is not so exhaustive, his theory of progress does not seem to suffer much thereby.

Another question that arises on the Marxian thesis of historical evolution is, Is the course of evolution traced by Marx necessary or contingent? In other words, Was it or was it not within the realm of possibility for the course of evolution to proceed along a different line? Certain remarks of Engels seem to suggest that the course of evolution is necessary. 'Each stage is necessary', he observes.³ A deeper probe into the writings of Marx and Engels will reveal a different picture. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, alternative courses of evolution are quite possible in the scheme of things, on the Marxian view. Originally, it is true, Marx and Engels looked forward to the outbreak of the proletarian revolution in Germany, France, England, Great Britain, and America, guided by the thought that such a situation can supervene only where capitalism has grown to ripeness and the full sum of its possibilities has been exhausted. They thought that the order of the successive stages through which society has passed was unchangeable and irreversible, that society cannot overleap the natural phases of its evolution, and that it can, at best, only shorten and lessen its birth-pangs. Engels once ruled out the possibility of a proletarian revolution in Russia till such a revolution is successfully carried out in the West, even though he had no doubt that Russia was on the eve of a social revolution. Marx had a similar perception: 'Russia...has long been standing on the threshold of an upheaval; all the elements of it are prepared.'⁴ In 1884, Engels expected an impulse of revolution from Russia,⁵ and in 1885 thought 'The revolution *must* break out there in a limited period of time; it *may* break out any day.... the country is like a charged mine which only needs a match to be applied to it.'⁶ He regarded the Russian situation as 'one of the exceptional cases where it is possible for a handful of people to *make* a revolution, i. e., with one

3. *LF*, p. 328.

4. Marx's letter to F. A. Sorge, dated September 27, 1877, *SC*, p. 374.

5. Engels' letter to A. Bebel, dated December 11, 1884, *SC*, p. 457.

6. Engels' letter to V. I. Zasulich, dated April 23, 1895, *SC*, p. 459.

little push to cause a whole system...to come crashing down, and thus by an action in itself insignificant to release explosive forces that afterwards become uncontrollable.'⁷ Marx cites the instance of Rome which failed to usher in an era of capitalism despite favouring conditions. It came, in course of time, to develop big landed property and big money capital on one hand and the class of 'free men, stripped of everything except their labour power'. But what happened? 'The Roman proletarians became not wage labourers but a *mob* of do-nothings more abject than the former "poor whites" in the South of the United States, and alongside of them there developed a mode of production which was not capitalist but based on slavery. Thus events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historical surroundings led to totally different results.'⁸ Marx hastens to add, therefore, that 'By studying each of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by using as one's master key a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical.'⁹ Indeed, confesses Engels, 'as to what social and political phases these countries will have to pass through before they likewise arrive at socialist organization, I think we today can advance only rather idle hypotheses.'¹⁰

In a previous chapter, we have also seen Marx and Engels confess that their 'whole interpretation of history appears to be contradicted by the fact of conquest.'¹¹ They refer to 'the destruction of an old civilization by a barbarous people and the resulting formation of an entirely new organisation of society. (Rome and the barbarians; feudalism and Gaul; the Byzantine Empire and the Turks.)'¹² On another occasion, they take up the case of 'countries which, like North America, begin in an already advanced historical epoch,' wherein 'the development proceeds very rapidly....Thus they begin with the most advanced individuals of the old countries, and, therefore, with the correspondingly most advanced form of intercourse, before this form of intercourse has been able to establish itself in the old countries. This is the case with all colonies, insofar as they are not mere military or trading stations. Carthage, the Greek colonies, and Iceland in the eleventh and

7. *Loc. cit.*

8. Marx's letter to the Editorial Board of the 'Otechestvenniya Zapiski', dated November 1877, *SC*, p. 379.

9. *Loc. cit.*

10. Engels' letter to Karl Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, *SC*, p. 423.

11. *GI*, p. 34.

12. *Loc. cit.*

twelfth centuries, provide examples of this.¹³ Elsewhere, Marx note the difference made to the process of evolution by capitals invested in colonies,¹⁴ which we have already adverted to on an earlier occasion. Now, resuming the thread of the argument broken by the preceding sentence, Marx and Engels observe: 'A similar relationship issues from conquest, when a form of intercourse which has evolved on another soil is brought over complete to the conquered country: whereas in its home it was still encumbered with interests and relationships left over from earlier periods, here it can and must be established completely and without hindrance. . . . (England and Naples after the Norman conquest, when they received the most perfect form of feudal organisation).'¹⁵ Engels recurs to the role of conquest in history with a more candid avowal of its destructivity: 'Then there is also the case of the conquest and brutal destruction of economic resources, by which, in certain circumstances, a whole local or national economic development could formerly be ruined.'¹⁵ Outlining the 'role played in history by force as contrasted with economic development,' he visualizes the possibility of economic development succumbing to it. This happens generally in the case of conquest, 'in which the more barbarian conquerors exterminated or drove out the population of a country and laid waste or allowed to go to ruin productive forces which they did not know how to use. This was what the Christians in Moorish Spain did with the major part of the irrigation works on which the highly-developed agriculture and horticulture of the Moors depended!' Engels' conclusion is: 'Every conquest by a more barbarian people disturbs of course the economic development and destroys numerous productive forces.'¹⁷

Indeed, Marx cautions the reader that his 'concept of progress is on the whole not to be understood in the usual abstract form.'¹⁸ Engels warns that it should not 'serve as an excuse for not studying history.'¹¹ Instead of hurrying' to get their own relatively scanty historical knowledge...constructed into a neat system as quickly as possible,'²⁰ 'All history must be studied afresh, the conditions of existence of the different formations of society must be examined individually.'²¹ Engels goes to the extent of acknowledging

13. *GI*, p. 91.

14. *Capital*, III, pp. 238-239.

15. *GI*, p. 91.

16. Engels' letter to C. Schmidt, dated October 27, 1890, *SC*, p. 504.

17. *AD*, pp. 253-254.

18. *CCPE*, Appendices: Introduction, p. 215

19. Engels' letter to C. Schmidt, dated August 5, 1890, *SC*, p. 496.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 497.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 496-497.

that 'our conception of history is above all a guide to study, not a lever for construction after the manner of the Hegelian.'²²

Marx is not a believer in the linear theory of progress as commonly understood. He would be the last to admit that the path of progress is rectilinear. Engels chides one Maurer for 'his enlightened prejudice that since the dark Middle Ages a steady progress to a better state of things *must* surely have taken place' and invites him to see 'not only the antagonistic character of real progress but also the individual retrogressions.'²³ Marx asserts that 'In spite of "progress's" pretensions, continued *retrogressions* and *circular movements* are to be observed.'²⁴

Lenin is inclined to view the dialectical development as 'a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line;—a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolution;—"breaks in continuity"; the transformation of quantity into quality.'²⁵ Believe it or not, Engels is found countenancing a veritable cyclical view of history more than once. According to him, nature 'does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historical evolution.'²⁶ He observes later, that, 'even if nature, as a whole, must still be said to move in recurrent cycles, these cycles assume infinitely larger dimensions.'²⁷ Later, however, he seems to be fully converted to the cyclical conception of history. Quoting approvingly J. W. Draper's remark, 'The multiplicity of worlds in infinite space leads to the conception of a succession of worlds in infinite time,'²⁸ he contends that 'the eternally repeated succession of worlds in infinite time is only the logical complement to the co-existence of innumerable worlds in infinite space.'²⁹ He then proceeds to expand upon the idea at some length: 'It is an eternal cycle in which matter moves, a cycle that certainly only completes its orbit in periods of time for which our terrestrial year is no adequate measure, a cycle in which the time of highest development, the time of organic life and still more that of the life of beings conscious of nature and of themselves, is just as narrowly restricted as the space in which life and self-consciousness come into

22. *Ibid.*, p. 496.

23. Engels' letter to Marx, dated December 15, 1882, *SG*, p. 428.

24. *HF*, pp. 112-113.

25. Lenin, Karl Marx' (1914), *MEM*, p. 25.

26. *AD*, p. 36; *SUS*, p. 121.

27. *AD*, p. 40; *SUS*, p. 123.

28. J. W. Draper, *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe*, Vol. 2, p. 325, quoted in *DN*, p. 53.

29. *DN*, p. 53; *S. W.*, II, p. 72.

operation; a cycle in which every finite mode of existence of matter, whether it be sun or nebular vapour, single animal or genus of animals, chemical combination or dissociation, is equally transient, and wherein nothing is eternal but eternally changing, eternally moving matter and the laws according to which it moves and changes. But however often, and however relentlessly, this cycle is completed in time and space; however many millions of suns and earth may arise and pass away, however long it may last before, in one solar system and only on *one* planet, the conditions for organic life develop; however innumerable the organic beings, too, that have to arise and to pass away before animals with a brain capable of thought are developed from their midst, and for a short span of time find conditions suitable for life, only to be exterminated later without mercy—we have the certainty that matter remains eternally the same in all its transformations, that none of its attributes can ever be lost, and therefore, also, that with the same iron necessity that it will exterminate on the earth its highest creation, the thinking mind, it must somewhere else and at another time again produce it.³⁰

But it may be contended that the spirals and cycles are within the lines, rather than the other way round. Stalin's understanding of the Marxian position is that the process of development is to be regarded 'not as movement in a circle, not as a simple repetition of what has already occurred, but as an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher.'³¹ It appears that, the question of contradiction posed by Engels' cyclical view of history apart, the substantive Marxian hypothesis or hyperthesis is threefold: (1) that the delineation of the successive stages of society from primitive communism to transcommunism is limited in scope: it has Western Europe as the field of its applicability; (2) that the path of evolution of other societies may well be different; and (3) that, all the same, history's goal is clear, which is establishment of the Millennium, upto which a not-uniformly-straight line but yet a line can be drawn from the stage of primitive communism onwards.

To sum up the result of the foregoing considerations, the process of evolution/progress sketched by Marx is neither a unilinear, rectilinear, or cyclical process in the ordinary sense of the terms but a multilinear process consisting of rectilinear, curvilinear, as well as cyclical sub-processes, with the reservation, however, that all the lines of the process converge in the long run

30. *DN*, p. 54; *S.W.*, II, p. 72.

31. Stalin, *Philosophy of Marxism*, p. 5.

towards a definite goal called the communist or rather transcommunist millennium. So, ultimately, Marx remains a meliorist of the staunchest kind.

So, our finding is that Marx and Engels are protagonists of the idea of progress with a difference. The difference is thrown into bolder relief by the fact that, as critics of civilization and admirers of the state of original innocence termed primitive communism, they seem to be second only to Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the one hand and the religions in general on the other. With them they appear to believe that there was a golden age of innocence represented by primitive tribal society and that civilization represents a veritable fall from that paradise, an alienation of humanity from its pristine self. Marx's kinship with Rousseau in this regard is unequivocally acknowledged by Engels, who finds in Rousseau 'not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's *Capital*, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used.'³²

Primitive tribal society was a classless society.³³ It is stateless, too. 'Everything runs smoothly without soldiers, gendarmes or police; without nobles, kings, governors, prefects or judges; without prisons; without trials. All quarrels and disputes are settled by the whole body of those concerned—the gens or the tribe or the individual gentes among themselves.'³⁴ That 'it found no place for rulers and ruled' constitutes its 'grandeur.' In this society, 'there was as yet no distinction between rights and duties; the question of whether participation in public affairs, blood revenge or atonement for injuries was a right or a duty never confronted' it.³⁵ The 'communitistic household and the gens' saw to it that there are 'no poor and needy' and that 'the aged, the sick and those disabled in war' are properly looked after. It is an ideally equalitarian society, in which 'All are free and equal—including the women.' Slavery was conspicuous by its absence. Even aliens and belligerents were not subjugated. 'When the Iroquois conquered the Eries and the "Neutral Nations" about the year 1651, they invited them to join the Confederacy as equal members....' The vanquished refused but, instead of being enslaved or killed, they were 'driven out of their territory.'³⁶

'Production', at that stage of humanity's development, 'was essentially collective, and, likewise, consumption took place by the direct distribution of

32. *AD*, p. 194.

33. Engels, 'On Social Relations in Russia' (1875); *S. W.*, II, p. 46.

34. *OFPPS*, p. 230.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 279.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

the products within larger or smaller communistic communities. . . . the producers were masters of their process of production and of their product. They knew what became of their product: they consumed it, it did not leave their hands. . . .³⁷ At that stage, production 'could not raise any strange, phantom powers against the producers, 'as is the case regularly and inevitably under civilization.'³⁸ Engels is all admiration for such a state of affairs and laments its loss at the hands of civilization. 'This was the immense advantage of barbarian production that was lost with the advent of civilization; and to win it back on the basis of the enormous control man now exercises over the forces of nature, and of the free association that is now possible, will be the task of the next generations.'³⁹

That primitive tribal society characterized by communism, be it ever so rudimentary, was an ideal society in many ways, as compared with civil society, is acknowledged by Engels in no ambiguous terms. He remarks that 'the kind of men and women that are produced by such a society is indicated by the admiration felt by all white men who came into contact with uncorrupted Indians, admiration of the personal dignity, straightforwardness, strength of character and bravery of these barbarians.'⁴⁰

Thus, primitive tribal society was a sort of paradise for Engels. It was lost by man, who had, consequently, to suffer 'a degradation, a fall from the simple moral grandeur of the ancient gentile society.' With what results? 'The lowest interests—base greed, brutal sensuality, sordid avarice, selfish plunder of common possessions—usher in the new, civilized society, class society: the most outrageous means—theft, rape, deceit and treachery—undermine and topple the old, classless, gentile society.'⁴¹ And the worst thing about the civilized society is that it, 'during all the 2500 years of its existence has never been anything but the development of the small minority at the expense of the exploited and oppressed great majority.'⁴²

According to Engels, 'the exploitation of one class by another is the basis of civilization',⁴³ which mars the progress achieved by man after his fall from the state of innocence. 'Every advance in production is at the same

37. *Ibid.*, p. 292.

38. *Loc. cit.*

39. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 231.

42. *Loc. cit.*

43. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

time a retrogression in the condition of the oppressed class, that is, of the great majority. What is a boon for the one is necessarily a bane for the other; each new emancipation of one class always means a new oppression of another class.⁴⁴ Engels also charges civilization with introducing 'conventional hypocrisy', by covering 'the ills it necessarily creates with the cloak of love, by embellishing them, or by denying their existence, through induction of ideology.'⁴⁵ Another bane of civilization pointed out by Engels is the curtailment of purely human sentiments. 'The possibility of purely human sentiments in our intercourse with other human beings has nowadays been sufficiently curtailed by the society in which we must live, which is based upon class antagonism and class rule.'⁴⁶ Marx and Engels both lament the civilizational phenomenon of the monetary nexus between man and man which is fast displacing, or rather has already displaced, in effect, all other nexūs, all other human and humane ties. 'The bourgeoisie...has put an end to all feudal, partriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors", and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment"'. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egoistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value.'⁴⁷ Not only this. 'The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe....The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.'⁴⁸

Primitive communism is a universal phenomenon, in the sense that 'every people has passed through such a state.'⁴⁹ But it could not last long, the paradise had to be lost, 'for the simple reason that class distinctions necessarily emerge out of it as the productive forces of society develop.'⁵⁰ There are three stages of barbarism through which primitive tribal society has passed: the lowest stage, the middle stage, and the upper stage. Primitive commu-

44. *Loc. cit.*

45. *Loc. cit.*

46. *LF*, p. 344.

47. *CM*, p. 35.

48. *Loc. cit.*

49. Engels, 'On Social Relations in Russia' (1875), *S. W.*, II, p. 46. Also see *Capital*, I, pp. 77-78 fn.

50. *Loc. cit.*

nism is the distinguishing feature of the lowest stage of barbarism. The middle stage is marked, on the one hand, by a form of property which the pastoral peoples had in their cattle and which tended to provide 'a surplus over and above their needs' and, on the other, by 'a division of labour between the pastoral peoples and backward tribes without herds'. The upper stage of barbarism is marked by 'a further division of labour, between agriculture and handicrafts.'⁵¹ Barbarism was replaced and succeeded by civilization which 'added a third division of labour... it created a class that took no part in production, but engaged exclusively in exchanging products—the *merchants*.'⁵² It is at this stage that 'a class of parasites arises, genuine social sycophants, who, as a reward for very insignificant real services, skim the cream off production at home and abroad.'⁵³ Defining civilization, Engels states that 'civilization is that stage of development of society at which division of labour, the resulting exchange between individuals, and commodity production, which combines the two, reach their complete unfoldment and revolutionize the whole of hitherto existing society.'⁵⁴

The phenomenon of exploitation raises its ugly head at the last, upper stage of barbarism, when slavery becomes an essential part of the social system.⁵⁵ Slavery reaches its fullest development in civilization, and with slavery 'came the first great cleavage of society into an exploiting and an exploited class.'⁵⁶ In the beginning, it was open; later, it became disguised. In fact, there 'are three great forms of servitude, characteristic of the three great epochs of civilization':⁵⁷ 'Slavery was the first form of exploitation, peculiar to the world of antiquity; it was followed by serfdom in the Middle Ages, and by wage labour in modern times.'⁵⁸

Marx and Engels paint an extremely grim and gloomy picture of the condition of the mass of workers in capitalist society, in which 'The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious.'⁵⁹ For them, it is a condition of growing

51. *OFPPS*, p. 285.

52. *Loc. cit.*

53. *Loc. cit.*

54. *Ibid.*, p. 292.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 283.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

59. *Capital*, I, p. 762.

'misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation.'⁶⁰ Capitalist society is marked by two parallel but contradictory tendencies, wealth and misery. 'Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole, i. e., on the side of the class that produces its own product in the form of capital.'⁶¹ After filling hundreds of pages with descriptions of the havoc wrought by capitalism in regard to the fate of the mass of real producers of wealth, Marx sums up the role of money and capital in these words: 'If money, according to Augier, "comes into the world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek," capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.'⁶²

A subtler effect of capitalism, already noted in part, is that it tends to turn everything, even human sentiments, into a marketable commodity and leads to total corruption. Marx observes that, in the course of society's evolution, 'there came a time when everything that men had considered as inalienable became an object of exchange, of traffic and could be alienated. This is the time when the very things which till then had been communicated, but never exchanged; given, but never sold; acquired, but never bought—virtue, love, conviction, knowledge, conscience, etc.—when everything, in short, passed into commerce. It is the time of general corruption, of universal venality, or, to speak in terms of political economy, the time when everything, moral or physical, having become a marketable value, is brought to the market to be assessed at its truest value.'⁶³

The greatest bane of capitalism is the height of the tendency of alienation and self-alienation to which the toiling millions come to be subjected and which serves to eclipse and mar the entire thrust of the progressive advance ushered in by science and technology responsible for the growth of capitalism. The worker produces wealth and earns poverty.⁶⁴ In fact, 'the wretchedness of the worker is in inverse proportion to the power and magnitude of his production.'⁶⁵ Elsewhere, Marx puts the worker's position thus: 'The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and range. The worker becomes an ever cheaper com-

60. *Ibid.*, p. 763.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 645.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 760.

63. *PP*, p. 36.

64. *EPM*, p. 28.

65. *EPM*, p. 67.

modity the more commodities he creates. With the *increasing value* of the of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the *devaluation* of the world of men.⁶⁶ Marx recurs to this theme with characteristic literary flourish again. He writes that 'the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more value he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes; the better formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the more civilized his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker; the mightier labour becomes, the more powerless becomes the worker; the more ingenious labour becomes, the duller becomes the worker and the more he becomes nature's bondsman.'⁶⁷ Again: 'labour produces for the rich wonderful things—but for the worker it produces privation. It produces palaces—but for the worker, hovels. It produces beauty—but for the worker, deformity. . . . It produces intelligence—but for the worker idiocy, cretinism'⁶⁸. Another paradox pointed out by Marx in industrial capitalism is the fact obtaining in his time that '*The most developed machinery thus forces the worker to work longer than the savage does, or than he himself did with the simplest, crudest, tools.*'⁶⁹

To sum up this state of affairs, misery is the lot of the worker in every phase of civilization. 'Thus in a declining state of society—increasing misery of the worker; in an advancing state—misery with complications; and in a fully developed state of society—static misery.'⁷⁰

According to Marx and Engels, growth of civilization up to our days has been made possible by 'the antagonism of orders, estates classes, and finally... accumulated labour and actual labour.'⁷¹ Accumulated labour is what is called capital: 'Capital is *stored-up* labour.'⁷² Under class society, especially under capitalism, it so happens that 'the object which labour produces—labour's product—confronts it as *something alien*, as a *power independent* of the producer. The product of labour is labour which has been congealed in an object, which has become material: it is the *objectification* of labour. Labour's realization is its objectification.'⁷³ In class-society 'this realization of labour

66. *EPM*, p. 69.

67. *EPM*, p. 71.

68. *Loc. cit.*

69. *Grundrisse*, pp. 708-709.

70. *EPM*, p. 26.

71. *PP*, p. 68.

72. *EPM*, p. 37.

73. *EPM*, pp. 69, 92.

74. *Loc. cit.*

appears as *loss of reality* for the workers ; objectification as *loss of the object* and *object-bondage* ; appropriation as *estrangement*, as *alienation*.⁷⁵

Thus does Marx moot his now widely discussed theory of alienation. The German original of 'alienation' is 'entausserung' (literally, dispossession) and of 'estrangement', 'entfremdung' (literally, alienation or estrangement); both borrowed from Hegel. Hegel uses the term alienation in two different senses: (1) separation, such as between the individual and society on one hand and (as 'self-alienation') between one's actual condition and essential nature; and (2) surrender.⁷⁶ Marx seems to dovetail the two senses into the single sense of 'separation through surrender', perhaps unwittingly, using the two terms indiscriminately. 'In Marx,' according to Richard Schacht, 'the separation is the *result* of the surrender; whereas in Hegel's discussion of the relation of the individual to the social substance the separation...is *overcome through* the surrender....'⁷⁷

To Marx, labour or work is a necessity, as well as an opportunity of self-realization, self-fulfilment. But labour is such only if it is internal to the worker in the sense that it should belong to his essential being; if, in his work, he has the sense of self-fulfilment and happiness; if, through his work, he develops his physical and spiritual energy; if he feels at home while working and uneasy while not working; if his work is in the nature of a voluntary, free, and spontaneous activity. On the contrary, man comes to feel alienated or estranged from his work if 'labour is *external* to the worker, i. e., it does not belong to his essential being'; if, 'in his work,...he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind', if the worker 'only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself'; if he 'is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home'; if his labour is, 'not voluntary, but coerced; it is *forced labour*'; if it is 'not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to *satisfy* needs external to it', if, 'as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague'; if 'it is not his own, but someone else's'; if his 'activity is not his spontaneous activity'; if the work involves 'the loss of his self.'⁷⁸ In an interim summing up of his idea of alienation Marx remarks: 'The *alienation* of the worker in his product means not only that

75. Hegel, *Phenomenology of the Spirit*.

76. *Ibid.*

77. Richard Schacht, *Allienation* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971), p. 83.

78. *EPM*, pp. 72-73.

his labour becomes an object, an *external* existence, but that it exists *outside him* independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him; it means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien.⁷⁹ The human individual is not only an individual but a 'social individual,'⁸⁰ a universal individual,⁸¹ or a 'species being.'⁸² 'Man is a species being,' writes Marx, 'not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species as his object... but also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a *universal* and therefore a free being.'⁸³ Marx makes out the point by means of an apt metaphor: 'The universality of man is in practice manifested precisely in the universality which makes all nature his *inorganic* body—both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life-activity. Nature is man's *inorganic* body.... Man *lives* on nature—means that nature is his body....'⁸⁴ Now, the alienation of labour pointed out above 'estranges the species from man.'⁸⁵ Thanks to the alienation, the life of the species is rendered subservient to individual life. The individual is abstracted from the species and is installed as the purpose and goal of the life of the species.⁸⁶ As a matter of fact, individual and society cannot be so separated. 'Man's individual and species life are not *different*,' the individual's life is 'an expression and confirmation of social life.'⁸⁷

The alienated worker 'sinks to the level of a commodity'⁸⁸ and 'the most wretched of commodities' at that.⁸⁹ Alternatively, the capitalist knows him 'only as a working-animal—as a beast reduced to the strictest bodily needs.'⁹⁰ The worker is allowed only as much as will enable him to work, like a horse.⁹¹ He is not considered 'when he is not working, as a human being'. Such

79. *EPM*, p. 70.

80. *Grundrisse*, p. 832, for example.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 542. Cp. *ibid.*, p. 325.

82. *EPM*, p. 74, for example.

83. *EPM*, p. 74.

84. *Loc. cit.*

85. *Loc. cit.*

86. *EPM*, p. 75.

87. *EPM*, p. 105.

88. *EPM*, p. 67.

89. *Loc. cit.*

90. *EPM*, p. 30.

91. *EPM*, p. 29.

consideration is left 'to criminal law, to doctors, to religion, to the statistical tables, to politics and to the workhouse beadle.'⁹²

In some respects, alienation has overtaken the capitalist as well. Alienation does not mean only 'that *my* means of life belong to *someone else*, that *my* desire is the inaccessible possession of *another*, but also that everything is in itself something *different* from itself—that my activity is *something else* and that, finally (and this applies also to the capitalist), all is under the sway of *inhuman* power.'⁹³ Thus, alienation becomes a universal phenomenon at long last, in some sense or other. It seems to take the form of a neurosis which overtakes society entire.

Well, the worker is alienated, under capitalism, in the product of his labour. There is another form of alienation, which manifests itself 'not only in the result but in the *act of production*—within the *producing activity* itself.' The worker is found to estrange himself from himself in the very act of production. The product is the summary of the activity of production, and, if 'the product of labour is alienation, production itself must be active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation.'⁹⁴ So, alienation of labour has two aspects: '(1) The relation of the worker to the *product of labour* as an alien object exercising power over him.' (2) 'The relation of labour to the *act of production* within the *labour* process.' Explaining the second aspect of alienation Marx observes: 'This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him; it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as emasculating, the worker's own physical and mental energy, his personal life or what is life other than activity—as an activity which is turned against him, neither depends on nor belongs to him.'⁹⁵

Hence, on one hand there is alienation or 'estrangement of the *thing*' and on the other, self-alienation or 'self-estrangement.'⁹⁶ These are the two aspects of alienation noted above.

Marx tries to deduce 'yet a third aspect of estranged *labour*' from the two just noted. As we have already seen, man, according to Marx, is a species being and all nature is his inorganic body. Alienated labour alienates

92. *EPM*, pp. 29, 85.

93. *EPM*, p. 126.

94. *EPM*, p. 72.

95. *EPM*, p. 73.

96. *Loc. cit.*

nature on one hand as well as 'himself, his own active functions, his life-activity,' on the other, from man. In doing so, alienated labour alienates the species from man, thereby turning 'the life of the species into a means of individual life. First it estranges the life of the species and individual life, and secondly it makes individual life in its abstract form the purpose of the life of the species, likewise in its abstract and estranged form.'⁹⁷

Marx's sense of universal alienation was so acute that he is led to imagine that 'man is regressing to the cave dwelling...in an estranged, malignant form.' In this respect, the alienated man is worse off than even the cave-dwelling savage. 'The savage in his cave...feels himself no more a stranger. But the cellar-dwelling of the poor man is a hostile dwelling, "an alien, restraining power which only gives itself up to it his blood and sweat"—a dwelling which he cannot look upon as his own home...but where instead he finds himself in *someone else's* house, in the house of a *stranger* who daily lies in wait for him and throws him out if he does not pay his rent.'⁹⁸

We have drawn the foregoing picture of human predicament under capitalism in dark colours borrowed, as far as possible, directly from Marx, with a view to giving a peep into the inhuman pass humanity was brought to in Marx's time as well as sampling the wrathful, humanistic indignation towards it felt by Marx, one of the greatest humanists of all time. Subsequent developments have helped render the picture less and less gloomy, however, to which, to be sure, the contribution of Marx's indignation cannot be overrated.

The foregoing description of alienation will remain incomplete without a discussion of the question whether alienation or self-alienation, estrangement or self-estrangement, is a perennial human condition, as in Hegel and the religions in general, or a condition supervenient upon a particular historical development, such as capitalism. From certain casual remarks in the *Grundrisse*, which are not very clear, one is likely to have the impression that alienation belongs to 'a specific historic stage of social development.'⁹⁹ The finding of the translator of the book is that 'alienation is conceived of [in the said work] as fundamentally a particular relation of *property*, namely involuntary sale (surrender of ownership) to a hostile Other.'¹⁰⁰ Another passage in the work may lead to the conclusion that

97. *EPM*, pp. 74-75.

98. *EPM*, p. 125.

99. *Grundrisse*, p. 832.

100. *Ibid.*, Translator's 'Foreword', p. 50.

'The worker's propertylessness, and the ownership of living labour by objectified labour, or the appropriation of alien labour by capital—both merely expressions of the same relation from opposite poles—are fundamental conditions of the bourgeois mode of production, in no way accidents irrelevant to it.'¹⁰¹ In a different passage, all labour—slave-labour, serf-labour, and wage-labour—'always appears as repulsive, always as *external forced labour*; and not-labour by contrast, as freedom, and happiness.'¹⁰² And repulsive, external, forced labour is, as we have already seen, just a synonym for alienated labour. In fact, in the very next sentence, Marx talks of a kind of 'labour which has not yet created the subjective and objective conditions for itself (or also, in contrast to the pastoral etc. state, which it has lost), in which labour becomes attractive work, the individual's self-realization.'¹⁰² Such labour is non-alienated labor. From the third and fourth quotations in the present paragraph, therefore, it is more or less evident that alienation is a fundamental condition not of the bourgeois mode of production but of the division of labour itself, dating from slavery, so that the view that alienation is fundamentally a particular relation of property stands confirmed. Bourgeois dispensation is, of course, marked by 'the most extreme form of alienation'.¹⁰³

As a matter of fact, in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx himself raises a question similar in effect, 'How is this estrangement rooted in the nature of human development? In reply, he transforms 'the question as to the *origin of private property* into the question as to the relation of *alienated labour* to the course of humanity's development.' He adds, 'For when one speaks of *private property*, one thinks of being concerned with something external to man This new formulation of the question already contains its solution.'¹⁰⁵ From this it is evident that private property and externalization or alienation go together. Indeed, a few lines later, Marx clearly describes private property 'as the material, summary expression of alienated labour.'¹⁰⁴ Elsewhere, too, private property is described as an 'expression of estranged human life.'¹⁰⁶ Again: *Private property* is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of *alienated labour*, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself.'¹⁰⁷ A few lines later, Marx observes that 'though private

101. *Ibid.*, p. 832.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 611.

103. *Grundrisse*, p. 515.

104. *EPM*, p. 82.

105. *EPM*, p. 83.

106. *EPM*, p. 103.

107. *EPM*, p. p. 80.

property appears to be the source, the cause of alienated labour, it is really its consequence Later this relationship becomes reciprocal.¹⁰⁸ Restating the point, he continues, 'Only at the very culmination of the development of private property does this, its secret, re-emerge, namely, that on the one hand it is the *product* of alienated labour, and that secondly it is the *means* by which labour alienates itself, the *realisation of this alienation*.'¹⁰⁹

These statements make the position abundantly clear and leave no room for doubt that, practically speaking, alienation and private property are co-eval and that, strictly speaking, the former precedes the latter. So, Marx's alienation is far from confined to capitalism: it was very much there in feudalism and slavery and was nascent in the upper stage of barbarism, if not in the middle stage of barbarism. Engels contends, 'Real private property began with the ancients, as with modern nations, with movable property.'¹¹⁰ Private property was absent in primitive communism and, as will transpire in the sequel, will no longer be there in communism. Hence, alienation, too, was absent in primitive communism and will no longer be there in communism.

108. *Loc. cit.*

109. *EPM*, pp. 80-81.

110. *GI*, p. 78.

CHAPTER XI

Religion: The Fool's Paradise

Marx often and Engels oftener tend to regard religion as a form of class ideology, as a means of exploitation of one class by another. One and the same religion is generally shared by both the exploiting and the exploited classes. It favours the interests of the dominant class by inculcating devotion to the established orders in the oppressed class as well as by inducing them to believe that the sufferings and inequities in store for them on account of the established order are either well merited, being the fruits of their own Karma, or divinely ordained, to be duly compensated for hereafter.

Apart from conceiving it as a form of class ideology, however, Marx regards religion as 'a product of sel-alienation', as '*alienated* human self-consciousness.'¹ Man objectifies himself into God, even as the worker objectifies his labour, his life, into the object produced by him. The worker's alienation consists in the facts that 'his labour becomes an object, an *external* existence,' that 'it exists *outside him*, independently, as something alien to him', and that 'the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as some-

1. *EPM*, p. 161.

thing hostile and alien.² Man alienates himself into God the same way. 'The more man puts into God', says Marx, 'the less he retains in himself. The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object.'³ The worker's activity is alienated from him and comes to belong to another. It 'is the loss of his self.'⁴ Likewise, 'in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates on him as an alien, divine or diabolical activity.'⁵ If the activity or product of labour is alien to the worker, to man, confronting him as an alien power, it must, so the weakling tacitly assumes, belong to the gods.⁶ And this assumption is at the root of religion and all that it implies.

Religion is '*alienated* human self-consciousness.'⁷ If, therefore, man has to regain self-consciousness, his self, he must transcend religion. This he has to do along with the positive transcendence of all other estrangement, such as family, state, law, morality.⁸

Marx regards the religious world as 'but the reflex of the real worlds,'⁹ 'as an illusion of the earthly world.'¹⁰ And the 'religious reflex of the real world' will vanish when man is in a position to normalize his 'relations with regard to his fellowmen and to Nature'¹¹, as we shall see in the sequel.

Thanks to the fact of alienation, even as man is governed in capitalist society by the products of his own hand, he is governed in religion by the products of his own brain.¹² The products used to be tribal and national gods, so far as ancient society is concerned. It was through 'a tedious process of abstraction' that the one God of theistic religions was born, as 'the concentrated quintessence of the numerous earlier tribal and national gods.'¹³

It is agreed on all hands that the origin of religion is traceable to primitive times. Engels also believes that 'Religion arose in very primitive times from

2. *EPM*, p. 70.

3. *Loc. cit.*

4. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

5. *Loc. cit.*

6. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

9. *Capital*, I, p. 79.

10. *GI*, p. 259.

11. *Capital*, I, p. 79.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 621.

13. *LF*, p. 344.

erroneous, primitive conceptions of men about their own nature and external nature surrounding them.¹⁴ And religion is a form of human alienation. So, human alienation is nothing new; its origin, too, is traceable to primitive times. This fact serves to buttress the conclusion reached by us in the preceding chapter as regards the ancientness of alienation.

Marx's thesis that religion is the reflex of the real world finds ample elaboration in his *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. He writes: 'This state, this society, produce religion, a *reversed world-consciousness*, because they are a *reversed world*. Religion is the general theory of that world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in a popular form, its spiritualistic *point d'honneur*, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn completion, its universal ground for consolation and justification. It is the *fantastic realization* of the human essence because the *human essence* has no true reality.'¹⁵ In an all the more artistic vein: 'Religion is only the illusory sun which revolves round man as long as he does not revolve round himself.'¹⁶

But to say that religion is the reflex of the real world is not to tell the whole truth. Religion is such, but much more, too: it is a protest against the misery and other imperfections of the real world. 'Religious distress', says Marx, 'is at the same time the *expression* of real distress and the *protest* against real distress. Religion is the sign of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation.'¹⁷ Religion represents a revolt from the distress of real life. When man fails in the world of fact, he erects a world of fiction to his own liking, a world of religion, a religious world. Thus does he compensate himself for his failures in life.

The passage just quoted ends with the oft-quoted dictum, 'It is the opium of the people.'¹⁸ It means that religion helps man forget his troubles and be absorbed in fantasies. One who cannot face hard, painful, and ugly fact tends to seek his refuge in enchanting fiction to the oblivion of the former, to create an illusion for himself escapistically. On this issue, Marx and Freud are at one.

Thus, so long as man is in distress, religion will be there. In such a situation, it does perform a useful function: it plays the role of a sort of

14. *LF*, p. 360.

15. *CCHPR (OR)*, pp. 41-42.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

17. *Loc. cit.*

18. *Loc. cit.*

defence-mechanism, or opium, to keep all thought of misery at bay, as also to create an illusion of happiness.

Marx is an atheist and non-believer, or rather disbeliever, in religion. But he differs from the bulk of atheists, non-believers, and disbelievers, in so far as the latter are for abolition of religion all at once, as a nuisance or nonsense, while he is for abolition of the conditions responsible for the inception of religion before planning to abolish religion itself. In fact, he is inclined to the view that, if the conditions responsible for the growth of religion are taken care of, religion will take care of itself, it will commit suicide. That is why Marx is led to write: 'The demand to give up the illusions about its condition is the *demand to give up a condition which needs illusions*. The criticism of religion is therefore *in embryo the criticism of the vale of woe*, the *halo* of which is religion.'¹⁹ This being the case, Marx would contend, 'the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the *criticism of religion* into the *criticism of right* and the *criticism of theology* into the *criticism of politics*.'²⁰ So, the end of the criticism of religion is not just to get rid of religion, leaving all else intact, but to get rid of human predicament responsible for it. 'The criticism of religion', says Marx, 'ends with the teaching that *man is the highest essence for man*, hence with the *categoric imperative to overthrow all relations* in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, despicable essence . . .'²¹ In another piece of writing, Marx reiterates his position in the words: 'We do not claim that they must transcend their religious narrowness in order to get rid of their secular limitations. We claim that they will transcend their religious narrowness once they have overcome their secular limitations. We do not turn secular questions into theological questions; we turn theological questions into secular ones.'²² To sum up, in Marx's own words: 'The struggle against religion is therefore mediately the fight against the *other world* of which religion is the spiritual aroma.'²³

As an ideology in the Marxian parlance, as we have already noted in an earlier chapter, religion 'stands furthest away from material life and seems to be most alien to it.'²⁴ It is an ideology of helplessness and suffering, holding out to us the illusory prospect of gaining heaven in return for losing the earth.

19. *Loc. cit.*

20. *Loc. cit.*

21. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

22. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question', *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, T. B. Bottomore, tr. & ed. (London: C. A. Watts & Co., 1963), p. 10.

23. *CCHPR (OR)*, p. 42.

24. *LF*, p. 360.

Engels decries all attempt to abolish religion without first abolishing the world whose reflex it is. He complains that Herr Duhring 'incites his gendarmes of the future against religion' and adds that he (Duhring) 'thereby helps it to martyrdom and a prolonged lease of life.'²⁵ Otherwise, religion is bound to die its natural death. At present, 'man proposes and God (that is, the alien domination of the capitalist mode of production) disposes. . . . And... when therefore man no longer merely proposes, but also disposes—only then will the last alien force which is still reflected in religion vanish; and with it will also vanish the religious reflection itself, for the simple reason that then there will be nothing left to reflect.'²⁶ For example, 'What is a Vulcan compared with Roberts and Co., Jupiter compared with the lightning conductor, and Hermes compared with *Crédit mobilier*? All mythology subdues, controls and fashions the forces of nature in the imagination and through imagination; it disappears therefore when real control over these forces is established.'²⁷

The various religions are, according to Marx, in the nature of various '*stages in the development of the human mind*—snake skins which have been cast off by history, and man as the snake who clothed himself in them.'²⁸ And the human snake is likely to cast off all his skins and for good in communist society which is still in the womb of the future. (The existing 'communist' societies Marx and Engels cannot be held accountable for.)

To sum up the various ways religion is sought to be described by Marx and Engels: Religion is at once a semblance and symptom of, a justification for, a protest against, and a compensation for actual human misery; a means of exploitation of the masses; a stage in the development of the human mind, to be cast off like a snake-skin by the snake that is man; and the most extreme form of human alienation, to be overcome and transcended in communist society.

We have already seen that, according to Marx and Engels, religion forms part of the cultural superstructure raised by humanity upon the base structure called socio-economic formation of society and that it is an ideology furthest removed from the base structure. Marx believes that it is 'much easier to discover by analysis the earthly core of the misty creations of religion, than,

25. AD, p. 440.

26. AD, pp. 439-440.

27. CCPE, p. 216.

28. Marx, '*On the Jewish Question*', p. 5.

conversely, it is, to develop from the actual relations of life the corresponding celestialised forms of those relations.²⁹

Despite such forthright, candid confessions of the essential secularity and earthliness of religion, such a discerning admirer and exponent of Marx as Robert C. Tucker has not been able to help being involved in a confusion. He seems to suggest that Marx rejects not 'religion' as such but only 'the traditional religions', and that he does not espouse atheism but only negates the transmundane God of traditional Western religion, which, too, 'was merely a negative way of asserting that "man should be regarded as the supreme being or ultimate concern". He adds, 'thus his atheism was a positive a religious proposition.'³⁰ He contends elsewhere that Marx's, "Atheism" was belligerent way of saying "God is man"³¹. It is all metaphor," a tortuous way of saying something which admits of being said in plain language. If humanism is a religion, Marxism is of course religion; but in no other sense.

Marx's position with regard to God is beyond dispute. He has made it abundantly clear that 'atheism, being the annulment of God, is the advent of theoretic humanism, and communism, as the annulment of private property, is the justification of real human life as man's possession and thus the advent of practical humanism...'³² With reference to Robert Owen, he maintains that 'Communism begins from the outset (Owen) with atheism.'³³

The development of science has, Marx argues, paved the way for atheism. 'The creation of the *earth* has received a mighty blow from *geogeny*—i.e., from the science which presents the formation of the earth, the coming-to-be of the earth, as a process, as self-generation. *Generatio aequivoca* [spontaneous generation] is the only practical refutation of to creation'³⁴. But who begot the human individual? His father and mother the theory of viz. two human beings. So 'even physically, man owes his existence to man.'³⁵ But, again, 'who begot

29. *Capital*, I, pp. 372-373, f. n. 3.

30. Robert C. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge: University Press, 1961), p. 22. Also see *ibid.*, p. 74.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

32. *EPM*, p. 164. Cp. Engels, 'The Condition of England: Past and Present by Thomas Carlyle, London, 1843' (1844), *Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 463; 'On the Jewish Question', *ibid.*, p. 152.

33. *EPM*, p. 103.

34. *EPM*, p. 112.

35. *EPM*, p. 113.

the first man, and nature as a whole?' Marx's answer is: 'When you ask about the creation of nature and man, you are abstracting, in so doing, from man and nature. You postulate them as *non-existent*, and yet you want me to prove to you as *existing*'. Marx adds, *inter alia*, that 'if you think of man and nature as *non-existent*, then think of yourself as non-existent, for you too are surely nature and man.'³⁵ But the questioner does not want to postulate the nothingness of nature. 'I ask you about its *genesis*, he would contend, 'just as I ask the anatomist about the formation of bones, etc.'³⁶ Marx's rejoinder is that 'since...the *entire so-called history of the world* is nothing but the begetting of man through human labour, nothing but the coming-to-be of nature for man, he has the visible, irrefutable proof of his *birth* through himself, of his *process of coming-to-be*.'³⁷ Even 'Hegel conceives labour as man's act of *self-genesis*.'³⁸

Marx's standpoint is not mere atheism, it is rather tran-atheism. He contends that 'atheism is a *negation of God*, and postulates the *existence of man* through this negation; but socialism as socialism no longer stands in any need of such a mediation. It proceeds from the *practically and theoretically sensuous consciousness* of man and of nature as the *essence*. Socialism is man's *positive self-consciousness*, no longer mediated through the annulment of religion.'³⁹

36. *Loc. cit.*

37. *EPM*, pp. 113-114.

38. *EPM*, p. 165.

39. *EPM*, p. 114.

CHAPTER XII

Paradise Regained: The Yonder Side of History

Primitive communism did, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, constitute a kind of communism, a kind of paradise, but with a radical difference: it was, in important respects, much less than communism, the successor of capitalism; than Paradise, the Millennium. The paradise lost came to be tainted by the Fall, which is unthinkable in the Paradise the Millennium. Likewise, 'class distinctions necessarily emerge out of' primitive communist society,¹ which is an impossibility in communism. That is why, Engels observes, 'It could not occur to us to re-establish this state.'² Primitive classlessness is not in the nature of a lasting value. 'Only at a certain level of development of the productive forces of society', says Engels, 'an even very high level for our modern conditions, does it become possible to raise production to such an extent that

1. Engels, 'On Social Relations in Russia', *S.W.*, II, p. 46.

2. *Loc. cit.*

the abolition of class distinctions can be a real progress, can be lasting without bringing about stagnation or even decline in the mode of social production.³ And since 'the productive forces have reached this level of development only in the hands of the bourgeoisie', the bourgeoisie 'is just as necessary a precondition of the socialist revolution as the proletariat itself.'⁴ Of course, socialism/communism will be nothing else than '*a revival, in a higher form, of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the ancient gentes.*'⁵

Marx also contends that 'It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original fullness as it is to believe that with this complete emptiness history has come to a standstill.'⁶ In another context also, bearing on the present issue, Marx observes rather more emphatically, 'An adult cannot become a child again, or he becomes childish....Does not the child in every epoch represent the character of the period in its natural veracity? Why should not the historical childhood of humanity, where it attained its most beautiful charm, exert an eternal charm because it is a stage that will never recur?'⁷ In another connexion, too, Marx states categorically, 'To perpetuate it would be, as Pecqueur rightly says, "to decree universal mediocrity." At a certain stage of development it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution.... It must be annihilated; it is annihilated'.⁸

Marx and Engels seem to have begun as believers in the humanistic ideals of the Enlightenment, in 'the original goodness and equal intellectual endowment of men, the omnipotence of experience, habit and education, and the influence of environment on man.'⁹ Besides, Engels maintains, 'The urge towards happiness is innate in man, and must therefore form the basis of all morality.'¹⁰ Despite their essentially progressive character, the later stages through which the societies of Western Europe have passed, appear to both as having exercised a corrupting influence on man. So, as also the way described earlier, all post-primitive and pre-communist culture is a kind of conditioned culture, which needs to be deconditioned for the emergence of truly human culture. And the process of deconditioning involves revolution,

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

5. *OFPPS*, p. 296.

6. *Grundrisse*, p. 162.

7. *CCPE*, p. 216.

8. *Capital*, I, p. 762.

9. *HF*, p. 175.

10. *LF*, p. 346.

apparently a complete break with the past. In this Marx shares the fervour of several important religious and secular traditions of individual and social catharsis. Plato thought of dialectic as an absolutely assumption-free discipline, shining by its own light in the true sense of the term.¹¹ R. G. Collingwood conceived philosophy on the same pattern.¹² Aristotle dealt with the value of catharsis as the end of tragedy.¹³ Freud saw the salvation of the individual in getting rid of repressions and inhibitions.¹⁴ Mādhyamika Buddhism sets cessation of all dogma, all 'ideology' (sarvadṛṣṭi-prahāṇa) as the quintessence of its philosophy called Śūnyāvāda.¹⁵ Zen follows suit in its own way.¹⁶ Yogācāra Buddhism (including the Logicians) prescribes purging the mind of the conceptual constructions as a condition precedent to the dawn of true knowledge.¹⁷ The Vedānta lays down a quadruplicity of techniques (sādhana-catuṣṭaya) for purification of the mind (citta-śuddhi).¹⁸ The highest stage of Samādhi (trance) demands freedom from all conceptual construction for its inception.¹⁹ Marx and Engels also were all for purging the mind of all ideology in their peculiar sense of what passes for rationalization.²⁰ They thought, besides, of purging society of the muck of the ages through revolutionary activity,²¹ leading ultimately to universal disalienation/liberation.

Like salvation which, according to important religious traditions, dawns of itself at a certain stage of religious discipline, as if by God's grace, communism is not an ideal to be realized by dint of human effort but 'an *ideal* to which reality (will) have to adjust itself.'²² The Marxists 'have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.'²³ The 'present society is

11. Plato, *The Republic* 533c-d.

12. R. G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), pp. 23 ff.

13. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1449 b 25-30.

14. See Sigmund Freud's works.

15. *Mādhyamaka-Śāstra* 13.8; 27.30.

16. Christmas Humphreys, *Zen Buddhism* (4th impression, London: Unwin Books, 1971), p. 26, for example.

17. *Trīṃśikā*, 20 f.

18. *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* 1.1.1.

19. *Yoga-Sūtra* 1.18.

20. *GI*, pp. 86-87; Engels' letter to C. Schmidt, dated October 27, 1890, *SC*, 505.

21. *GI*, p. 87.

22. *GI*, p. 48.

23. *CWF*, pp. 474-475.

invariably tending' to 'that higher form',²⁴ without standing in need of positive endeavour on our part. Only negative endeavour of removing the obstacles on its way will do.

Now, if there is alienation/self-alienation, estrangement/self-estrangement, there is also disalienation/transcendence of alienation, disestrangement/transcendence of estrangement. And, Marx maintains, 'The transcendence of self-estrangement follows the same course as self-estrangement.'²⁵

The chief, immediate cause of self-estrangement or self-alienation is, according to Marx, division of labour, the bane of all class-society. Contrariwise, Emile Durkheim is all praise for division of labour. 'Higher societies', he writes, 'can maintain themselves in equilibrium only if labour is divided; the attraction of like for like less and less suffices to produce this result.'²⁶ It 'becomes the chief source of moral solidarity' and 'the foundation of the moral order.'²⁷ The progress of specialization resulting therefrom tends not to cramp and trammel but to develop individual personality.²⁸ 'It is, accordingly, a real illusion which makes us believe that personality was so much more complete when the division of labour had penetrated less.'²⁹ Besides, 'the idea of human fraternity can be realized only in proportion to the division of labour.'³⁰

Unlike Durkheim's, Alexis de Tocqueville's finding is that, with the progressively increasing application of the principle of division of labour, 'the art progresses, the artist retrogresses.'³¹ Marx and Engels, envisaging the possibility of the 'all-round development of the individual', complain of the individual's being 'crippled by the division of labour at the expense of his abilities and relegated to a one-sided vocation.'³² Division of labour serves to consolidate 'what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations.'³³ It also implies that 'intellectual and material activity—

24. CWF, p. 474.

25. EPM, p. 98.

26. Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, George Simpson, tr. from the French (3rd printing, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949), p. 397.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 401.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 403.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 404.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 406.

31. *Ibid.* (1960 ed.), pp. 43-44.

32. *GI*, p. 322.

33. *GI*, p. 45.

enjoyment and labour, production and consumption—devolve on different individuals.³⁴ So, division of labour in society 'is based on the natural division of labour in the family and the separation of society into individual families opposed to one another' and results in 'the *unequal* distribution of labour and its products, hence property.'³⁵ If property is defined as 'the power of others', the slavery, howsoever latent, of wife and children to the husband 'is the first property.'³⁶ In fact, according to Marx and Engels, division of labour and private property are identical expressions.³⁷ Division of labour is a necessary characteristic of what they call 'natural society', namely, a society in which 'a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest' and in which 'activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided.'³⁸ Thanks to division of labour, 'man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him.'³⁹ This process may be described more fully thus, in Marx and Engels' own words: 'For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive affair of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood.'⁴⁰ This unenviable state of affairs has to be abolished so as to bring about what Marx and Engels call communist society, 'where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.'⁴¹

This has not happened, however, anywhere, save, to some extent, in the United States of America. We understand that it is often the case that the same person has many jobs of different kinds before he is thirty. 'College students, in particular, support themselves in a variety of ways during the

34. *Loc. cit.*

35. *GI*, p. 44.

36. *Loc. cit.*

37. *Loc. cit.*

38. *GI*, p. 45.

39. *Loc. cit.*

40. *Loc. cit.*

41. *Loc. cit.*

academic year, and then, during the summer, work in factories and freight yards, on construction jobs and in offices, doing one sort of thing one summer and another the next. Moreover, it is not at all uncommon for men with all kinds of jobs to find the time to hunt or fish occasionally, and criticism is one of the most popular American sports and undoubtedly indulged in with greater frequency and less inhibitions than in any Communist country.⁴²

Here we cannot resist the temptation of referring to V. M. Kriukov, a Soviet economist, who wrote, in an unpublished work: 'An unintelligent person and philistine might form his own picture of communism approximately as follows: You rise in the morning and ask yourself, where shall I go to work today—shall I be chief engineer at the factory or go and head the fishing brigade? Or shall I run down to Moscow and hold an urgent meeting of the presidium of the Academy of Science?' The Soviet Party-journal, *Kommunist* (No. 12, August 1960, p. 117) cites this passage with approval and comments: 'It will not be so.'⁴³ What an 'unintelligent person and philistine' Marx (as well as Engels) is'!

Well, quite in continuation of the statement in *German Ideology*, Engels contends that 'there will no longer be any professional porters or architects and...the man who for half an hour gives instructions as an architect will also act as a porter for a period, until his activity as an architect is once again required.'⁴⁴ Under capitalism, the whole of our personality is 'sacrificed to the development of one single activity. This stunning of man grows in the same measure as the division of labour.'⁴⁵ On the contrary, socialism offers 'each individual the opportunity to develop all his faculties, physical and mental, in all directions and exercise them to the full.'⁴⁶

Marx describes the 'miserable routine of endless drudgery and toil in which the same mechanical process is gone through over and over again' 'like the labour of Sisyphus',⁴⁷ at length, but is full of hope that modern industry is bound 'to replace the detail-worker of today, crippled by life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment

42. Richard Schacht, *Alienation* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971), Introductory Essay entitled 'The Inevitability of Alienation', by Walter Kaufmann, p.xl.

43. Robert C. Tücker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge: University Press, 1961), p. 197, f.n.

44. *AD*, p. 278.

45. *AD*, p. 405.

46. *AD*, p. 408.

47. *Capital*, I, p. 422.

of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers.⁴⁸ In fact, Marxism aims at the development of integrated personalities as against divided personalities in class society run by division of labour.

In class society, there is little self-activity, only labour, save for the progressively decreasing bourgeois minority. Marx and Engels aim at abolishing labour with a view to bringing self-activity into full play. Only then will 'self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off of all natural limitations.'⁴⁹ This is the process of 'transformation of labour into self-activity'⁵⁰. Self-activity is 'free activity', 'the creative manifestation of life arising from the free development of all abilities.'⁵¹ It is then that the separation of work/labour and enjoyment is annulled altogether.⁵²

It is the division of labour which is responsible for the 'exclusive concentration of artistic talent in particular individuals, and its suppression in the broad mass which is bound up with this.'⁵³ Under a different dispensation favouring equal opportunities to all to pursue art, everyone would turn out to be an excellent and even original artist. And it is what is supposed to happen in communist society. In such society, 'there disappears the subordination of the artist to local and national narrowness, which arises entirely from division of labour, and also the subordination of the artist to some definite art, thanks to which he is exclusively a painter, sculptor, etc., the very name of his activity adequately expressing the narrowness of his professional development and his dependence on division of labour. In a communist society there are no painters but at most people who engage in painting among other activities.'⁵⁴ The uniqueness of Raphael as an artist 'was determined by the technical advances in art made before him, by the organization of society and the division of labour in his locality, and, finally, by the division of labour in all the countries with which his locality had intercourse. Whether an individual like Raphael succeeds in developing his talent depends wholly on demand, which in turn depends on the division of labour and the conditions

48. *Ibid.*, p. 488.

49. *GI*, p. 85.

50. *Loc. cit.*

51. *GI*, p. 246.

52. *GI*, p. 518.

of human culture resulting from it.'⁵⁵ Likewise, 'Intelligence in production expands in one direction, because it vanishes in many others. What is lost by the detail labourers, is concentrated in the capital what employs them.'⁵⁶

Marx underlines the necessity of dispelling the 'transformation, through the division of labour, of personal powers (relationships) into material powers'⁵⁷ by 'abolishing the division of labour',⁵⁸ which 'has assumed its sharpest and most universal form' in the present epoch.⁵⁹ Today, intercourse and production forces have developed 'to such a degree of universality that private property and division of labour become fetters on them.' This development serves to create conditions favouring abolition of the division of labour. But it can be done 'only on condition of an all-round development of individuals.'⁶⁰ But why all-round development? The answer is 'because the character of intercourse and productive forces is an all-round one, and only individuals that are developing in an all-round fashion can appropriate them.'⁶¹

The Marxian dream of the abolition of division of labour and man's consequent freedom 'to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening' etc., rest on the dream of the unlimited character of commodity production under socialism. Engels remarks that 'this is no longer a fantasy, no longer a pious wish. With the present development of the production forces, the increase in production that will follow from the very fact of the socialization of the productive forces, coupled with the abolition of the barriers and disturbances, and of the waste of products and means of production, resulting from the capitalist mode of production, will suffice, with everybody doing his share of work, to reduce the time required for labour to a point which, measured by our present conceptions, will be small indeed.'⁶² Besides, suggests Marx, 'the employment of machinery does away with the necessity of crystallising this distribution after the manner of Manufacture, by the constant annexation of a particular man

53. *GI*, p. 443.

54. *Loc. cit.*

55. *GI*, p. 442.

56. *Capital*, I, p. 361.

57. *GI*, p. 93.

58. *Loc. cit.*

59. *Ibid.*, p. 494.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 495.

61. *Loc. cit.*

62. *AD*, p. 408.

to a particular function.... Lastly, the quickness with which machine work is learnt- by young people, does away with the necessity of bringing up for exclusive employment by machinery, a special class of operatives.'⁶³ To sum up the position in Marx's words: 'Modern industry, by its very nature, therefore necessitates variation of labour, fluency of function, universal mobility of labour.'⁶⁴

It must be borne in mind, however, that, when Marx commends abolition of labour, he does not mean to say that he commends abolition of all exchange between man and nature. 'So far therefore', he observes, 'as labour is a creator of use-value, is useful labour, it is a necessary condition, independent of all forms of society, for the existence of the human race; it is an eternal nature-imposed necessity, without which there can be no material exchange between man and Nature, and therefore no life.'⁶⁵ In fact, he was out to found 'a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labour-power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour-power of the community.'⁶⁶ It is true that, 'in its historic forms as slave-labour, serf-labour, and wage-labour, labour always appears as repulsive, always as *external forced labour*; and not-labour, by contrast, as "freedom, and happiness".'⁶⁷ But, when under the new dispensation labour becomes self-activity, 'labour becomes attractive work, the individual's self-realization.'⁶⁸ Free labour, self-labour, 'Really free working, e.g. composing, is at the same time precisely the most damned seriousness, the most intense exertion.'⁶⁹ It does not mean, however, Marx cautions, 'that it becomes mere fun, mere amusement, as Fourier...conceives it.'⁷⁰ Marx does not, it is true, reduce the status of man to that of *homo economicus* or *homo laborans*. Far from it. Labour is essentially an outlet for his self-expression, is essentially a liberating force; although, in class society, it has all along been an instrument of self-alienation, a binding force. Engels highlights the decisive part played by labour in the transition from ape to man the liberated animal, capable of self-expression. 'First labour, after it and then with it speech—these were the most essential stimuli under the

63. *Capital*, I, 421.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 487.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

67. *Grundrisse*, p. 611.

68. *Loc. cit.*

69. *Loc. cit.*

70. *Loc. cit.*; *ibid.*, p. 712 also, in effect.

influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man.⁷¹ The origin of speech, too, is 'from and with labour', says Engels.⁷² Man cannot live without working, without labouring, not only for achieving something but also for the very pleasure of it. Man is a dynamic being, and cannot rest satisfied without constantly changing his conditions through work, through labour. Political economy is primarily intended to aid and finance, so to speak, the self-expression of all without causing self-alienation on the part of any, although in class society it forces the toiling majority to mortgage its birthright of self-fulfilment to the bourgeoisie.

Marx takes pains to delineate the process of human self-affirmation, self-realization, and disalienation under communist dispensation, which transforms labour into the individual's self-activity, activity undertaken by him in response to the demand of his own nature untrammelled by unwelcome factors. He maintains that, in such a scheme of things, 'In my *production* I would have objectified my *individuality*, its *specific character*, and therefore, enjoyed not only an individual *manifestation of my life* during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be *objective, visible to the senses* and hence a power *beyond all doubt*.' Secondly, 'In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the *direct* enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a *human* need by my work, that is, of having objectified *man's* essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another *man's* essential nature.' Thirdly, I would have had the satisfaction of being recognized and felt by you 'as a completion of your own essential nature' and consequently occupying your thought and winning your love and affection. And, lastly, 'in my individual activity I would have directly *confirmed* and *realized* my true nature, my *human* nature, my *communal nature*.'⁷³ Poetically stated, 'Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature.'⁷⁴ In class society, 'my work is an alienation of life, for I work *in order to live*, in order to obtain for myself the *means* of life. My work is *not* my life. . . . it is only a *forced* activity and one imposed on me only through an *external* fortuitous need, *not* through an *inner, essential* one.'⁷⁵ The

71. Engels, 'Labour in the Transition from Ape into Man', S.W. II, p. 77.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

73. Marx, 'Comments on James Mill, *Éléments d'Économie Politique*' (1844), J. T. Parisot, tr., *Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 3, 1843-44 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 211-228, pp. 227-228.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

75. *Loc. cit.*

product of my labour 'appears only as the expression of my *loss of self* and of my *powerlessness* that is objective, sensuously perceptible, obvious.'⁷⁶ In the new order, 'My work would be a *free manifestation of life*, hence an *enjoyment of life*.'⁷⁷

The process of transcendence of self-estrangement or self-alienation is vividly described by Marx, as following 'the same course as self-estrangement.'⁷⁸ First, private property is taken to have labour as its essence and to exist in the form of capital which is to be annulled as such. Or unfree labour 'is conceived as the source of private property's *perniciousness*'. Finally, communism is conceived as 'the *positive* expression of annulled private property—at first as *universal* private property.'⁷⁹ The first form of communism is 'only a *generalization* and *consummation* of this relationship.'⁸⁰ In it, 'the dominion of *material* property bulks so large that it wants to destroy *everything* which is not capable of being possessed by all as *private property*.... The category of *labourer* is not done away with, but extended to all men.'⁸¹ It negates the personality of man in every sphere and is thus 'nothing but the logical expression of private property.'⁸² The community becomes 'the universal capitalist.'⁸³ This 'first positive annulment of private property—*crude* communism—is thus merely one *form* in which the vileness of private property, which wants to set itself up as the *positive community*, *comes to the surface*.'⁸⁴ The second form of communism is either 'democratic or despotic'—of a political nature still. It has grasped the concept of private property but not its positive essence.⁸⁵ The third form of communism is 'the *positive* transcendence of *private property*, as *human self-estrangement*, and therefore as the real *appropriation of the human essence* by and for man.'⁸⁶ This communism is, therefore, 'the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e. human) being—a return become conscious.'⁸⁷ It 'is the *genuine*

76. *Loc. cit.*

77. *Loc. cit.*

78. *EPM*, p. 98.

79. *EPM*, pp. 98-99.

80. *EPM*, p. 99.

81. *Loc. cit.*

82. *EPM*, p. 100.

83. *Loc. cit.*

84. *EPM*, p. 101.

85. *EPM*, p. 102.

86. *Loc. cit.*

87. *Loc. cit.*

resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man—the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution.⁸⁸ We shall just see, however, that this, too, is not the final stage in communism.

There is a fourth form of communism, in which 'the positive transcendence of private property—i.e., the *sensuous* appropriation for and by man of the human essence and of human life, of objective man, of human *achievements*—is not to be conceived merely in the sense of *direct*, one-sided *gratification*—merely in the sense of *possessing*, of *having*. Man appropriates his total essence in a total manner, that is to say, as a whole man.'⁸⁹ The result is that man is in a position to see things as they are rather than as coloured by his greed, by freeing his 'seeing, hearing, smelling, testing, feeling, thinking, being aware, sensing, wanting, acting, loving of class-egoistic, or subjective factors and maintaining them 'in their *objective* orientation or in their *orientation to the object*.'⁹⁰ We in class society are prone unduly to viewing an object with the spectacles of our class prejudices and egoistic interests in order to appropriate it, with the result that we miss the real, human joy which it holds out to us. 'Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only *ours* when we have it—exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc.,—in short, when it is *used* by us.'⁹¹ Marx adds a little later, 'In place of *all* these physical and mental senses there has therefore come the sheer estrangement of *all* these senses—the sense of *having*.'⁹² This being the case, the transcendence of private property is 'the complete *emancipation* of all human senses and attributes;...because these senses and attributes have become...*human*.'⁹³ For example: 'The eye has become a *human* eye, just as its *object* has become a social, *human* object.'⁹⁴ The result is: 'Need or enjoyment have (sic) consequently lost their *egoistical* nature, and nature has lost its mere *utility* by use becoming *human* use.'⁹⁵ Of course, 'the *human* eye gratifies itself in a way different from the crude, non-

88. *Loc. cit.*

89. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

90. *Loc. cit.*

91. *Loc. cit.*

92. *Loc. cit.*

93. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

94. *Loc. cit.*

95. *Loc. cit.*

human eye; the human *ear* different from the crude ear, etc.⁹⁶ Music has no sense for the unmusical ear, is no object for it, 'because my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers...', because the sense of an object for me goes only so far as *my* senses go (has only sense for a sense corresponding to that object).⁹⁷ On this ground, Marx maintains that 'the *senses* of the social man are *other* senses than those of the non-social man.'⁹⁸ In fact, 'not only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses—the practical senses (will, love, etc.)—in a word, *human* sense—the humaneness of the senses—comes to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of *humanized* nature. The *forming* of the five senses is a labour of the world down to the present.'⁹⁹ Again, 'The *sense* caught up in crude practical need has only a *restricted* sense. For the starving man, it is not the human form of food that exists, but only its abstract being as food.... The care-burdened man in need has no sense for the finest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the mercantile value but not the beauty and the unique nature of the mineral: he has no mineralogical sense.'¹⁰⁰

In this, fourth form of communism it is that man will be in the best position to produce things 'in accordance with the laws of beauty' in contradistinction to an animal which 'forms things in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belong.'¹⁰¹ Then alone will it be possible to assert, 'All history is the preparation for "man" to become the object of *sensuous* consciousness.'¹⁰²

Lastly, there is also a fifth form of communism, in which man comes to realize that his birth is through himself, rather than through an alien being, a being above nature and man, like God; for history 'is nothing but the begetting of man through human labour, nothing but the coming-to-be of nature for man.'¹⁰³ And this realization is 'man's positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the annulment of religion',¹⁰⁴ as we have seen in the preceding chapter.

The highest ideal of the early Marx was positive humanism, neither atheism nor communism. Atheism is just 'the annulment of God' and hence 'is

96. *Loc. cit.*

97. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

98. *Loc. cit.*

99. *Loc. cit.*

100. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 113-114.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

the advent of theoretic humanism'; while communism is just 'the annulment of private property' and hence 'the advent of practical humanism'. In other words, 'atheism is humanism mediated with itself through the annulment of religion, whilst communism is humanism mediated with itself through the annulment of private property'. And 'Only through the annulment of this mediation...does positively self-deriving humanism, *positive humanism*, come into being.'¹⁰⁵ In a kindred vein, Marx once describes communism as 'the position as the negation of the negation' and a 'phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and recovery. Communism is the necessary pattern and dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development—the structure of human society.'¹⁰⁶

The foregoing account serves to yield the following trilogies:

Theoretic humanism	Practical humanism	Positive humanism
Crude communism	Communism	Transcommunism
Atheism	Atheism	Transatheism
Negation (of private property)	Negation of the negation	Transdialectic

Here, it appears, Marx visualizes a stage beyond negation of the negation, a transdialectical state, so to speak. A little later, too, Marx characterizes communism as negation of private property but 'as being not yet the *true*, self-originating position but rather a position originating from private property.'¹⁰⁷ It appears, therefore, that the transcendence of communism is a stage beyond all stages of evolution, discontinuous with the evolutionary stages. All evolutionary stages are positions of the new supervenient upon the negation of the old, whereas transcommunism is a post-evolutionary stage, so to speak, unadulterated by negativity, as it were. The transcommunist goal seems to be the prime mover, the unmoved mover, of human history, the dynamic factor that directs the whole historical process, keeping itself out of the process. It is the realm of freedom as opposed to the realm of necessity,¹⁰⁸ is 'the great transformation to which the century is moving—the reconciliation of mankind with nature and with itself.'¹⁰⁹

105. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

107. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.

108. *Capital*, III, p. 820.

109. *EPM*, p. 183.

Earlier, in a letter to Ruge, written in September 1843, Marx adjudged 'the actually existing communism, as Cabet, Dezamy, Weitling, etc., teach it' to be 'a dogmatic abstraction', being 'itself only a separate phenomenon of the humanistic principle, infected by its opposite, private advantage. Dissolution of private property, therefore, is in no way identical with communism.'¹¹⁰ Marx adds a little later that 'communism itself is only a special, one-sided realization of the socialistic principle. And the entire socialistic principle, in turn, is only one side of the reality of human nature.'¹¹¹ It boils down to this, that communism, as here defined, is just a part of socialism, which, in its turn, is just a part of humanism.

We have seen much earlier that communism, transcommunism, or the transdialectical phase of future society,—in short, the ideal dispensation envisaged by Marx,—knows no class struggle and is such that, in it, social evolutions cease to be political revolutions. We have tried to examine what Marxism has to offer by way of the solution of the riddle of the perennial dialectical law of evolution through conflict of the opposites operating at that stage of human society without such a conflict. Here we are tempted to invoke a peculiar parallel from the Sāṅkhya-Yoga school of Indian philosophy, in order to give a new dimension to the issue.

Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system which knows no such distinction, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system divides motion (kriyā) into movement (praspaṇḍa) and (qualitative) change (pariṇāma).¹¹² It is held that the three dimensions of primordial potentiality (prakṛti), which are called 'guṇa-s', are changingly eternal (pariṇāmi-nitya).¹¹³ That is to say, eternal as they are, not even for a moment do they exist without changing some way or other.¹¹⁴ That they keep changing during Actuality, during the world-process, is agreed on all hands; for it is they which constitute the Actuality, the world-process. But, that they keep changing during Potentiality, during dissolution of the world-process, is seldom appreciated. In fact, everything but consciousness force

110. David McLellan, *Marx Before Marxism* (rev. ed., Pelican Books, 1972), p. 165.

111. *Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.

112. *Tukṭi-Dīpikā*, Rama Shankar Tripathi, ed. (Varanasi: Balakrishna Tripathi, B 2/242, Bhadaini, 1970), 16, p. 102.

113. *Vyāsa-Bhāṣya*, with *Yoga-Sūtra* etc., Damodaralal Goswami, ed., Ka-hi Sanskrit Series, No. 110 (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1935), 4.33, p. 451.

114. *Ibid.*, 3.13, pp. 296-297; *Sāṅkhya-Tattvaśaṁudī*, with *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, Ganga Nath Jha, ed., Poona Oriental Series, No. 10 (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1934), 16, p. 34.

(citi-śakti) is held to be changing.¹¹⁵ During Actuality, the guṇa-s change heterogeneously (vaiṣamyena/visadrśa-pariṇāma); during Potentiality, homogeneously (sāmyena/sadrśa-pariṇāma).¹¹⁶ For, during Actuality, they combine, while, during Potentiality, they keep separate¹¹². The first kind of change is extrinsic, while the second, intrinsic.

Although there is no such distinction in the Marxian, and even in the Hegelian, dialectic, we feel tempted to suggest that, at the level of communism/transcommunism, when there are no class antagonisms, class contradictions, there will still be progress/evolution of a homogeneous nature. History will not come to a standstill, it will only cease explosions and convulsions, i.e. changes of a heterogeneous character marring orderly progress. Everything is in action but seeks equilibrium.

The afore-noted concept of homogeneous change can be fruitfully compared with the concept of unmodified change (a-vikṛta-pariṇāma) mooted in certain schools of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta. It may also be termed a-historical or trans-historical change.

The Marxian thesis of explosive change in class society and orderly change in classless society is comparable to Sri Aurobindo's thesis of 'transition from an evolution in the Ignorance to an always progressive evolution in the Knowledge,'¹¹⁸ Sri Aurobindo elaborates the idea thus: 'Instead of a constant inter-mixed and confused struggle between the growth of Consciousness and the power of inconscience, between the forces of light and the forces of darkness, the evolution would become a graded progression from lesser light to greater light.'¹¹⁹

Here a ticklish question arises. Dialectic, in the wider sense of the term (including, as it were, even the transdialectical moment), is a beginningless and endless process. Then how can we expect the dialectical denouement, which has not occurred in the beginningless past? If it has not been possible

115. *Sāṅkhya-Tattvakaumudī* 5, p. 16

116. *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā-Jayamaṅgalā*, Satkarisarma Vangiya, ed., Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 296 (2nd ed., Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1970) 16, pp. 82-83; *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā-Vidvattosinī* (Hardwar : Swami Atma Swarup, 1930), 16, p. 218; *Sāṅkhya-Pravacana-Sūtra*, Ashubodha Vidyabhushana and Nityabodha Vidyabhushana, eds. (3rd ed., Calcutta: Vacaspatya Press, 1936), 6.42.

117. *Sāṅkhya-Tattvakaumudī* 16, p. 34.

118. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, Vol. II (2nd ed., Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, December 1944), p. 821.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 824.

for dialectic to establish communism/transcommunism so far, what is there to warrant the assertion that it will be possible for it to do so in near future? Frankly speaking, there can be no reply to it, it is an *Avyākṛta*, to use a Buddhist expression. Even Bradley had to keep mum when asked the why of appearance: 'Why there are appearances, and why appearances of such various kinds, are questions not to be answered.'¹²⁰

It appears that Marxian dialectic is a two-level dialectic—dialectic of abnormality, prehistory, necessity on the one and dialectic of normality, history, freedom on the other. Sri Aurobindo says, 'Man is an abnormal who has not found his own normality, he is not perfect in his own nature like the plant and the animal.'¹²¹ Man is, we would suggest, normally an abnormal being groping for normality. History is a record of such groping. He lost the primitive paradise of normality as and when he fell out of the animal kingdom by tasting the fruit of the tree of knowledge. He has ever since been groping for a new paradise of normality exempt from the possibility of a fall. This may be treated as a trans-historical/post-historical or trans-dialectical/post-dialectical denouement.

It must be borne in mind, however, that, howsoever great a meliorist and a soteriologist he is claimed to be, Marx was by no means a utopian perfectionist. As Engels would have it, neither knowledge nor history can hope ever 'to reach a complete conclusion in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity ; a perfect society, a perfect "state", are things which can only exist in imagination.'¹²² The course of development of human society from the lower to the higher is endless.¹²³ Dialectic will not allow anything to be 'final, absolute, sacred.'¹²⁴ All system is perishable.¹²⁵ For Marx, as for Hegel and Herder, history starts from a state of undifferentiated, *primaeval* unity of man with himself and with nature (thesis), passes through an age of differentiation and conflict of man with himself and with nature (antithesis), and recovery of the unity tempered with the differentiation, on a higher plane, and consequent harmony of man with himself and with nature

120. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (London: Oxford: New York : Oxford University Press Paperback, 1969), p. 453.

121. Sri Aurobindo, *The Human Cycle* (with his two other works), Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education Collection, Vol. IX (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1962), p. 315.

122. *LF*, p. 328.

123. *Loc. cit.*

124. *Loc. cit.*

125. *Ibid.*, p. 330.

(synthesis). At this last stage, history is not literally abolished, it takes on a new texture and proceeds in such a harmonious and orderly fashion that it ceases to be felt at all. This is, therefore, a level of dialectic qualitatively different from the earlier one.

Our foregoing description of the yonder side of history serves to occasion an interesting question. Is the state of affairs so described going to be a permanent state of affairs without fear of a fall? If history has to be any guide, we find revolutions followed by counter-revolutions, generally speaking. The three hundred years of the struggle for liberty, for example, ended in Nazism. As a matter of fact, humanity has all along been prone to sink to a lower level not long after some incarnation of God, prophet, or messiah perished in his endeavour to elevate it. What is the peculiar germ responsible for the fall of man the moment it gets an opportunity therefor in defiance of all efforts to kill it and elevate him? It seems to have developed immunity from all human contrivance to get rid of it. Does it not indicate that decadence is the law, with progress only as an exception, even as gravitation of the earth is the law, with impulses upward, forward, and backward as only exceptions? If such is the case, what is there to vouch for the permanence of communism/transcommunism?

It appears that, Marx's view to the contrary notwithstanding, human nature has so far succeeded in defying all change worth the name. There has hitherto been no significant progress in human nature but in human culture; no progress in human essence but in human institutions. Hence there is no essential progress; there is only institutional/cultural progress. This being the case, communism/transcommunism cannot be held to be exempt from the possibility of downfall. Society will continue to abound in good, bad, and indifferent men and women, whatever be its form. And, if bad men and women take it into their head to create chaos, they will certainly pose a problem.

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1. ABBREVIATIONS

- AD* Frederick (or Friedrich) Engels: *Anti-Dühring*, the full title being *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, tr. from the 3rd German ed. of 1894 (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954).
- AD* (1969) Ditto (5th printing, Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1969).
- CCHPR* Karl Marx, 'A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right",' Introduction, appended to *CHPR*.
- CCHPR* (OR) Ditto, *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels On Religion* (2nd impression, Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.).
- CSPE* Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, tr. from the German by S. W. Ryazonskaya, ed. Maurice Dobb (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1970). This edition is not used in Chapter V, however.
- CCPE* Ditto, N. I. Stoke, tr. (Calcutta : Bharati Library, n.d.). This edition is used in Chapter V only.
- CGP* Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Program', also known as 'Marginal Notes to the Program of the German Workers' Party' (1875), *S. W.* II, pp. 13-45.
- CHPR* Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, tr. from the German by Annette Jolin and Joseph O' Malley, ed. by Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge : The University Press, 1970), with *CCHPR*,

- CM** Marx and Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, the full title being *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848), S.W. I, pp. 21-61.
- CSF** Marx, *The Class Struggle in France* (1850), S. W. I, pp. 109-220.
- CWF** Marx, *The Civil War in France* (1871), S. W. I, pp. 429-494.
- DN** Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954).
- EBLB** Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1851-52), S. W. I, pp. 221-311.
- EPM** Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (2nd impression, Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961).
- GI** Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, S. Ryazanskaya, tr. (2nd printing, Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1968).
- HF** Marx, *The Holy Family*, also known as *Critique of Critical Critique*, B. Dixon, tr. (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956).
- HG** Engels, *The Housing Question* (1872-73, rev. ed. 1887), S. W. I, pp. 495-574.
- LF** Engels, *Ludwing Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886), S. W. II, pp. 324-364.
- MEC** V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, A. Fineberg, tr. (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947).
- MEM** *Marx-Engels-Marxism*, a selection of Lenin's writings (4th English ed., Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951).
- OFPPS** Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884), S. W. II, pp. 155-296.
- OJQ** Marx, 'On the Jewish Question' (1843), *Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 3, 1843-44 (Moscow Progress Publishers, 1975), 146-174.

- PC Engels, *Principles of Communism* (1847), S. W. I (1969), pp. 81-97.
- PN Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks, Collected Works*, Vol. 38 (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961).
- PP Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, n. d.).
- SC Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence* (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, n. d.).
- SUS Engels, *Socialism : Utopian and Scientific* (1892), S. W., 11, pp. 86-142.
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- S. W. II (1969) Ditto, Vol. II (Ditto, 1969).
- S. W. III (1970) Ditto, Vol. III (Ditto, 1970).
- WLC Marx, *Wage Labour and Capital* (1874), S. W. I, pp. 66-97.

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